الأزهر بين الدين و السياسة

أحمد مرسي

ينبغي على المؤسسة الإسلامية الأعلى مقاماً في مصر أن تحارب من أجل استقلاليتها، لكن عليها البقاء خارج السياسة.

أحدثت الانتفاضة المصرية فراغاً سياسياً أدّى مؤخراً إلى أن يلعب الأزهر دوراً سياسياً ليس جزءاً من عقيدته الأساسية. وقد استمرّ في لعب هذا الدور، لاسيما بسبب الشعبية التي يتمتّع بها الأزهر ناهيك عن غياب الثقة بسياسات الرئيس محمد مرسي. على أن هذا لايمنح الأزهر مسوّغاً للتدخّل في السياسة وعقد الصفقات السياسية. ومع أن الإمام الأكبر أحمد الطيب قدّم، بالتعاون مع مجموعة كبيرة من السياسيين والمفكّرين المصريين، العديد من المبادرات لوضع حد للنزاع الأهلي في مصر، فإنه لم يتحقّق الكثير منها و أثرت على مصداقية المؤسسة عموماً. وقد كان الأزهر موضع ثناء للقائه مع مجموعات متنوّعة من المصريين والتشاور معهم - من قادة أقباط، وإسلاميين، وشخصيات معارضة، ونساء وشباب - وهو ما لم تنجح الحكومة في القيام به. بيد أن هذا المديح ينطوي على موافقة غير مبرّرة على تأدية الأزهر دور سياسي من الأجدى به تجنّبه. يجب ألا يُستخدَم الاحترام والشعبية اللذان تحظى بهما الأزهر ذريعةً للتدخّل في الشؤون السياسية.

عقب سقوط حسني مبارك، اتّخذت قيادة الأزهر خطوات للتحرّر من قبضة النظام وتحكُّمه بها لفترة طويلة. في حزيران/يونيو 2011، أصدر الإمام الأكبر - إلى جانب مجموعة من المفكّرين والسياسيين - ورقة من إحدى عشرة نقطة حول مستقبل مصر عُرِفَت بـ"وثيقة الأزهر". وحدّدت أولويات ما بعد الثورة: التركيز على الحرية والمساواة للجميع، ومكافحة الفساد وتحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية، وإصلاح التعليم، والحد من البطالة، والالتزام بالمعاهدات الدولية. وضغطت الوثيقة أيضاً من أجل استقلال الأزهر عن سيطرة الدولة.

في كانون الثاني/يناير 2012، اصدر المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة بعجالة قانون ينصّ على تغيير طريقة اختيار الإمام الأكبر للأزهر، فبات يُنتخَب من هيئة مؤلّفة من كبار علماء الأزهر بدلاً من أن يعيّنه رئيس الجمهورية. وبهذا أعيد اعتماد طريقة الاختيار القديمة التي كانت هذه المؤسسة الدينية تطبّقها قبل القرار الذي اتّخذه جمال عبد الناصر بتعيين الإمام الأكبر من قبل الرئيس. لكن القانون أثار جدلاً بسبب عدم تضمّنه بنوداً عملية وملموسة تمنح الأزهر استقلالية سياسية ومالية. وتجاوزت آلية إقراره الإشراف التشريعي، إذ تمّت قبل أيام من انعقاد الجلسة الأولى لمجلس الشعب المُنتخَب. وكان هناك أيضاً غياب كامل للشفافية بشأن الدوافع التي جعلت المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة يصدر المرسوم؛ ولانزال نجهل حتى الآن ما هي طبيعة الشروط والمعطيات التي أثيرت في المباحثات بين المجلس والإمام الأكبر توصّلاً إلى إقرار القانون المذكور.

على أي حال، فإن روح القانون الصادر عن المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلّحة حول الأزهر تجسّدت في الدستور المصري الذي أُقِرّ مؤخراً. فقد ورد في المادة الرابعة أن الأزهر هو "هيئة إسلامية مستقلة جامعة يختص دون غيره بالقيام على شؤونه كافة". كما تنص المادّة على أن "يؤخذ رأي هيئة كبار العلماء بالأزهر الشريف في الشؤون المتعلقة بالشريعة الإسلامية"، إلا أنها لاتذكر ما هي المؤسسات الحكومية التي يجدر بها التشاور مع الهيئة أو متى يجب القيام بذلك. وإذ تعي الدولة تماماً الدور المهم والنافذ للأزهر، فقد أحتفظت بحق توفير "الاعتمادات المالية الضرورية ليحقّق الأزهر أغراضه"، مما يُبقي الباب مفتوحاً أمام التأثير المستمر من النظام على الأزهر. وعلى غرار العديد من المواد الأخرى في الدستور، تُختتَم المادّة الرابعة بعبارة ملتبسة: "وكل ذلك على النحو الذي ينظّمه القانون"، بما يُتيح إعادة تحديد نص مبهم أصلاً وتقييده بموجب مراسيم تصدر لاحقاً عن الهيئة التشريعية.

الدور الاستشاري الذي يُحدّده الدستور الجديد للأزهر قد يجعله عرضة للتأثيرات من الدولة ومن مجموعة من التفسيرات الإسلامية للشريعة. بيد أن هذه التغييرات تبدو رمزية إزاء تنامي شعبية الدعاة السلفيين الذين قد يتسلّلون في نهاية المطاف إلى قيادة الأزهر ويغيروا من سياساته و ارائه المعتدلة التي عُرِف بها على مر العصور. وربما يقف هذا الأمر كأحد الأسباب التي دفعت المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة إلى إصدار قانون الأزهر الذي يهدف إلى "تمكين" الهيئة، لتشكّل توزاناً في مقابل صعود السلفيين.

بعيدا عن هذه التغييرات البنيوية والقانونية، يواجه الأزهر تحدّيات داخلية نتيجة التفسيرات والتأويلات المختلفة، وتدفق الفتاوى المتطرّفة الصادرة عن دعاة مستقلين غير مدرَّبين وكذلك عن أساتذة في هيئته التعليمية. فعلى سبيل المثال، أثارت الفتوى الصادرة أخيراً عن الأستاذ في جامعة الأزهر، محمود شعبان، إلى اغتيال قادة المعارضة في "جبهة الإنقاذ الوطني" لغطاً شديداً. ويحل شعبان ودعاة آخرون يومياً ضيوفاً على محطات فضائية ذات اتجّاهات سلفية مثل "الناس" و"الرحمة". ففي خضم الصراع الدائر حالياً في مصر، تشكل هذه التصريحات المثيرة للجدل ضربة قوية لقدرة الأزهر على تمثيل الرأي الإسلامي الوسطي، كما تثير علامات استفهام حول منهجيته التعليمية ومناهجه الدراسيه، وقدرته على الوقوف في وجه مثل هذه الآراء الغريبة والشاذّة التي تصدر عن هيئته التعليمية (ومن خارجها).

ما الذي يحمله المستقبل لمؤسسة الأزهر؟ مع أنه لايزال من المبكر تقييم تأثير التغييرات الأخيرة، فيمكننا افتراض بعض السيناريوهات. السيناريو الأول هو أن يُدير الأزهر بحذر وتروٍّ الوضع الجديد الذي بلغه في العامين الماضيين، أي شبه الاستقلالية المذكورة في الدستور. في هذه الحالة، يواصل الأزهر ممارسة "القوة الناعمة" التي تتمحور حول سلطة الإمام الأكبر وشخصه، وستستمر هذه الاستراتيجية على الأرجح ببقاء أحمد الطيب، البالغ من العمر 67 عاماً، في السلطة. بموجب الدستور الجديد، يستطيع الإمام الأكبر البقاء في السلطة حتى بلوغه الثمانين من العمر، ويملك حصانة تحول دون إمكانية إقالته من منصبه.

السيناريو الثاني هو استمرار النظام أو الإسلاميين، أو حتى الاثنين معاً، في استيعاب الأزهر تحت مظلّتهم. أدرك القادة المصريون المعاصرون القوة و الشرعية الكبيرة التي يكتسبوها إذا استمالوا الأزهر إلى جانبهم،  ومع أن الرئيس خسر "امتياز" تعيين الإمام الأكبر، لايزال يحتفظ مع الحكومة بالسيطرة على شؤون الأزهر المالية عن طريق وزارة الأوقاف. لكن، في الوقت نفسه، بإمكان العلماء المحافظين داخل الهيئة ممارسة تأثير كبير أيضاً على الطبيعة المعتدلة التي عُرِف بها الأزهر وقيادته تقليدياً. الأسبوع الماضي، انتخبت هيئة كبار العلماء المفتي الجديد شوقي إبراهيم عبد الكريم علام خلفاً لعلي جمعة المنتهي ولايته. وبحسب مصادر مختلفة، ليست لدى المفتي الجديد أي أيديولوجية سياسية أو انتماء سياسي واضح. وقبل الانتخاب، كانت هناك مخاوف من اختيار عبد الرحمن البر، عضو مكتب الإرشاد في جماعة الإخوان المسلمين الذي يُلقَّب "بمفتي" الجماعة. فاختياره كان ليشكّل خطوة أساسية نحو إحكام قبضة الإخوان على الأزهر، وهو ما تتخوّف منه قوى المعارضة والمسلمون الذين لاتعنيهم السياسة، فكلاهما لايريدان رؤية الإسلاميين يحتكرون الحكومة والأزهر.

السيناريو الثالث قد يكون الأصعب بالنسبة إلى الأزهر، ويتمثّل في خوض معركة لاستعادة الاستقلالية التي كان يتمتّع بها على المستويَين الإداري والمالي قبل عهد جمال عبد الناصر. الأمر الذي من شأنه أن يسمح للمؤسسة بالعودة إلى وظيفتها التعليمية الأساسية وعقيدتها الوسطية و التصدّي للتفسيرات المتطرّفة للدين الإسلامي. بيد أن الظروف الراهنة تحول دون تحقّيق ذلك. فيجب قطع شوط طويل لتغيير القوانين الحالية التي تعطّل استقلالية الأزهر، ولاسيما القانون 103 الصادر في العام 1961 الذي وضع الأزهر تحت سلطة وزارة الأوقاف، وما تلته من تشريعات تمنح الحكومة مزيداً من الإشراف عليه.

في ظل الأجواء السياسية الضبابية، حيث تعاني البلاد من ضعف نظام الحكم وترنح تحت وطأة الجدل و الخلاف حول مستقبل مصر، وجد الأزهر المجال متاحاً أمامه لاستخدام مصداقيته و احترامه في الشارع في لعب دور سياسي قد يكون مغرياً، إلا أنه يجب ألا يشكّل جزءاً من وظيفته الأساسية.

أحمد مرسي باحث مصري و طالب دكتوراه في كلية العلاقات الدولية في جامعة سانت أندروز، المملكة المتحدة.

* تُرجم هذا المقال من اللغة الإنجليزية.

Al-Azhar on the Tightrope

By: Ahmed Morsy

Egypt’s most prestigious Islamic institution should fight for its autonomy—but stay out of politics.

The Egyptian uprising facilitated a political vacuum that has recently empowered al-Azhar to play a political role that is not part of its core foundational doctrine. It has persisted in this role mainly because of the institution’s popularity coupled with mistrust in President Mohamed Morsi. This does not, however, warrant al-Azhar interfering in politics and brokering political deals. And though the Grand Sheikh Ahmed Muhammad el-Tayeb, in cooperation with a wide range of Egyptian politicians and intellectuals, has presented several initiatives to end the civil strife in Egypt, little has been accomplished besides a collective diminishing of the institution’s credibility. Al-Azhar has received praise for convening and consulting with diverse groups of Egyptians—from Coptic leaders, Islamists, opposition figures, women, and youth—in ways that the government failed to do, but this praise effectively places an unwarranted approval on al-Azhar playing a political role it should avoid. The institution’s respect and popularity should not be a pretext to meddle in political matters. 

Following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, al-Azhar’s leadership took steps to break free from longtime regime manipulation. In June 2011, Grand Sheikh el-Tayeb—alongside a group of intellectuals and politicians—issued an eleven-point paper on Egypt’s future, dubbed the “al-Azhar Document.” This blueprint sketched out post-revolutionary priorities: emphasizing freedom and equality for all, fighting corruption and achieving social justice, reforming education, reducing unemployment, and abiding by international treaties. The document also pressed for the independence of al-Azhar from state control. 

In January 2012, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) hastily issued a lawchanging the process by which al-Azhar’s grand sheikh is chosen—from a presidential appointment to an election by a council of senior al-Azhar scholars. This reinstated the old selection method that the religious institution had used prior to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to make the post a presidential appointment. The law stirred up controversy, however, due to a lack of concrete articles to enforce political and financial independence for al-Azhar. Its approval process—days before the first meeting of the elected Parliament—effectively bypassed legislative oversight. There was also a total lack of transparency regarding the motivation that drove the SCAF to issue this decree; it remains unknown even now what terms and exchanges the SCAF had with the grand sheikh before the passage of this law.

In any case, the spirit of the SCAF-approved law on al-Azhar was enshrined in the recentlyapproved Egyptian constitution. In Article 4, al-Azhar is described as “an encompassing independent Islamic institution with exclusive autonomy over its own affairs.” The article stipulates that the senior scholars’ council is to be consulted on issues pertaining to the application of Islamic law (sharia), but the language does not indicate when or which branches of government must do such consult. Mindful of the institution’s important and powerful role, the State also reserves the right to provide “sufficient funds for al-Azhar to achieve its goals,”—leaving the door open for continued State influence and even coercion. As with several other articles in the constitution, Article 4 concludes ambiguously: “All of the above is subject to regulations of the law.” This provision allows an already vague text to be redefined and restricted by subsequent decrees from the legislature. 

Al-Azhar’s new constitutional consultative role might make it vulnerable to influences from both the state and a range of Islamist understandings of Sharia. However, these changes seem nominal in the face of rising popularity of Salafi preachers, who could eventually infiltrate al-Azhar’s leadership and overpower the institution’s typically moderate views.  This might explain why the SCAF issued the al-Azhar law to “empower” al-Azhar–as a counterweight to the rising Salafis.

Beyond these core structural and legal changes, al-Azhar faces internal challenges from shifting interpretations and an influx of extreme religious opinions (fatwas) presented by independent untrained preachers as well its own faculty. The latest fatwa from al-Azhar faculty member Mahmoud Shaban, for example, called for the assassination of National Salvation Front (NSF) opposition leaders. Shabaan and other preachers are daily guests of Salafi-oriented satellite channels like Al-Nas and Al-Rahma. At a time of national struggle, such controversial declarations constitute a serious blow to the organization’s ability to represent the middle ground of Islamic opinion, as well as call into question its educational methodology, curriculum, and its ability to stand against such bizarre and atypical opinions from its faculty (and beyond). 

What does the future hold for al-Azhar? Though it is too early to assess the impact of the most recent changes, some scenarios can be presumed. One path for al-Azhar is to carefully manage the new status it has attained over the past two years: one of quasi-independence cited in the constitution. The institution would then continue the “soft power” of personality politics centered on the authority of the grand sheikh—a strategy which will probably last as long as the 67 year-old Ahmed el-Tayeb remains in authority. Per the new constitution, the elected Grand Sheikh can remain in power until 80 years of age, and is immune from dismissal.

Another scenario is continued co-option of al-Azhar by the ruling regime or Islamists—or even both. Modern Egyptian leaders have typically understood the legitimacy to be had by pulling al-Azhar to their side. And although the president lost his “prerogative” of appointing the sheikh, he and the government maintain control over the institution’s finances by way of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. At the same time, however, conservative scholars from within can also exert significant influence on the traditionally moderate nature of the institution and its leadership. Last week, the Senior Scholars’ Council elected Egypt’s new grand mufti, Shawqi Ibrahim Abdel-Karim Allam, to succeed the outgoing Ali Gomaa. According to different sources the new grand mufti has no clear political ideology and affiliation. There had been concerns that the new mufti might have been Abdel Rahman El-Bar—a member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau and dubbed its own “mufti.”  If El-Bar had been chosen this would have been a significant step toward tightening the Brotherhood’s grip over al-Azhar—a prominent fear among opposition forces and politically apathetic Muslims alike, both of whom do not want to see the Islamists monopolize government and al-Azhar.  

The third scenario might be the most difficult for al-Azhar to maneuver, is to fight for more independence at the administrative and financial levels it enjoyed before Nasser. Such autonomy would allow the institution to return to its core educational functions and moderate doctrine to stand against extremist interpretations of Islam. Current circumstances, however, prevent this. There is a long way to go to change existing laws that cripple the institution’s independence (specifically Law 103 of 1961, which placed al-Azhar under the Ministry of Religious Endowments) and subsequent legislation that accords the government further oversight. 

The muddled political environment, fraught with weak governance and contentious debates about the future, has left a space for al-Azhar to use its credibility in a political role that, tempting as it may be, should not be part of its mandate.      

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph. D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published at Carnegie's Sada Journal.

An Eager Iran & Hesitant Egypt: Relations Before & After the Arab Spring

By: Ahmed Morsy

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadineja (L) and Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi (R) (Source: Foreignpolicy.com)

In the wake of the Egyptian revolution, Iran has sought to capitalize on the country’s new Islamist government to forge closer ties between the two nations. Egypt has, however, hesitated to embrace Iran. Indeed, any future alliance between the two countries remains fraught with challenges. The explanation for this can be found in the historical relationship between the two countries, as well as in Egypt’s strategic alliance with the United States and other Arab states that staunchly oppose Iranian influence in the region.

A Historical Overview of Iranian-Egyptian Relations

Egyptian-Iranian relations have included periods of competition and cooperation, friendship and enmity. Prior to the Iranian revolution, the two countries enjoyed close relations influenced by the personal friendship between Egyptian president, Anwar al-Sadat, and Iranian shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. The two leaders shared common interests in building their nations, held a pro-Western bias during the Cold War, and were anxious about the rise of domestic Islamist movements.

After the overthrow of the Shah and ascendance of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Egyptian-Iranian relationship changed into one of distrust and bitterness.  The deterioration grew out of several factors, including Khomeini’s condemnation of the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty, the close relationship between Sadat and the United States, Egypt’s decision to host the ousted Iranian Shah in Cairo, and the Egyptian government’s refusal to hand the Shah over to the revolutionary regime in Tehran. After Sadat’s assassination, one of Tehran’s streets was named after his assassin, Khaled al-Islambouli. In response, Egypt cut all ties with the Iranian government.

Iranian support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas alienated the Egyptians further and was a factor in Egypt’s decision to support Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran in the 1980’s. Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric and presumed influence over the Gulf’s Shiite population pushed Egypt to create a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia to counterbalance Khomeini’s evolving regional aspirations.

After Khomeini’s death, the Iranian leadership began a new path toward reconciliation with neighboring Gulf States. Under the leadership of presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and later Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Iran focused on developing commercial and trade relations with its Arab neighbors and the region as a whole.

Iran’s new approach to the region also extended to Egypt, though the pace of engagement was slower and less successful as compared to the Gulf States. After an extended period of stagnation, relations finally moved forward following a phone call between Presidents Mubarak and Khatami in June 2000. A series of goodwill gesturesfollowed, including a decision from the Tehran City Council to entertain Khatami’s request to rename the street for Sadat’s assassin as “intifada.” The move was hailed by Egyptian parliamentarians, including the Muslim Brotherhood’s then-leader in Parliament and current Egyptian President, Dr. Mohamed Morsi. At the time, Morsi said“there was abundance of goodwill between the two countries before Tehran made this move, perhaps the path is now open to strengthen ties between them.”

Other developments followed. This included a meeting between Presidents Mubarak and Khatami at a UN technology summit in Geneva where they exchanged views dubbed “very important,” and an invitation for Mubarak toattend the D-8 economic summit in Tehran for developing nations.

After Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, the Iranian government continued efforts to normalize relations with Egypt. In 2007, Ahmadinejad said “We are determined to pursue normalization of relations with Egypt, and if the Egyptian government declares its readiness, before the working hour is over today, we are willing to open Iran’s embassy in Cairo.”

Despite these gestures of friendship, Mubarak remained unprepared to pursue better relations with Iran. The Egyptian President enjoyed strong relations with the Gulf monarchies, especially the Saudis, and had built a strategic alliance with Iran’s adversaries, the United States and Israel. For the Mubarak government, maintaining these connections was far more important than reestablishing diplomatic relations with Tehran.

Egypt’s Uprising: Any Prospects for Conciliation?

Shortly after the start of the Egyptian revolution, on February 4th, 2011, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made statements that compared the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt with Iran’s Islamic revolution. Khamenei further described the upheaval in the region as ‘liberating the Islamic movement’ and dealing a blow to the United States.

Khamenei’s comments were intended, in part, to win over the rising Islamist parties in these countries. Unsurprisingly, these statements spurred negative responses from Mubarak’s foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit. Aboul Gheit condemned Khamenei’s comments as “revealing feelings of hatred and hostility toward Egypt.” The Brotherhood also rejected the Supreme Leader’s statement, insisting it was the ‘Egyptian people’s revolution.”

After Mubarak’s fall, Tehran believed a new relationship with Cairo would soon follow.  On April 4th, 2011, Egypt’s new foreign minister, Nabil Al Araby, met with the head of the Iranian Interest Section in Cairo. During the meeting, Al Araby “affirmed that Egypt is opening a new page with all countries including Iran, and the Egyptian and Iranian peoples deserve having relations that reflect their history and culture, provided they are based on mutual respect for the state sovereignty and the non-interference whatsoever in the internal affairs.”

Two months later, an Egyptian delegation of intellectuals, journalists, and businessmen visited Tehran. Dubbed the “people’s diplomacy delegation,” Ahmadinejad and several key government officials received the delegation. Together, they discussed opportunities for restoring ties between the two countries, with Ahmadinejad expressing his willingness to support and share Iran’s industrial and technological expertise with Egypt. Ahmadinejad also took the opportunity to speak of ‘enemies’ opposing renewed relations between the two countries. Two months later, a delegation of Iranian parliamentarians arrived in Cairo.

Iran welcomed the July 2012 inauguration of Mohamed Morsi as Egypt’s first Islamist President. Ahmadinejadspoke with Morsi to wish him success and invited the new President to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Tehran in late August.

Several days before the Morsi-Ahmadinejad call, Iran’s Fars News Agency, published a fabricated interview with the newly elected Egyptian president claiming he was ‘interested in closer ties with Iran’ and ‘sought revisions to the Camp David Accords with Israel.’ The Egyptian government denied these reports and asserted that “legal action will be taken against the Iranian Fars news agency, which fabricated an interview.” The FARS news report received another blow after Morsi made public comments pledging to be ‘president for all Egyptians,’ and ‘to honor all international treaties.’

The Iranian Rationale

Iran’s response to the Egyptian revolution has several potential motivations. First, Tehran may hope to capitalize on post-Arab Spring realities and the rise of Islamists to advance its narrative of an ‘Islamic Awakening’ and to bolster anti-Western sentiments among regional governments.

Second, Iran’s anxious attempts to renew relations with Egypt may also be attributed in part to escalating pressure and international sanctions against Tehran.  The U.S. and the EU have tightened sanctions on Iran, with particular focus on financial sectors and the oil industry. By re-establishing relations with Egypt, Iran may hope to win safe access to the Suez Canal and bypass sanctions by opening a new market for its goods.

Finally, in light of the worsening conflict inside Syria, Iran may be pursuing an alliance with Egypt to counteract the potential loss of its Syrian ally. The Syrian crisis has left Iran standing alone while other regional players side with the Syrian opposition.

The Egyptian Position

Morsi’s decision to attend the NAM summit in Tehran was met with concern from the Western media, who saw it as a victory for Iran. Egypt has responded with an outreach strategy to reassure its regional and international partners that Morsi’s stopover in Tehran – after a state visit to China – does not signal a shift in Egyptian foreign policy and that any possible engagement with Iran will not come at their expense. This strategy likely influenced the U.S. State Department’s decision to downplay Morsi’s Iran visit, stating that normalization of relations between Egypt and Iran is “a national decision (for Egypt) to make.”

Morsi’s speech at the summit criticizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime is further evidence that the President has decided to side with Egypt’s Arab and Western partners over and above the Iranians, who were noticeably displeased with his comments.

Conclusion

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise, it is naïve to assume that Islamists in Egypt will automatically ally with those in Iran. Egypt’s Islamist movement is predominantly Sunni, as are its Arab allies in the Gulf who share an interest in countering Shiite and Iranian influence in the region. Domestically, the Salafi party, al-Nour, is leading the fight against the spread of Shiism in Egypt. Its members have gone so far as to warn against opening Egypt to Iranian tourism, for fears this would increase Shiite influence and challenge Egypt’s Sunni character.

Egypt’s regional and foreign policy will not change swiftly to embrace Iran. Morsi has continually promised to respect Egypt’s international treaties and maintain its close relationship with other Arab states, specifically Saudi Arabia where Morsi made his first official state visit as president. In addition, Egypt will seek to preserve its strategic relationship with several Western countries and the United States. Most importantly, Egypt’s relationship with the West and the GCC is vital, at least in the short-term, to help Egypt overcome its growing economic crisis.

*Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and PhD Candidate at School of International Relations, University of St Andrews. This piece was originally published in a special edition by Muftah.org and Insideiran.org. A later version appeared at Egypt Independent

SCAF Declaration Turns "Soft Coup" Into Hard Reality

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: AP

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has issued an addendum to the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that human rights activists fear will institutionalizemilitary dictatorship in Egypt. The SCAF’s decision to issue amendments to several articles on the eve of the announcement of the official presidential results was strategically timed to avoid accusations of anti-Brotherhood bias after a likely victory by the Freedom and Justice Party’s candidate Mohamed Morsi.

The announcement has renewed concerns that the SCAF is seeking to prolong its political role beyond June 30, the previously announced deadline for its transfer of power to an elected civilian president. Although the SCAF has renewed its pledge to hand over power by the end of the month, the dissolution of Parliament and subsequent transfer of legislative authorities to the military (confirmed in yesterday’s constitutional declaration) means that the SCAF will continue to wield significant political power until a new Parliament is formed – which the latest SCAF declaration suggests will not take place until a month after the new constitution has been written.

The new addendum referenced the role of the newly elected President as stated in Article 56 of the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration. According to the original article, the President possesses supreme rights that no other institution can challenge, especially in the absence of the Parliament. These rights include the issuing of laws and vetoing of Parliament-proposed legislation, appointing the cabinet and state bureaucracies, negotiating treaties and representing Egypt at home and abroad. In the new constitutional supplement, however, the SCAF has abridged presidential powers and further entrenched the military establishment as a de facto fourth branch of government. The SCAF now wields legislative power and the prerogative to oversee all military-related matters until a new Constitution is written and a Parliament is elected a month later. The generals, moreover, by giving themselves the right under Articles 60-B and 60-B1 to form and intervene in the work of the Constituent Assembly, have thus successfully engineered a legal basis for perpetuating their political and economic privileges in the new system and more importantly institutionalizing the “soft coup” they staged in February 2011.

In retrospect, the generals would not have been able to seize this opportunity and issue the new articles if the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) had not ruled the parliamentary law unconstitutional last week, a decision that required the dissolution of the recently elected People’s Assembly. In addition, the military and its security services were further empowered by last week’s Ministry of Justice Decree giving military police and intelligence officers sweeping powers  to arrest civilians, a move that effectively replaces the recently expired Emergency Law with martial law.

It is apparent that the generals issued this new constitutional declaration to maintain their interests and preemptively curb the powers of the President to prepare for their worst case scenario: a win by Mohamed Morsi. No matter how hard the generals feign impartiality, it is clear Shafik would be much more amenable to the perpetuation of military influence over Egypt’s political future, in comparison with Morsi and the Brotherhood, who represent a serious threat to the SCAF’s institutional and economic interests.

On the whole, the constitutional addendum enshrines the power of the military as a separate branch of government that is not only protected from civilian oversight, but possesses the power to check the president’s political agenda. By reserving for itself the power to issue laws and oversee the state budget, as well as veto presidential declarations of war, the SCAF has signaled that it is only willing to partially surrender its interim executive authorities. Instead of returning to the barracks by June 30 as promised to the Egyptian people, the generals have effectively broken their commitment and extended their rule until at least a new constitution is written, a process that could take months. The new powers that the SCAF has unilaterally claimed for itself present a serious and frustrating setback to Egypt’s so-called “democratic” transition. As human rights activist Hossam Baghat remarked, “Egypt just witnessed the smoothest military coup.  We’d be outraged if we weren’t so exhausted." 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

On the Eve of Pivotal Supreme Court Rulings, All Scenarios Point to Turmoil

By: Ahmed Morsy

Photo Credit: AP

Egypt’s judiciary has emerged as a surprising new power-broker on the political scene, pushing the limits of its jurisdiction to rule on a number of polarizing and partisan disputes that have the potential to derail Egypt’s democratic transition just as it reaches the threshold of a transfer of power to civilian leadership. The judges - already struggling for their independence in the face of alleged interference from the executive branch -- have come under intense scrutiny after a controversial decision to suspendthe Constituent Assembly, then the trial against of NGO employees, and most recently the sentencing of former President Mubarak to a 25-year (life) prison term and acquitting his sons and six senior security officials. However, the most significant rulings that will impact Egypt’s democratic transition are still to come on June 14.  Just two days before the scheduled presidential runoff between Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s last prime minister, and Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, the Supreme Constitutional Court will review the constitutionality of both the Political Disenfranchisement and Parliament laws. The decisions of the court will have a tremendous effect on Egypt’s future and could prolong the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

The SCAF as well as political factions have committed terrible mistakes that threaten to reverse the whole transitional process back to square one. The upcoming Supreme Court rulings are politically charged and raise difficult questions about the next steps. For instance, in the case of barring Ahmed Shafiq, will the entire presidential election be re-run from scratch, or will the race be limited to the 12 candidates who competed in the first round? On June 13, Hatem Bagato, the secretary general of the Presidential Election Commission (PEC), suggested that the latter would be the appropriate course of action, but the SCC has yet to decide. If the Parliament is deemed unconstitutional, how would Islamists react to losing control of the legislative branch? Parliamentary Speaker Saad al-Katatny has stated that Parliament will abide by the SCC’s ruling, yet he insists that Parliament cannot be dissolved until the next elected president takes office – if and when that happens. How would these rulings affect the already struggling Constituent Assembly tasked with writing the new Constitution? And finally how would the Egyptians react to the new changes, bearing in mind that it might lead to the extension of SCAF’s rule beyond the June 30 deadline?

Several scenarios have been argued by various constitutional and legal experts regarding the constitutionality of the discussed laws. Below I tried to offer a concise summary of these various possibilities based on some legal opinions.     

Constitutional Court Scenarios for the Disenfranchisement Law:

• The disenfranchisement law is found to be unconstitutional. Ahmed Shafiq will be allowed to participate in the presidential elections runoff on June 16-17 (Most Likely)
   
• The SCC declines to review the constitutionality of the law, finding that the Supreme Presidential Elections Commission (SPEC) did not have jurisdiction to refer it in the first place. The disenfranchisement law is allowed to stand.
   
• The law is upheld and Ahmed Shafiq is banned from the runoff; the election is suspended and restarted (least likely)

Constitutional Court Scenarios for the Parliament Law:

• Law is ruled unconstitutional and Parliament is dissolved (likely option)
   
• Removing party-based MPs from the individual candidates' seats they won, and re-running elections for those seats.  (another likely option that would minimize conflict with the Islamist majority)
   
• Law is ruled unconstitutional but Parliament is allowed to serve out the remainder of its term before new elections are called.
   
•  Law is upheld (least likely, in light of strong precedents for dissolving Parliament on constitutional grounds in 1984, 1987, and 1990)

The Four possible scenarios after the Constitutional Court rulings on June 14:

Scenario 1 

High possibility - Islamists weakened, and Parliament dissolved):

• Disenfranchisement Law is ruled unconstitutional. The elections continue and Ahmed Shafiq participates in the runoff on June 16-17.
   
• The Parliament Law found to be unconstitutional. Parliament will be dissolved and the electoral law changed, leading to a new round of parliamentary elections.

Scenario 2

(Least likely):

• Disenfranchisement Law is upheld (SCC declines to review the law because the electoral commission had no authority to refer it to the SCC in the first place). The Presidential election is halted; Ahmed Shafiq barred, and the election is restarted, probably including only the 12 candidates who participated in the first round.
   
•  Parliament Law is upheld and the legislature is not dissolved.

Scenario 3

(Compromise – Power sharing arrangement between SCAF & MB):

• Disenfranchisement Law ruled unconstitutional. The elections continue and Ahmed Shafiq participates in the runoff on June 16-17.
   
•  Parliament Law is upheld and the legislature is not dissolved.

Scenario 4

(Worst Case; Leads to the continuation of SCAF and wide array of havoc):

•  Disenfranchisement Law is ruled constitutional. The Presidential elections is halted; Ahmed Shafiq barred, and the elections are restarted.
   
•  Parliament Law is ruled unconstitutional. Parliament to be dissolved and the electoral law changed.

 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.