The Grand Sheikh and the President

By: Ahmed Morsy

From Muhammad Ali to Mohamed Morsi, modern Egyptian leaders have understood that any attempt to control the state without the endorsement, if not blatant co-option, of key institutions such as al-Azhar is an ill-fated pursuit. The headache for President Morsi is that these institutions are trying to assert their independence and are presenting a range of direct and indirect challenges to his authority and, more broadly, to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).  One cannot truly grasp the crisis of legitimacy and strategy facing President Morsi without an understanding of the frictional relationships between the state, al-Azhar, and the Muslim Brotherhood before and since the 25 January 2011 uprising.

State Co-Option of al-Azhar

Al-Azhar is recognized as a fundamental and respected source of religious guidance for the Muslim umma (community).[1] Because of its influence and respected status, al-Azhar has been subjected to numerous attempts of co-option and control since the time of Muhammad Ali. He reorganized land ownership and nationalized thousands of acres of waqf (religious endowment) land, thereby limiting the financial resources on which al-Azhar depended. Since Ali, Egypt’s governments have worked hard to control al-Azhar through successive reorganization laws in 1896, 1911, and 1930. The combined effect of these laws was the centralization of al-Azhar’s administration, which effectively facilitated future manipulation of the grand sheikh’s role and the institution by the Egyptian state.

The greatest infiltration of al-Azhar, however, occurred under Gamal Abdel Nasser, who “understood the importance of gaining control over al-Azhar in order to ensure domestic control and promote his foreign-policy objectives.”[2] Under the infamous Law 103 of 1961, Nasser placed the entire institution under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Endowments and, consequently, ensured that all financial resources would be directed through non-Azhar state officials. The law also made the appointment of the grand sheikh the prerogative of the Egyptian president.

Nasser’s domination of al-Azhar set the path for its future manipulation by both Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. While Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all relied on the use of al-Azhar and religious symbolism as part of their legitimization tactics to achieve political gains, each manipulated Islamic references in a slightly different way. Nonetheless, their strategy of controlling al-Azhar rested on three main considerations: they recognized that an institution as established and respected as al-Azhar could provide legitimacy and support for their policies; they realized that they needed a strong counterbalance to the growing religious influence of both internal forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis and external forces like Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism; and they understood that garnering al-Azhar’s power could ensure regional stability among Arab and Muslim nations due to the institution’s influence and legitimacy.

By controlling al-Azhar, the government tainted the neutrality and integrity of the institution.  In “supporting” the corrupt and ineffective state, al-Azhar has at times been considered an accessory to the state’s violations and, accordingly, a failure in upholding the true tenets of Islam.  Illustratively, Sheikh Abd al-Hamid Kishk, a popular Islamist preacher, criticized al-Azhar’s giving-in to the government, arguing that “ever since the reform [of 1961], the leadership of al-Azhar has ceased to render any service to Islam.”[3]

Al-Azhar and the Brotherhood: It’s Complicated

Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna was skeptical at the frail role of al-Azhar in opposing the British occupation of Egypt, the corrupt monarchy, and encroaching Western values. Unlike Muhammad Abduh’s call for Islamic revivalism and critical thinking, al-Banna advocated for a stricter version of Islam, as he believed that all Egypt’s “illnesses” (such as poverty, corruption, and occupation) were a result of adopting Western values and failing to adhere to Islam.  From here came the famous, ambiguous slogan, “Islam is the Solution.”  By the time of Nasser, Brotherhood skepticism toward al-Azhar had turned into antagonism.

The Brotherhood faced heavy setbacks under Nasser. After the “failed assassination attempt” on the president in 1954,[4] the group was banned and thousands of its members were tortured or killed or fled the country. During this period, al-Azhar stood with Nasser against the Brotherhood, and its senior scholars issued several statements that portrayed the Brotherhood’s ideology as a threat to social cohesion and as anti-Islamic and apostate.[5] Many Brotherhood members have never forgotten or forgiven al-Azhar for this betrayal or the way that al-Azhar became a tool of subsequent regimes against the Brotherhood and extremist groups.

A more recent case that shows how this bitterness is still at play is the 2006 Brotherhood-affiliated students’ “military parade” at al-Azhar University. Grand Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, university president at the time, criticized the Brotherhood, accused it of infiltrating al-Azhar via the parade, and vowed that the university would never be an open field for Islamists to spread their religious and political ideologies.[6] Over 100 students were arrested, and Mubarak’s regime used the arrests as a pretext to detain senior Brotherhood leaders, later sentencing them in a military trial. 

Al-Azhar and the Brotherhood beyond 25 January 2011

In the last two years, al-Azhar has managed to re-emerge as an important player in the political and social vacuum created by the 2011 uprising. It took progressive steps by bringing together Coptic leaders, Islamists, opposition figures, women, and youth and sponsoring several consensus initiatives[7] in a way that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) failed to do and Morsi has yet to accomplish. Understanding the importance of al-Azhar against the rising Islamists, the SCAF hastily issued a decree to amend Law 103 of 1961, establishing a quasi-independent position for al-Azhar.[8] Its main component was reinstalling the senior scholars council that would elect al-Azhar’s grand sheikh and nominate Egypt’s mufti—a pre-Nasser selection process. The law stirred controversy,[9] especially since the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood regarded Grand Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb and Mufti Ali Gomaa as remnants of the Mubarak regime.[10] However, the Islamist-dominated parliament of 2011 decided not to challenge the law, and President Morsi later confirmed the composition of the council.[11]

Despite this display of accord, since Morsi’s election several incidents have characterized the friction between al-Azhar and the Brotherhood. The initial incident occurred when el-Tayeb walked out of Morsi’s inauguration at Cairo University after discovering that he would be seated at the back.[12] Despite the official explanation that blamed his seat assignment on “lack of organization,” it can be inferred as a snub against him, especially since Saad el-Katatni, a Brotherhood and FJP leader who held no official role in the government at the time, was seated in the front row among dignitaries.

In November 2012, Morsi issued a constitutional decree that sparked violent protests across the country. Al-Azhar challenged Morsi in a statement, saying that “the president of the republic must freeze the recent constitutional declaration and engage immediately in a dialogue that includes all political forces, without exception and without preconditions.”[13] Such a political statement, viewed within the context of al-Azhar’s successful track record of sponsoring inclusive dialogues, represented another blow to Morsi through criticism of his divisive policies.  

Another sticking point has been the new constitutional role of al-Azhar, chiefly Article 4, which enshrines the spirit of the SCAF-approved al-Azhar law.[14] The article stipulates that the senior scholars’ council is to be consulted on issues pertaining to the application of Shariah, but the language does not indicate when or which branches of government must carry out such consultations. Al-Azhar asserted its constitutional right by insisting that it review the contentious bill regarding Islamic bonds (sukuk). Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Complex said that “the draft [law] should have been referred to the Senior Scholars Authority for discussion and so it could give its legal opinion, in line with its duty.”[15] This move, supported by the Salafi al-Nour party, surprised the FJP and Morsi, who then acknowledged that al-Azhar did indeed have the right to review the law. Al-Azhar submitted nine amendments to the law, which were accepted unanimously by the Shura Council before Morsi signed it into law in May 2013.[16]  The case of the sukuk law set an important precedent for al-Azhar to review draft legislation in the future.

Recent public interest stories have also illustrated the rift between al-Azhar and the Brotherhood. Al-Azhar students affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have capitalized on the April 2013 food poisoning scandal on campus to call for the dismissal of the grand sheikh and the university president, who was indeed sacked. This case and the associated student protests have fueled conspiracy theories and brought concern of a “Brotherhoodization” of al-Azhar—controlling such prized positions as the grand sheikh and mufti—back to the forefront.[17] When a second round of food poisoning occurred just weeks later, the grand sheikh was in the United Arab Emirates receiving the Sheikh Zayed Book Award for Cultural Personality of the Year. El-Tayeb was recognized for his “leadership in moderation and tolerance…and lauded for encouraging a culture of tolerance, dialogue and protection of civil society.”[18] This particular praise for el-Tayeb, describing qualities that Morsi lacks and coming from Abu Dhabi at a time when the Emirati government led a crackdown against 94 members of al-Islah, an Islamist group suspected of having links to the Brotherhood, is a striking affront to Morsi and the Brotherhood back in Cairo.[19]

Conclusion

Beyond its tense relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Azhar faces internal challenges,[20] from an influx of extreme religious opinions (fatwas) presented by independent untrained preachers as well as its own faculty to a lack of institutional and educational reform and alleged instances of corruption. In recent discussions with senior aides to the grand sheikh, this author learned that al-Azhar is working with a consultancy firm to restructure its bureaucracy to improve the management of the institution and launch a satellite channel to present “moderate” Islamic views to counter extremist, Salafi interpretations promoted on channels like al-Nas and al-Rahma.[21] And in a huge step for al-Azhar’s bid for further independence, the prime minister recently delegated powers to the grand sheikh to issue and amend stipulations from the 1961 law regarding the internal administration of al-Azhar.[22] Though vaguely written, this decree represents a rare gesture from the government to return authority to the grand sheikh to govern al-Azhar’s internal affairs, authority that has been traditionally sidelined by the modern Egyptian state. It remains unclear what kind of discussions took place behind the scenes before this decree was issued, why Morsi and the Brotherhood would tacitly allow this to occur, and what changes the grand sheikh will pursue and be sanctioned to pursue in the near future.

With the Muslim Brotherhood in power and Islamist discourse crowding the public sphere, al-Azhar cannot help but to be an important player in Egyptian politics. A stark difference between the organizations, however, is their ambitions. While the Muslim Brotherhood seeks socioeconomic and political gains, as well as success at the ballot box, al-Azhar is concerned with ensuring its institutional independence and promoting its moderate interpretation of Islam. In the coming months, it will be important to follow the al-Azhar-Brotherhood dynamics, paying particular attention to public remarks by figureheads and possible reviews of legislation by al-Azhar. A large part of the contestation between the organizations lies in personality politics between el-Tayeb and al-Azhar’s senior scholars on the one hand, and Morsi and Brotherhood figures on the other. And because al-Azhar has already won the legitimacy game that the Brotherhood desperately seeks to champion itself, the historical contestation between both organizations will continue.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on Middle East Institute's Arab Transitions Blog.

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[1] As Nathan Brown observes, al-Azhar has historically had three key interests: to maintain institutional autonomy; to preserve its respected status through its role as key interpreter of Islam; and to encourage the propagation of Islam. Nathan Brown, “Post Revolutionary al-Azhar,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/al_azhar.pdf.

[2] Tamir Moustafa, “Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (February 2000).

[3] Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 183.

[4] Al-Ahram newspaper (Arabic), 27 October 1954, Accessed on 8 May 2013, http://digital.ahram.org.eg/youmy/EventBrowes2.aspx?addd=28573.

[5] Al-Ahram newspaper (Arabic), 17 November 1954, Accessed on 8 May 2013, http://digital.ahram.org.eg/youmy/EventBrowes2.aspx?addd=28594.

[6] Gamal Essam el-Din, “Unmasked Condemnation,” Ahram Weekly, 21-27 December 2006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/825/fr2.htm.

[7] For example, check the June 2011 al-Azhar document from the Egypt State Information Service, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=56424. Zeinab el-Gundy, “Al-Azhar Unveils 10-point Initiative to End Egypt's Political Crisis,” Ahramonline, 31 January 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/63759.aspx and Ahmed Morsy, “An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?,” Sada Journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 July 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/07/13/independent-voice-for-egypt-s-al-azhar/eiat.

[8] SCAF Decree no. 13 of 2012 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 19 January 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=279738.

[9] Gihane Shahin, “Change at Al-Azhar?,” Ahram Weekly, 8-11 February 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1083/eg51.htm.

[10] Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb was appointed as al-Azhar’s grand sheikh in March 2010 and previously held the positions of grand mufti (2002-2003) and president of al-Azhar University (2003-2010). Sheikh Ali Gomaa served as grand mufti from September 2003 until March 2013. Nadia Abou el-Magd, “Mubarak Appoints a New Chief of Al Azhar,” The National, 21 March 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/mubarak-appoints-a-new-chief-of-al-azhar#page1.

[11]Presidential Decree no. 24 of 2012 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 17 July 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=281274.

[12]“Egypt's Grand Imam Walked out of Morsi's Inauguration,” Ahram Online, 30 June 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/46560.aspx.

[13] Noha el-Hennawy, “Al-Azhar Body Calls on Morsy to Freeze Constitutional Declaration,” Egypt Independent, 6 December 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/al-azhar-body-calls-morsy-freeze-constitutional-declaration.

[14] 2012 Egypt Constitution (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 25 December 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=281480; Nariman Youssef, “Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated,” Egypt Independent, 2 December 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated.

[15] “Al-Azhar Asserts Role, Clashes with the Brotherhood,” Egypt Independent, 29 March 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/al-azhar-asserts-role-clashes-brotherhood?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter.

[16] “Egypt's President Signs Islamic Bonds Bill into Law,” Ahramonline, 9 May 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/71025.aspx.

[17] Mai Shams el-Din, “Food Poisoning Scandal Further Deepens Political Split inside Al-Azhar,” Egypt Independent, 6 April 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/food-poisoning-scandal-further-deepens-political-split-inside-al-azhar.

[18] Mohammed Eissa, “Azhar Grand Imam el-Tayyeb Wins Cultural Personality Award,” Ahramonline, 30 April 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/18/0/70444/Books/Azhar-Grand-Imam-ElTayyeb-wins-Cultural-Personalit.aspx.

[19] Ayesha al-Khoori, “UAE Sedition Trial: Final Addresses for the 94 Accused as Court Sets Date for Verdict,” The National, 22 May 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/courts/uae-sedition-trial-final-addresses-for-the-94-accused-as-court-sets-date-for-verdict; “UAE to Try 94 Over Plot to Seize Power: Agency,”Reuters, 27 January 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-emirates-security-idUSBRE90Q0C120130127.

[20] Ahmed Morsy, “Al-Azhar on the Tightrope,” Sada Journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 February 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/21/al-azhar-on-tightrope/fk3t.

[21] Author interviews at al-Azhar, April 2013.

[22] Prime Minster Decree no. 501 of 2013 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 19 May 2013, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=282596.

Al-Azhar on the Tightrope

By: Ahmed Morsy

Egypt’s most prestigious Islamic institution should fight for its autonomy—but stay out of politics.

The Egyptian uprising facilitated a political vacuum that has recently empowered al-Azhar to play a political role that is not part of its core foundational doctrine. It has persisted in this role mainly because of the institution’s popularity coupled with mistrust in President Mohamed Morsi. This does not, however, warrant al-Azhar interfering in politics and brokering political deals. And though the Grand Sheikh Ahmed Muhammad el-Tayeb, in cooperation with a wide range of Egyptian politicians and intellectuals, has presented several initiatives to end the civil strife in Egypt, little has been accomplished besides a collective diminishing of the institution’s credibility. Al-Azhar has received praise for convening and consulting with diverse groups of Egyptians—from Coptic leaders, Islamists, opposition figures, women, and youth—in ways that the government failed to do, but this praise effectively places an unwarranted approval on al-Azhar playing a political role it should avoid. The institution’s respect and popularity should not be a pretext to meddle in political matters. 

Following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, al-Azhar’s leadership took steps to break free from longtime regime manipulation. In June 2011, Grand Sheikh el-Tayeb—alongside a group of intellectuals and politicians—issued an eleven-point paper on Egypt’s future, dubbed the “al-Azhar Document.” This blueprint sketched out post-revolutionary priorities: emphasizing freedom and equality for all, fighting corruption and achieving social justice, reforming education, reducing unemployment, and abiding by international treaties. The document also pressed for the independence of al-Azhar from state control. 

In January 2012, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) hastily issued a lawchanging the process by which al-Azhar’s grand sheikh is chosen—from a presidential appointment to an election by a council of senior al-Azhar scholars. This reinstated the old selection method that the religious institution had used prior to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to make the post a presidential appointment. The law stirred up controversy, however, due to a lack of concrete articles to enforce political and financial independence for al-Azhar. Its approval process—days before the first meeting of the elected Parliament—effectively bypassed legislative oversight. There was also a total lack of transparency regarding the motivation that drove the SCAF to issue this decree; it remains unknown even now what terms and exchanges the SCAF had with the grand sheikh before the passage of this law.

In any case, the spirit of the SCAF-approved law on al-Azhar was enshrined in the recentlyapproved Egyptian constitution. In Article 4, al-Azhar is described as “an encompassing independent Islamic institution with exclusive autonomy over its own affairs.” The article stipulates that the senior scholars’ council is to be consulted on issues pertaining to the application of Islamic law (sharia), but the language does not indicate when or which branches of government must do such consult. Mindful of the institution’s important and powerful role, the State also reserves the right to provide “sufficient funds for al-Azhar to achieve its goals,”—leaving the door open for continued State influence and even coercion. As with several other articles in the constitution, Article 4 concludes ambiguously: “All of the above is subject to regulations of the law.” This provision allows an already vague text to be redefined and restricted by subsequent decrees from the legislature. 

Al-Azhar’s new constitutional consultative role might make it vulnerable to influences from both the state and a range of Islamist understandings of Sharia. However, these changes seem nominal in the face of rising popularity of Salafi preachers, who could eventually infiltrate al-Azhar’s leadership and overpower the institution’s typically moderate views.  This might explain why the SCAF issued the al-Azhar law to “empower” al-Azhar–as a counterweight to the rising Salafis.

Beyond these core structural and legal changes, al-Azhar faces internal challenges from shifting interpretations and an influx of extreme religious opinions (fatwas) presented by independent untrained preachers as well its own faculty. The latest fatwa from al-Azhar faculty member Mahmoud Shaban, for example, called for the assassination of National Salvation Front (NSF) opposition leaders. Shabaan and other preachers are daily guests of Salafi-oriented satellite channels like Al-Nas and Al-Rahma. At a time of national struggle, such controversial declarations constitute a serious blow to the organization’s ability to represent the middle ground of Islamic opinion, as well as call into question its educational methodology, curriculum, and its ability to stand against such bizarre and atypical opinions from its faculty (and beyond). 

What does the future hold for al-Azhar? Though it is too early to assess the impact of the most recent changes, some scenarios can be presumed. One path for al-Azhar is to carefully manage the new status it has attained over the past two years: one of quasi-independence cited in the constitution. The institution would then continue the “soft power” of personality politics centered on the authority of the grand sheikh—a strategy which will probably last as long as the 67 year-old Ahmed el-Tayeb remains in authority. Per the new constitution, the elected Grand Sheikh can remain in power until 80 years of age, and is immune from dismissal.

Another scenario is continued co-option of al-Azhar by the ruling regime or Islamists—or even both. Modern Egyptian leaders have typically understood the legitimacy to be had by pulling al-Azhar to their side. And although the president lost his “prerogative” of appointing the sheikh, he and the government maintain control over the institution’s finances by way of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. At the same time, however, conservative scholars from within can also exert significant influence on the traditionally moderate nature of the institution and its leadership. Last week, the Senior Scholars’ Council elected Egypt’s new grand mufti, Shawqi Ibrahim Abdel-Karim Allam, to succeed the outgoing Ali Gomaa. According to different sources the new grand mufti has no clear political ideology and affiliation. There had been concerns that the new mufti might have been Abdel Rahman El-Bar—a member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau and dubbed its own “mufti.”  If El-Bar had been chosen this would have been a significant step toward tightening the Brotherhood’s grip over al-Azhar—a prominent fear among opposition forces and politically apathetic Muslims alike, both of whom do not want to see the Islamists monopolize government and al-Azhar.  

The third scenario might be the most difficult for al-Azhar to maneuver, is to fight for more independence at the administrative and financial levels it enjoyed before Nasser. Such autonomy would allow the institution to return to its core educational functions and moderate doctrine to stand against extremist interpretations of Islam. Current circumstances, however, prevent this. There is a long way to go to change existing laws that cripple the institution’s independence (specifically Law 103 of 1961, which placed al-Azhar under the Ministry of Religious Endowments) and subsequent legislation that accords the government further oversight. 

The muddled political environment, fraught with weak governance and contentious debates about the future, has left a space for al-Azhar to use its credibility in a political role that, tempting as it may be, should not be part of its mandate.      

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph. D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published at Carnegie's Sada Journal.

SCAF Declaration Turns "Soft Coup" Into Hard Reality

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: AP

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has issued an addendum to the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that human rights activists fear will institutionalizemilitary dictatorship in Egypt. The SCAF’s decision to issue amendments to several articles on the eve of the announcement of the official presidential results was strategically timed to avoid accusations of anti-Brotherhood bias after a likely victory by the Freedom and Justice Party’s candidate Mohamed Morsi.

The announcement has renewed concerns that the SCAF is seeking to prolong its political role beyond June 30, the previously announced deadline for its transfer of power to an elected civilian president. Although the SCAF has renewed its pledge to hand over power by the end of the month, the dissolution of Parliament and subsequent transfer of legislative authorities to the military (confirmed in yesterday’s constitutional declaration) means that the SCAF will continue to wield significant political power until a new Parliament is formed – which the latest SCAF declaration suggests will not take place until a month after the new constitution has been written.

The new addendum referenced the role of the newly elected President as stated in Article 56 of the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration. According to the original article, the President possesses supreme rights that no other institution can challenge, especially in the absence of the Parliament. These rights include the issuing of laws and vetoing of Parliament-proposed legislation, appointing the cabinet and state bureaucracies, negotiating treaties and representing Egypt at home and abroad. In the new constitutional supplement, however, the SCAF has abridged presidential powers and further entrenched the military establishment as a de facto fourth branch of government. The SCAF now wields legislative power and the prerogative to oversee all military-related matters until a new Constitution is written and a Parliament is elected a month later. The generals, moreover, by giving themselves the right under Articles 60-B and 60-B1 to form and intervene in the work of the Constituent Assembly, have thus successfully engineered a legal basis for perpetuating their political and economic privileges in the new system and more importantly institutionalizing the “soft coup” they staged in February 2011.

In retrospect, the generals would not have been able to seize this opportunity and issue the new articles if the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) had not ruled the parliamentary law unconstitutional last week, a decision that required the dissolution of the recently elected People’s Assembly. In addition, the military and its security services were further empowered by last week’s Ministry of Justice Decree giving military police and intelligence officers sweeping powers  to arrest civilians, a move that effectively replaces the recently expired Emergency Law with martial law.

It is apparent that the generals issued this new constitutional declaration to maintain their interests and preemptively curb the powers of the President to prepare for their worst case scenario: a win by Mohamed Morsi. No matter how hard the generals feign impartiality, it is clear Shafik would be much more amenable to the perpetuation of military influence over Egypt’s political future, in comparison with Morsi and the Brotherhood, who represent a serious threat to the SCAF’s institutional and economic interests.

On the whole, the constitutional addendum enshrines the power of the military as a separate branch of government that is not only protected from civilian oversight, but possesses the power to check the president’s political agenda. By reserving for itself the power to issue laws and oversee the state budget, as well as veto presidential declarations of war, the SCAF has signaled that it is only willing to partially surrender its interim executive authorities. Instead of returning to the barracks by June 30 as promised to the Egyptian people, the generals have effectively broken their commitment and extended their rule until at least a new constitution is written, a process that could take months. The new powers that the SCAF has unilaterally claimed for itself present a serious and frustrating setback to Egypt’s so-called “democratic” transition. As human rights activist Hossam Baghat remarked, “Egypt just witnessed the smoothest military coup.  We’d be outraged if we weren’t so exhausted." 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

On the Eve of Pivotal Supreme Court Rulings, All Scenarios Point to Turmoil

By: Ahmed Morsy

Photo Credit: AP

Egypt’s judiciary has emerged as a surprising new power-broker on the political scene, pushing the limits of its jurisdiction to rule on a number of polarizing and partisan disputes that have the potential to derail Egypt’s democratic transition just as it reaches the threshold of a transfer of power to civilian leadership. The judges - already struggling for their independence in the face of alleged interference from the executive branch -- have come under intense scrutiny after a controversial decision to suspendthe Constituent Assembly, then the trial against of NGO employees, and most recently the sentencing of former President Mubarak to a 25-year (life) prison term and acquitting his sons and six senior security officials. However, the most significant rulings that will impact Egypt’s democratic transition are still to come on June 14.  Just two days before the scheduled presidential runoff between Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s last prime minister, and Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, the Supreme Constitutional Court will review the constitutionality of both the Political Disenfranchisement and Parliament laws. The decisions of the court will have a tremendous effect on Egypt’s future and could prolong the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

The SCAF as well as political factions have committed terrible mistakes that threaten to reverse the whole transitional process back to square one. The upcoming Supreme Court rulings are politically charged and raise difficult questions about the next steps. For instance, in the case of barring Ahmed Shafiq, will the entire presidential election be re-run from scratch, or will the race be limited to the 12 candidates who competed in the first round? On June 13, Hatem Bagato, the secretary general of the Presidential Election Commission (PEC), suggested that the latter would be the appropriate course of action, but the SCC has yet to decide. If the Parliament is deemed unconstitutional, how would Islamists react to losing control of the legislative branch? Parliamentary Speaker Saad al-Katatny has stated that Parliament will abide by the SCC’s ruling, yet he insists that Parliament cannot be dissolved until the next elected president takes office – if and when that happens. How would these rulings affect the already struggling Constituent Assembly tasked with writing the new Constitution? And finally how would the Egyptians react to the new changes, bearing in mind that it might lead to the extension of SCAF’s rule beyond the June 30 deadline?

Several scenarios have been argued by various constitutional and legal experts regarding the constitutionality of the discussed laws. Below I tried to offer a concise summary of these various possibilities based on some legal opinions.     

Constitutional Court Scenarios for the Disenfranchisement Law:

• The disenfranchisement law is found to be unconstitutional. Ahmed Shafiq will be allowed to participate in the presidential elections runoff on June 16-17 (Most Likely)
   
• The SCC declines to review the constitutionality of the law, finding that the Supreme Presidential Elections Commission (SPEC) did not have jurisdiction to refer it in the first place. The disenfranchisement law is allowed to stand.
   
• The law is upheld and Ahmed Shafiq is banned from the runoff; the election is suspended and restarted (least likely)

Constitutional Court Scenarios for the Parliament Law:

• Law is ruled unconstitutional and Parliament is dissolved (likely option)
   
• Removing party-based MPs from the individual candidates' seats they won, and re-running elections for those seats.  (another likely option that would minimize conflict with the Islamist majority)
   
• Law is ruled unconstitutional but Parliament is allowed to serve out the remainder of its term before new elections are called.
   
•  Law is upheld (least likely, in light of strong precedents for dissolving Parliament on constitutional grounds in 1984, 1987, and 1990)

The Four possible scenarios after the Constitutional Court rulings on June 14:

Scenario 1 

High possibility - Islamists weakened, and Parliament dissolved):

• Disenfranchisement Law is ruled unconstitutional. The elections continue and Ahmed Shafiq participates in the runoff on June 16-17.
   
• The Parliament Law found to be unconstitutional. Parliament will be dissolved and the electoral law changed, leading to a new round of parliamentary elections.

Scenario 2

(Least likely):

• Disenfranchisement Law is upheld (SCC declines to review the law because the electoral commission had no authority to refer it to the SCC in the first place). The Presidential election is halted; Ahmed Shafiq barred, and the election is restarted, probably including only the 12 candidates who participated in the first round.
   
•  Parliament Law is upheld and the legislature is not dissolved.

Scenario 3

(Compromise – Power sharing arrangement between SCAF & MB):

• Disenfranchisement Law ruled unconstitutional. The elections continue and Ahmed Shafiq participates in the runoff on June 16-17.
   
•  Parliament Law is upheld and the legislature is not dissolved.

Scenario 4

(Worst Case; Leads to the continuation of SCAF and wide array of havoc):

•  Disenfranchisement Law is ruled constitutional. The Presidential elections is halted; Ahmed Shafiq barred, and the elections are restarted.
   
•  Parliament Law is ruled unconstitutional. Parliament to be dissolved and the electoral law changed.

 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Egypt's Transition in Danger of Regression

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: AP 

The word “transition” implies both an origin and a destination, yet Egypt’s transitional period is still circling around a dead-end.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has proven incompetent in leading the interim period, except in matters affecting the military. A bigger problem is that none of the other civil political forces in Egypt has yet managed to fill the power vacuum left by Mubarak. Meanwhile, a wave of legal turmoil is shaking up an already volatile political scene. The past weeks have witnessed several controversial decisions and court rulings on a wide range of issues from suspending the constituent assembly to banning 10 presidential candidates and approving a ‘Disenfranchisement Law’ That bars former Mubarak officials from public office.

In the midst of these recent legal developments, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Solidarity (MoISS) issued a contentious decision – on April 23 - denying registration requests for eight American civil society organizations. The Egyptian government claims that the “activities of these NGOs violate Egypt’s sovereignty.” Among these groups are the human rights and election monitoring Carter Center, the development group Coptic Orphans, and the youth-based conflict resolution organization Seeds of Peace. Despite claims made by the Egyptian government, these organizations assert they did not receive any official notices or charges to date. Most of these NGOs, including the ones put on trial last February, have been operating in Egypt for years and their activities were widely known and tracked by the Egyptian authorities. Among these well-established and legitimate organizations is the Carter Center, which was invited last year to “witness” Egypt’s Parliamentary elections. The Egyptian government’s decision to deny the application of an NGO that has been invited by the same government just a few months ago to observe the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections is both inconsistent and irrational.

This unfortunate decision is reminiscent of the NGOs crackdown last December, which resulted in civil society groups being charged with operating and receiving money illegally in a politically motivated trial that has now been postponed until June 5. The MoISS decision issued one month ahead of the upcoming Presidential election is another blow to democracy, and signals to the international community that Egypt’s interim leaders are no more committed to transparency and human rights than their authoritarian predecessor.

On the same day that the eight American NGOs were denied registration, the Supreme Presidential Elections Committee (SPEC) issued the regulations for local as well as foreign NGOs planning to witness the Presidential elections. Unlike the regulations for the Parliamentary elections, foreign groups will now need to be registered in Egypt and file the names of their individual observers, which cannot include any Egyptian nationals, to a special committee comprised of representatives from the SPEC as well as the ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and National Security. This special committee will evaluate the applications and make recommendations to the SPEC, which will issue final decisions on the registration of international observers. However, the electoral commission also reserves the right to invite any organization it deems appropriate, even if it is not registered in Egypt, to observe the elections. It’s important to highlight that the SPEC’s decisions are immune against appeals according to article 28 of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration. This article defines the SPEC’s decisions as final and authoritative, which is an infringement on the constitutional right to due process.

The next couple of weeks will witness crucial decisions that will impact the duration of the transitional period and shape the character of Egypt’s next elected government. Rumors are circulating that the Presidential elections may even be postponed over legal challenges to certain electoral procedures. The Parliament’s vote to reject the Cabinet’s management plan and withdraw confidence from the government represents a challenge in the relationship between the SCAF and Parliament. Furthermore, we should not forget the much anticipated ruling on May 6 that will determine the constitutionality of the Parliamentary Law. If the legality of the parliamentary elections is successfully challenged, it could bring about dramatic consequences and possibly necessitate the dissolution of Parliament. A political shake-up of this magnitude could further  aggravate Egypt’s ailing economy and delay the military’s transfer of power to civilians beyond the June 30 deadline -- leading to a chaotic state of affairs that will not be favorable for any Egyptian whether in power or on the streets. 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.