The Grand Sheikh and the President

By: Ahmed Morsy

From Muhammad Ali to Mohamed Morsi, modern Egyptian leaders have understood that any attempt to control the state without the endorsement, if not blatant co-option, of key institutions such as al-Azhar is an ill-fated pursuit. The headache for President Morsi is that these institutions are trying to assert their independence and are presenting a range of direct and indirect challenges to his authority and, more broadly, to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).  One cannot truly grasp the crisis of legitimacy and strategy facing President Morsi without an understanding of the frictional relationships between the state, al-Azhar, and the Muslim Brotherhood before and since the 25 January 2011 uprising.

State Co-Option of al-Azhar

Al-Azhar is recognized as a fundamental and respected source of religious guidance for the Muslim umma (community).[1] Because of its influence and respected status, al-Azhar has been subjected to numerous attempts of co-option and control since the time of Muhammad Ali. He reorganized land ownership and nationalized thousands of acres of waqf (religious endowment) land, thereby limiting the financial resources on which al-Azhar depended. Since Ali, Egypt’s governments have worked hard to control al-Azhar through successive reorganization laws in 1896, 1911, and 1930. The combined effect of these laws was the centralization of al-Azhar’s administration, which effectively facilitated future manipulation of the grand sheikh’s role and the institution by the Egyptian state.

The greatest infiltration of al-Azhar, however, occurred under Gamal Abdel Nasser, who “understood the importance of gaining control over al-Azhar in order to ensure domestic control and promote his foreign-policy objectives.”[2] Under the infamous Law 103 of 1961, Nasser placed the entire institution under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Endowments and, consequently, ensured that all financial resources would be directed through non-Azhar state officials. The law also made the appointment of the grand sheikh the prerogative of the Egyptian president.

Nasser’s domination of al-Azhar set the path for its future manipulation by both Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. While Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all relied on the use of al-Azhar and religious symbolism as part of their legitimization tactics to achieve political gains, each manipulated Islamic references in a slightly different way. Nonetheless, their strategy of controlling al-Azhar rested on three main considerations: they recognized that an institution as established and respected as al-Azhar could provide legitimacy and support for their policies; they realized that they needed a strong counterbalance to the growing religious influence of both internal forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis and external forces like Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism; and they understood that garnering al-Azhar’s power could ensure regional stability among Arab and Muslim nations due to the institution’s influence and legitimacy.

By controlling al-Azhar, the government tainted the neutrality and integrity of the institution.  In “supporting” the corrupt and ineffective state, al-Azhar has at times been considered an accessory to the state’s violations and, accordingly, a failure in upholding the true tenets of Islam.  Illustratively, Sheikh Abd al-Hamid Kishk, a popular Islamist preacher, criticized al-Azhar’s giving-in to the government, arguing that “ever since the reform [of 1961], the leadership of al-Azhar has ceased to render any service to Islam.”[3]

Al-Azhar and the Brotherhood: It’s Complicated

Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna was skeptical at the frail role of al-Azhar in opposing the British occupation of Egypt, the corrupt monarchy, and encroaching Western values. Unlike Muhammad Abduh’s call for Islamic revivalism and critical thinking, al-Banna advocated for a stricter version of Islam, as he believed that all Egypt’s “illnesses” (such as poverty, corruption, and occupation) were a result of adopting Western values and failing to adhere to Islam.  From here came the famous, ambiguous slogan, “Islam is the Solution.”  By the time of Nasser, Brotherhood skepticism toward al-Azhar had turned into antagonism.

The Brotherhood faced heavy setbacks under Nasser. After the “failed assassination attempt” on the president in 1954,[4] the group was banned and thousands of its members were tortured or killed or fled the country. During this period, al-Azhar stood with Nasser against the Brotherhood, and its senior scholars issued several statements that portrayed the Brotherhood’s ideology as a threat to social cohesion and as anti-Islamic and apostate.[5] Many Brotherhood members have never forgotten or forgiven al-Azhar for this betrayal or the way that al-Azhar became a tool of subsequent regimes against the Brotherhood and extremist groups.

A more recent case that shows how this bitterness is still at play is the 2006 Brotherhood-affiliated students’ “military parade” at al-Azhar University. Grand Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, university president at the time, criticized the Brotherhood, accused it of infiltrating al-Azhar via the parade, and vowed that the university would never be an open field for Islamists to spread their religious and political ideologies.[6] Over 100 students were arrested, and Mubarak’s regime used the arrests as a pretext to detain senior Brotherhood leaders, later sentencing them in a military trial. 

Al-Azhar and the Brotherhood beyond 25 January 2011

In the last two years, al-Azhar has managed to re-emerge as an important player in the political and social vacuum created by the 2011 uprising. It took progressive steps by bringing together Coptic leaders, Islamists, opposition figures, women, and youth and sponsoring several consensus initiatives[7] in a way that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) failed to do and Morsi has yet to accomplish. Understanding the importance of al-Azhar against the rising Islamists, the SCAF hastily issued a decree to amend Law 103 of 1961, establishing a quasi-independent position for al-Azhar.[8] Its main component was reinstalling the senior scholars council that would elect al-Azhar’s grand sheikh and nominate Egypt’s mufti—a pre-Nasser selection process. The law stirred controversy,[9] especially since the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood regarded Grand Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb and Mufti Ali Gomaa as remnants of the Mubarak regime.[10] However, the Islamist-dominated parliament of 2011 decided not to challenge the law, and President Morsi later confirmed the composition of the council.[11]

Despite this display of accord, since Morsi’s election several incidents have characterized the friction between al-Azhar and the Brotherhood. The initial incident occurred when el-Tayeb walked out of Morsi’s inauguration at Cairo University after discovering that he would be seated at the back.[12] Despite the official explanation that blamed his seat assignment on “lack of organization,” it can be inferred as a snub against him, especially since Saad el-Katatni, a Brotherhood and FJP leader who held no official role in the government at the time, was seated in the front row among dignitaries.

In November 2012, Morsi issued a constitutional decree that sparked violent protests across the country. Al-Azhar challenged Morsi in a statement, saying that “the president of the republic must freeze the recent constitutional declaration and engage immediately in a dialogue that includes all political forces, without exception and without preconditions.”[13] Such a political statement, viewed within the context of al-Azhar’s successful track record of sponsoring inclusive dialogues, represented another blow to Morsi through criticism of his divisive policies.  

Another sticking point has been the new constitutional role of al-Azhar, chiefly Article 4, which enshrines the spirit of the SCAF-approved al-Azhar law.[14] The article stipulates that the senior scholars’ council is to be consulted on issues pertaining to the application of Shariah, but the language does not indicate when or which branches of government must carry out such consultations. Al-Azhar asserted its constitutional right by insisting that it review the contentious bill regarding Islamic bonds (sukuk). Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Complex said that “the draft [law] should have been referred to the Senior Scholars Authority for discussion and so it could give its legal opinion, in line with its duty.”[15] This move, supported by the Salafi al-Nour party, surprised the FJP and Morsi, who then acknowledged that al-Azhar did indeed have the right to review the law. Al-Azhar submitted nine amendments to the law, which were accepted unanimously by the Shura Council before Morsi signed it into law in May 2013.[16]  The case of the sukuk law set an important precedent for al-Azhar to review draft legislation in the future.

Recent public interest stories have also illustrated the rift between al-Azhar and the Brotherhood. Al-Azhar students affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have capitalized on the April 2013 food poisoning scandal on campus to call for the dismissal of the grand sheikh and the university president, who was indeed sacked. This case and the associated student protests have fueled conspiracy theories and brought concern of a “Brotherhoodization” of al-Azhar—controlling such prized positions as the grand sheikh and mufti—back to the forefront.[17] When a second round of food poisoning occurred just weeks later, the grand sheikh was in the United Arab Emirates receiving the Sheikh Zayed Book Award for Cultural Personality of the Year. El-Tayeb was recognized for his “leadership in moderation and tolerance…and lauded for encouraging a culture of tolerance, dialogue and protection of civil society.”[18] This particular praise for el-Tayeb, describing qualities that Morsi lacks and coming from Abu Dhabi at a time when the Emirati government led a crackdown against 94 members of al-Islah, an Islamist group suspected of having links to the Brotherhood, is a striking affront to Morsi and the Brotherhood back in Cairo.[19]

Conclusion

Beyond its tense relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Azhar faces internal challenges,[20] from an influx of extreme religious opinions (fatwas) presented by independent untrained preachers as well as its own faculty to a lack of institutional and educational reform and alleged instances of corruption. In recent discussions with senior aides to the grand sheikh, this author learned that al-Azhar is working with a consultancy firm to restructure its bureaucracy to improve the management of the institution and launch a satellite channel to present “moderate” Islamic views to counter extremist, Salafi interpretations promoted on channels like al-Nas and al-Rahma.[21] And in a huge step for al-Azhar’s bid for further independence, the prime minister recently delegated powers to the grand sheikh to issue and amend stipulations from the 1961 law regarding the internal administration of al-Azhar.[22] Though vaguely written, this decree represents a rare gesture from the government to return authority to the grand sheikh to govern al-Azhar’s internal affairs, authority that has been traditionally sidelined by the modern Egyptian state. It remains unclear what kind of discussions took place behind the scenes before this decree was issued, why Morsi and the Brotherhood would tacitly allow this to occur, and what changes the grand sheikh will pursue and be sanctioned to pursue in the near future.

With the Muslim Brotherhood in power and Islamist discourse crowding the public sphere, al-Azhar cannot help but to be an important player in Egyptian politics. A stark difference between the organizations, however, is their ambitions. While the Muslim Brotherhood seeks socioeconomic and political gains, as well as success at the ballot box, al-Azhar is concerned with ensuring its institutional independence and promoting its moderate interpretation of Islam. In the coming months, it will be important to follow the al-Azhar-Brotherhood dynamics, paying particular attention to public remarks by figureheads and possible reviews of legislation by al-Azhar. A large part of the contestation between the organizations lies in personality politics between el-Tayeb and al-Azhar’s senior scholars on the one hand, and Morsi and Brotherhood figures on the other. And because al-Azhar has already won the legitimacy game that the Brotherhood desperately seeks to champion itself, the historical contestation between both organizations will continue.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on Middle East Institute's Arab Transitions Blog.

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[1] As Nathan Brown observes, al-Azhar has historically had three key interests: to maintain institutional autonomy; to preserve its respected status through its role as key interpreter of Islam; and to encourage the propagation of Islam. Nathan Brown, “Post Revolutionary al-Azhar,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/al_azhar.pdf.

[2] Tamir Moustafa, “Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (February 2000).

[3] Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 183.

[4] Al-Ahram newspaper (Arabic), 27 October 1954, Accessed on 8 May 2013, http://digital.ahram.org.eg/youmy/EventBrowes2.aspx?addd=28573.

[5] Al-Ahram newspaper (Arabic), 17 November 1954, Accessed on 8 May 2013, http://digital.ahram.org.eg/youmy/EventBrowes2.aspx?addd=28594.

[6] Gamal Essam el-Din, “Unmasked Condemnation,” Ahram Weekly, 21-27 December 2006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/825/fr2.htm.

[7] For example, check the June 2011 al-Azhar document from the Egypt State Information Service, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=56424. Zeinab el-Gundy, “Al-Azhar Unveils 10-point Initiative to End Egypt's Political Crisis,” Ahramonline, 31 January 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/63759.aspx and Ahmed Morsy, “An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?,” Sada Journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 July 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/07/13/independent-voice-for-egypt-s-al-azhar/eiat.

[8] SCAF Decree no. 13 of 2012 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 19 January 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=279738.

[9] Gihane Shahin, “Change at Al-Azhar?,” Ahram Weekly, 8-11 February 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1083/eg51.htm.

[10] Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb was appointed as al-Azhar’s grand sheikh in March 2010 and previously held the positions of grand mufti (2002-2003) and president of al-Azhar University (2003-2010). Sheikh Ali Gomaa served as grand mufti from September 2003 until March 2013. Nadia Abou el-Magd, “Mubarak Appoints a New Chief of Al Azhar,” The National, 21 March 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/mubarak-appoints-a-new-chief-of-al-azhar#page1.

[11]Presidential Decree no. 24 of 2012 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 17 July 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=281274.

[12]“Egypt's Grand Imam Walked out of Morsi's Inauguration,” Ahram Online, 30 June 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/46560.aspx.

[13] Noha el-Hennawy, “Al-Azhar Body Calls on Morsy to Freeze Constitutional Declaration,” Egypt Independent, 6 December 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/al-azhar-body-calls-morsy-freeze-constitutional-declaration.

[14] 2012 Egypt Constitution (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 25 December 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=281480; Nariman Youssef, “Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated,” Egypt Independent, 2 December 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated.

[15] “Al-Azhar Asserts Role, Clashes with the Brotherhood,” Egypt Independent, 29 March 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/al-azhar-asserts-role-clashes-brotherhood?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter.

[16] “Egypt's President Signs Islamic Bonds Bill into Law,” Ahramonline, 9 May 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/71025.aspx.

[17] Mai Shams el-Din, “Food Poisoning Scandal Further Deepens Political Split inside Al-Azhar,” Egypt Independent, 6 April 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/food-poisoning-scandal-further-deepens-political-split-inside-al-azhar.

[18] Mohammed Eissa, “Azhar Grand Imam el-Tayyeb Wins Cultural Personality Award,” Ahramonline, 30 April 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/18/0/70444/Books/Azhar-Grand-Imam-ElTayyeb-wins-Cultural-Personalit.aspx.

[19] Ayesha al-Khoori, “UAE Sedition Trial: Final Addresses for the 94 Accused as Court Sets Date for Verdict,” The National, 22 May 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/courts/uae-sedition-trial-final-addresses-for-the-94-accused-as-court-sets-date-for-verdict; “UAE to Try 94 Over Plot to Seize Power: Agency,”Reuters, 27 January 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-emirates-security-idUSBRE90Q0C120130127.

[20] Ahmed Morsy, “Al-Azhar on the Tightrope,” Sada Journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 February 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/21/al-azhar-on-tightrope/fk3t.

[21] Author interviews at al-Azhar, April 2013.

[22] Prime Minster Decree no. 501 of 2013 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 19 May 2013, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=282596.

Al-Azhar on the Tightrope

By: Ahmed Morsy

Egypt’s most prestigious Islamic institution should fight for its autonomy—but stay out of politics.

The Egyptian uprising facilitated a political vacuum that has recently empowered al-Azhar to play a political role that is not part of its core foundational doctrine. It has persisted in this role mainly because of the institution’s popularity coupled with mistrust in President Mohamed Morsi. This does not, however, warrant al-Azhar interfering in politics and brokering political deals. And though the Grand Sheikh Ahmed Muhammad el-Tayeb, in cooperation with a wide range of Egyptian politicians and intellectuals, has presented several initiatives to end the civil strife in Egypt, little has been accomplished besides a collective diminishing of the institution’s credibility. Al-Azhar has received praise for convening and consulting with diverse groups of Egyptians—from Coptic leaders, Islamists, opposition figures, women, and youth—in ways that the government failed to do, but this praise effectively places an unwarranted approval on al-Azhar playing a political role it should avoid. The institution’s respect and popularity should not be a pretext to meddle in political matters. 

Following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, al-Azhar’s leadership took steps to break free from longtime regime manipulation. In June 2011, Grand Sheikh el-Tayeb—alongside a group of intellectuals and politicians—issued an eleven-point paper on Egypt’s future, dubbed the “al-Azhar Document.” This blueprint sketched out post-revolutionary priorities: emphasizing freedom and equality for all, fighting corruption and achieving social justice, reforming education, reducing unemployment, and abiding by international treaties. The document also pressed for the independence of al-Azhar from state control. 

In January 2012, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) hastily issued a lawchanging the process by which al-Azhar’s grand sheikh is chosen—from a presidential appointment to an election by a council of senior al-Azhar scholars. This reinstated the old selection method that the religious institution had used prior to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to make the post a presidential appointment. The law stirred up controversy, however, due to a lack of concrete articles to enforce political and financial independence for al-Azhar. Its approval process—days before the first meeting of the elected Parliament—effectively bypassed legislative oversight. There was also a total lack of transparency regarding the motivation that drove the SCAF to issue this decree; it remains unknown even now what terms and exchanges the SCAF had with the grand sheikh before the passage of this law.

In any case, the spirit of the SCAF-approved law on al-Azhar was enshrined in the recentlyapproved Egyptian constitution. In Article 4, al-Azhar is described as “an encompassing independent Islamic institution with exclusive autonomy over its own affairs.” The article stipulates that the senior scholars’ council is to be consulted on issues pertaining to the application of Islamic law (sharia), but the language does not indicate when or which branches of government must do such consult. Mindful of the institution’s important and powerful role, the State also reserves the right to provide “sufficient funds for al-Azhar to achieve its goals,”—leaving the door open for continued State influence and even coercion. As with several other articles in the constitution, Article 4 concludes ambiguously: “All of the above is subject to regulations of the law.” This provision allows an already vague text to be redefined and restricted by subsequent decrees from the legislature. 

Al-Azhar’s new constitutional consultative role might make it vulnerable to influences from both the state and a range of Islamist understandings of Sharia. However, these changes seem nominal in the face of rising popularity of Salafi preachers, who could eventually infiltrate al-Azhar’s leadership and overpower the institution’s typically moderate views.  This might explain why the SCAF issued the al-Azhar law to “empower” al-Azhar–as a counterweight to the rising Salafis.

Beyond these core structural and legal changes, al-Azhar faces internal challenges from shifting interpretations and an influx of extreme religious opinions (fatwas) presented by independent untrained preachers as well its own faculty. The latest fatwa from al-Azhar faculty member Mahmoud Shaban, for example, called for the assassination of National Salvation Front (NSF) opposition leaders. Shabaan and other preachers are daily guests of Salafi-oriented satellite channels like Al-Nas and Al-Rahma. At a time of national struggle, such controversial declarations constitute a serious blow to the organization’s ability to represent the middle ground of Islamic opinion, as well as call into question its educational methodology, curriculum, and its ability to stand against such bizarre and atypical opinions from its faculty (and beyond). 

What does the future hold for al-Azhar? Though it is too early to assess the impact of the most recent changes, some scenarios can be presumed. One path for al-Azhar is to carefully manage the new status it has attained over the past two years: one of quasi-independence cited in the constitution. The institution would then continue the “soft power” of personality politics centered on the authority of the grand sheikh—a strategy which will probably last as long as the 67 year-old Ahmed el-Tayeb remains in authority. Per the new constitution, the elected Grand Sheikh can remain in power until 80 years of age, and is immune from dismissal.

Another scenario is continued co-option of al-Azhar by the ruling regime or Islamists—or even both. Modern Egyptian leaders have typically understood the legitimacy to be had by pulling al-Azhar to their side. And although the president lost his “prerogative” of appointing the sheikh, he and the government maintain control over the institution’s finances by way of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. At the same time, however, conservative scholars from within can also exert significant influence on the traditionally moderate nature of the institution and its leadership. Last week, the Senior Scholars’ Council elected Egypt’s new grand mufti, Shawqi Ibrahim Abdel-Karim Allam, to succeed the outgoing Ali Gomaa. According to different sources the new grand mufti has no clear political ideology and affiliation. There had been concerns that the new mufti might have been Abdel Rahman El-Bar—a member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau and dubbed its own “mufti.”  If El-Bar had been chosen this would have been a significant step toward tightening the Brotherhood’s grip over al-Azhar—a prominent fear among opposition forces and politically apathetic Muslims alike, both of whom do not want to see the Islamists monopolize government and al-Azhar.  

The third scenario might be the most difficult for al-Azhar to maneuver, is to fight for more independence at the administrative and financial levels it enjoyed before Nasser. Such autonomy would allow the institution to return to its core educational functions and moderate doctrine to stand against extremist interpretations of Islam. Current circumstances, however, prevent this. There is a long way to go to change existing laws that cripple the institution’s independence (specifically Law 103 of 1961, which placed al-Azhar under the Ministry of Religious Endowments) and subsequent legislation that accords the government further oversight. 

The muddled political environment, fraught with weak governance and contentious debates about the future, has left a space for al-Azhar to use its credibility in a political role that, tempting as it may be, should not be part of its mandate.      

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph. D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published at Carnegie's Sada Journal.

An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?

An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?

In a June 20th statement titled the “Al-Azhar Document”, read and covered by different media outlets, Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayeb, the country’s highest religious authority, outlined an eleven-point program  that addressed a number of political, social, and economic issues the center of the extensive debates in post-revolution Egypt. Based on a broad consensus of numerous religious figures, the document expresses support for a "modern, democratic state, based on a constitution, which separates between state authorities; determines the boundaries of governance; guarantees the rights and duties of its citizens on equal footing and gives people’s representatives the power of legislation in accordance with the precepts of true Islam, a religion, which has never, throughout its history, experienced a religious or a theocratic state.”  

With this article, Al-Tayeb effectively presents Al-Azhar’s rejection of Salafist demands for a theocratic state.  The Al-Azhar document incriminates,  furthermore, “the abuse of religion to disunite and pit citizens against each other.”  The document declares Al-Azhar’s embrace of democracy, which the institution considers to be “the modern formula of the Islamic precept of ‘shura’ (or consultation)”, and the guarantor of pluralism, circulation of power, and accountability to the people.  The sum of these articles, along with others outlining priorities in post-revolution Egypt--like education, scientific research, fighting corruption, reducing unemployment, maintaining international treaties and rebuilding relations with Arab, Islamic, and African countries--result in a document that reads very much like a short version of Egypt’s missing constitution.

In addition to these calls, one of the key demands presented in the document is the appeal for al-Azhar’s independence. As the oldest Islamic institution in the world (established 973 CE), the university represents one of the most respected sources of guidance and religious scholarship in the Muslim world.  As such, tapping into the institution’s credibility has long been a strategic component of authoritarian rule in Egypt. Muhammad ‘Ali (ruled 1805-1848), for example, nationalized 623,000 acres of waqf land and sought to sideline the influence and checks of ‘ulama, effectively laying the groundwork for future manipulation of Al-Azhar by the state.

Modern Egyptian leaders have also understood that controlling al-Azhar, and by extension Egypt’s vast network of imams and mosques, represented a means to secure political capital and counter Islamist opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.  The greatest infiltration of Al-Azhar occurred under the regime of Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser, who placed the entire institution and all waqf land under the purview of the Ministry of Endowments, added a number of secular colleges whose deans gained seats on the Al-Azhar High Council, and stipulated that the appointment of Sheikh Al-Azhar become the prerogative of the Egyptian President instead of an internal election process at Al-Azhar.  These changes were met with strong opposition and between the years 1959 to 1963, Nasser removed the most vocal opposition voices, reducing Al-Azhar’s faculty by nearly half.

In an attempt to break away from Nasser’s era, Sadat offered Al-Azhar’s ‘ulema a relatively more open space for expression, which some used to voice their opposition to a number of Sadat’s policies, including the infitah, “Jehan’s law” regarding personal status matters, and peace with Israel. Under Mubarak, the state’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood--particularly during election cycles--as well as its efforts to outdo Islamists by wrapping government policies in an Islamic cloak, illustrated the regime’s continued perception of threat from Islamist opposition. Through the co-option of Al-Azhar and the appointment of pro-government sheikhs--like Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi in 1996 and then-National Democratic Party member Ahmed El-Tayeb in 2010--the government tainted the neutrality and integrity of the Al-Azhar. Hossam Tamam, an expert on Islamist groups, explains that “After Mubarak held the helm of state, Al-Azhar kept losing its influence to radical groups, which sought to discredit the state-sanctioned religious establishment by arguing that it represented the regime’s interests rather than true Islam.”

Given this context, the release of the al-Azhar’s document drafting in Egypt’s post-revolutionary environment demonstrates the institution’s desire to break away from its previous role as a regime puppet, regain independence, and win popular support with an assertive statement made amidst the uncertainty of Egypt’s transitional period.  Several groups and coalitions of imams have formed to advocate for al-Azhar’s independence. In a March 13 rally that went largely unnoticed in the shadow of mass protests in Tahrir Square, over 1,000 imams marched from the Nour Mosque in Abbassiya toward the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) to protest the failure to fulfill promises addressing their demands. The imams called for investigation into corruption charges leveled at the Ministry of Endowments and  the reversal of Nasser's 1961 law that put the university’s budget under state control and gave the president the power to appoint the Grand Sheikh. The military police clashed with the protesters, assaulting them with fists and electric batons, according to eyewitnesses.  Imams have continued protesting in recent months, joining last Friday’s sit-in at Tahrir Square, where they also distributed fliers for a mass rally for al-Azhar’s independence on the symbolic national day of July 23, the date commemorating Egypt’s 1952 coup d’état.

A wide range of Egyptian intellectuals and figures have offered their support for the document.  Literary critic Salah Fadl said the document “confirms al-Azhar's respect for others’ values and ideals. The institution has been regarded as a symbol of enlightenment and moderate Islam throughout history...and the document will help it regain its former prominence.”  Deputy Prime Minister Yehia El Gamal commended it as “one of the most important charters issued to date,” and similar support was voiced by Rifaat Al-Saeid, head of the leftist Tagammu Party, and Christian business tycoon Naguib Sawiris, who heads the Free Egyptians Party.  Spokespersons of the Coptic Church, though skeptical of any religious intervention in politics, welcomed al-Azhar’s document as an illustration of wisdom, social justice, and respect and equality for all citizens.

Despite initial praise from some groups, advocacy organizations like Human Rights First, have expressed concern over the document’s “vagueness”, stressing that certain safeguards are needed to protect the envisioned civil state and prevent potential rights abuses.  The document’s stipulation identifying shari’a law as the basis for legislation, for example, highlights the statement’s inherent ambiguities and raises a number of questions about the drafters’ intentions. Can a state be considered civil and tolerant of all faiths if its laws are derived from the tenets of one particular religion? Secularist writer Salah Elissa argues that “if new laws need the consent of al-Azhar, then that immediately means we are in a religious, and not a civil, state.”  Ikram Lamie, Director of the Evangelical School of Theology in Egypt and spokesman of the Evangelical Church, reiterates a similar concern, stressing that religious figures should not interfere in political matters.  Abdel Mouti Bayoumi member of Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Center and a scholar who helped draft the document, reotrts that Egypt’s secular Supreme Constitutional Court would be responsible for approving new laws, and that al-Azhar would have only an advisory role.

Despite this assertion, the issue of what role religion may play in the politics of the new Egypt remains contentious, with divided opinions even within Egypt’s Muslim community. Al-Azhar has pledged support for a state that practices religious tolerance, while simultaneously reiterating its position that shari’a remain the primary source of legislation and Islam as Egypt’s official religion, under Article 2 of the 1971 constitution. Deputy Leader of the Brotherhood Rashad Bayoumi welcomed this commitment, commenting that the document “demonstrates accurately the meaning of a secular state in Islam.” And though he added that the Brotherhood does not seek a theocratic state, it remains unclear whether the group and the newly-legal Freedom and Justice Party will actually retain this commitment and ensure equal rights for minorities if elected to power.  In contrast to Bayoumi, Sheikh Gamal Qotb--former head of Al-Azhar's Fatwa Committee--criticized the document, arguing that it fails to focus on mechanisms for reform, calling it “window-dressing.” Others still (such as Mamdouh Ismail, founder of the Egyptian Renaissance Party) refused to comment “on anything issued by Al-Azhar as long as it remains headed by a [former National Democratic] party member,” in reference to al-Tayeb. Further reactions from the Salafists came from the Liberation Party, whose members presented on July 6 an “advisory memorandum” to al-Tayeb calling upon him to abolish the document they find to be contrary to Islam and God’s law.

The release and words of the Al-Azhar document show promise for the new Egypt, and special attention must be paid toward upcoming protests (like the one scheduled for July 23), statements, and conferences sponsored by Al-Azhar.  As noted by Nabil Abdel Fattah, political analyst for Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and one of the drafters of the Al-Azhar statement, “this document was established through calm dialogue and a true will to establish a document that would unite the people away from slogans and propaganda.”  This effort lends great significance to the Al-Azhar document, especially in the context of a transitional period that has seen the emergence of several competing voices and actors seeking to cause national and sectarian strife. According to Abdel Fattah, this document will be followed by several others in advance of a national conference titled “The Egyptian Nation” that Al-Azhar will hold to further discuss issues deemed critical to Egypt’s future.  Supporting a democratic state in the new Egypt will require the rule of law and truly independent institutions, among other things, and Al-Azhar could prove a case in point for other Egyptian institutions like the judiciary, syndicates, unions, and other universities who may follow to demand their own independence from government intervention. Fridays have become regular times of protests for Egyptians, and it will be essential to follow the demands from Egyptians week to week as we approach the historic parliamentary elections tentatively scheduled for September.

This piece was originally published at Carnegie's Sada Journal