SCAF Declaration Turns "Soft Coup" Into Hard Reality

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: AP

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has issued an addendum to the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that human rights activists fear will institutionalizemilitary dictatorship in Egypt. The SCAF’s decision to issue amendments to several articles on the eve of the announcement of the official presidential results was strategically timed to avoid accusations of anti-Brotherhood bias after a likely victory by the Freedom and Justice Party’s candidate Mohamed Morsi.

The announcement has renewed concerns that the SCAF is seeking to prolong its political role beyond June 30, the previously announced deadline for its transfer of power to an elected civilian president. Although the SCAF has renewed its pledge to hand over power by the end of the month, the dissolution of Parliament and subsequent transfer of legislative authorities to the military (confirmed in yesterday’s constitutional declaration) means that the SCAF will continue to wield significant political power until a new Parliament is formed – which the latest SCAF declaration suggests will not take place until a month after the new constitution has been written.

The new addendum referenced the role of the newly elected President as stated in Article 56 of the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration. According to the original article, the President possesses supreme rights that no other institution can challenge, especially in the absence of the Parliament. These rights include the issuing of laws and vetoing of Parliament-proposed legislation, appointing the cabinet and state bureaucracies, negotiating treaties and representing Egypt at home and abroad. In the new constitutional supplement, however, the SCAF has abridged presidential powers and further entrenched the military establishment as a de facto fourth branch of government. The SCAF now wields legislative power and the prerogative to oversee all military-related matters until a new Constitution is written and a Parliament is elected a month later. The generals, moreover, by giving themselves the right under Articles 60-B and 60-B1 to form and intervene in the work of the Constituent Assembly, have thus successfully engineered a legal basis for perpetuating their political and economic privileges in the new system and more importantly institutionalizing the “soft coup” they staged in February 2011.

In retrospect, the generals would not have been able to seize this opportunity and issue the new articles if the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) had not ruled the parliamentary law unconstitutional last week, a decision that required the dissolution of the recently elected People’s Assembly. In addition, the military and its security services were further empowered by last week’s Ministry of Justice Decree giving military police and intelligence officers sweeping powers  to arrest civilians, a move that effectively replaces the recently expired Emergency Law with martial law.

It is apparent that the generals issued this new constitutional declaration to maintain their interests and preemptively curb the powers of the President to prepare for their worst case scenario: a win by Mohamed Morsi. No matter how hard the generals feign impartiality, it is clear Shafik would be much more amenable to the perpetuation of military influence over Egypt’s political future, in comparison with Morsi and the Brotherhood, who represent a serious threat to the SCAF’s institutional and economic interests.

On the whole, the constitutional addendum enshrines the power of the military as a separate branch of government that is not only protected from civilian oversight, but possesses the power to check the president’s political agenda. By reserving for itself the power to issue laws and oversee the state budget, as well as veto presidential declarations of war, the SCAF has signaled that it is only willing to partially surrender its interim executive authorities. Instead of returning to the barracks by June 30 as promised to the Egyptian people, the generals have effectively broken their commitment and extended their rule until at least a new constitution is written, a process that could take months. The new powers that the SCAF has unilaterally claimed for itself present a serious and frustrating setback to Egypt’s so-called “democratic” transition. As human rights activist Hossam Baghat remarked, “Egypt just witnessed the smoothest military coup.  We’d be outraged if we weren’t so exhausted." 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

On the Eve of Pivotal Supreme Court Rulings, All Scenarios Point to Turmoil

By: Ahmed Morsy

Photo Credit: AP

Egypt’s judiciary has emerged as a surprising new power-broker on the political scene, pushing the limits of its jurisdiction to rule on a number of polarizing and partisan disputes that have the potential to derail Egypt’s democratic transition just as it reaches the threshold of a transfer of power to civilian leadership. The judges - already struggling for their independence in the face of alleged interference from the executive branch -- have come under intense scrutiny after a controversial decision to suspendthe Constituent Assembly, then the trial against of NGO employees, and most recently the sentencing of former President Mubarak to a 25-year (life) prison term and acquitting his sons and six senior security officials. However, the most significant rulings that will impact Egypt’s democratic transition are still to come on June 14.  Just two days before the scheduled presidential runoff between Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s last prime minister, and Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, the Supreme Constitutional Court will review the constitutionality of both the Political Disenfranchisement and Parliament laws. The decisions of the court will have a tremendous effect on Egypt’s future and could prolong the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

The SCAF as well as political factions have committed terrible mistakes that threaten to reverse the whole transitional process back to square one. The upcoming Supreme Court rulings are politically charged and raise difficult questions about the next steps. For instance, in the case of barring Ahmed Shafiq, will the entire presidential election be re-run from scratch, or will the race be limited to the 12 candidates who competed in the first round? On June 13, Hatem Bagato, the secretary general of the Presidential Election Commission (PEC), suggested that the latter would be the appropriate course of action, but the SCC has yet to decide. If the Parliament is deemed unconstitutional, how would Islamists react to losing control of the legislative branch? Parliamentary Speaker Saad al-Katatny has stated that Parliament will abide by the SCC’s ruling, yet he insists that Parliament cannot be dissolved until the next elected president takes office – if and when that happens. How would these rulings affect the already struggling Constituent Assembly tasked with writing the new Constitution? And finally how would the Egyptians react to the new changes, bearing in mind that it might lead to the extension of SCAF’s rule beyond the June 30 deadline?

Several scenarios have been argued by various constitutional and legal experts regarding the constitutionality of the discussed laws. Below I tried to offer a concise summary of these various possibilities based on some legal opinions.     

Constitutional Court Scenarios for the Disenfranchisement Law:

• The disenfranchisement law is found to be unconstitutional. Ahmed Shafiq will be allowed to participate in the presidential elections runoff on June 16-17 (Most Likely)
   
• The SCC declines to review the constitutionality of the law, finding that the Supreme Presidential Elections Commission (SPEC) did not have jurisdiction to refer it in the first place. The disenfranchisement law is allowed to stand.
   
• The law is upheld and Ahmed Shafiq is banned from the runoff; the election is suspended and restarted (least likely)

Constitutional Court Scenarios for the Parliament Law:

• Law is ruled unconstitutional and Parliament is dissolved (likely option)
   
• Removing party-based MPs from the individual candidates' seats they won, and re-running elections for those seats.  (another likely option that would minimize conflict with the Islamist majority)
   
• Law is ruled unconstitutional but Parliament is allowed to serve out the remainder of its term before new elections are called.
   
•  Law is upheld (least likely, in light of strong precedents for dissolving Parliament on constitutional grounds in 1984, 1987, and 1990)

The Four possible scenarios after the Constitutional Court rulings on June 14:

Scenario 1 

High possibility - Islamists weakened, and Parliament dissolved):

• Disenfranchisement Law is ruled unconstitutional. The elections continue and Ahmed Shafiq participates in the runoff on June 16-17.
   
• The Parliament Law found to be unconstitutional. Parliament will be dissolved and the electoral law changed, leading to a new round of parliamentary elections.

Scenario 2

(Least likely):

• Disenfranchisement Law is upheld (SCC declines to review the law because the electoral commission had no authority to refer it to the SCC in the first place). The Presidential election is halted; Ahmed Shafiq barred, and the election is restarted, probably including only the 12 candidates who participated in the first round.
   
•  Parliament Law is upheld and the legislature is not dissolved.

Scenario 3

(Compromise – Power sharing arrangement between SCAF & MB):

• Disenfranchisement Law ruled unconstitutional. The elections continue and Ahmed Shafiq participates in the runoff on June 16-17.
   
•  Parliament Law is upheld and the legislature is not dissolved.

Scenario 4

(Worst Case; Leads to the continuation of SCAF and wide array of havoc):

•  Disenfranchisement Law is ruled constitutional. The Presidential elections is halted; Ahmed Shafiq barred, and the elections are restarted.
   
•  Parliament Law is ruled unconstitutional. Parliament to be dissolved and the electoral law changed.

 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Egypt's Transition in Danger of Regression

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: AP 

The word “transition” implies both an origin and a destination, yet Egypt’s transitional period is still circling around a dead-end.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has proven incompetent in leading the interim period, except in matters affecting the military. A bigger problem is that none of the other civil political forces in Egypt has yet managed to fill the power vacuum left by Mubarak. Meanwhile, a wave of legal turmoil is shaking up an already volatile political scene. The past weeks have witnessed several controversial decisions and court rulings on a wide range of issues from suspending the constituent assembly to banning 10 presidential candidates and approving a ‘Disenfranchisement Law’ That bars former Mubarak officials from public office.

In the midst of these recent legal developments, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Solidarity (MoISS) issued a contentious decision – on April 23 - denying registration requests for eight American civil society organizations. The Egyptian government claims that the “activities of these NGOs violate Egypt’s sovereignty.” Among these groups are the human rights and election monitoring Carter Center, the development group Coptic Orphans, and the youth-based conflict resolution organization Seeds of Peace. Despite claims made by the Egyptian government, these organizations assert they did not receive any official notices or charges to date. Most of these NGOs, including the ones put on trial last February, have been operating in Egypt for years and their activities were widely known and tracked by the Egyptian authorities. Among these well-established and legitimate organizations is the Carter Center, which was invited last year to “witness” Egypt’s Parliamentary elections. The Egyptian government’s decision to deny the application of an NGO that has been invited by the same government just a few months ago to observe the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections is both inconsistent and irrational.

This unfortunate decision is reminiscent of the NGOs crackdown last December, which resulted in civil society groups being charged with operating and receiving money illegally in a politically motivated trial that has now been postponed until June 5. The MoISS decision issued one month ahead of the upcoming Presidential election is another blow to democracy, and signals to the international community that Egypt’s interim leaders are no more committed to transparency and human rights than their authoritarian predecessor.

On the same day that the eight American NGOs were denied registration, the Supreme Presidential Elections Committee (SPEC) issued the regulations for local as well as foreign NGOs planning to witness the Presidential elections. Unlike the regulations for the Parliamentary elections, foreign groups will now need to be registered in Egypt and file the names of their individual observers, which cannot include any Egyptian nationals, to a special committee comprised of representatives from the SPEC as well as the ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and National Security. This special committee will evaluate the applications and make recommendations to the SPEC, which will issue final decisions on the registration of international observers. However, the electoral commission also reserves the right to invite any organization it deems appropriate, even if it is not registered in Egypt, to observe the elections. It’s important to highlight that the SPEC’s decisions are immune against appeals according to article 28 of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration. This article defines the SPEC’s decisions as final and authoritative, which is an infringement on the constitutional right to due process.

The next couple of weeks will witness crucial decisions that will impact the duration of the transitional period and shape the character of Egypt’s next elected government. Rumors are circulating that the Presidential elections may even be postponed over legal challenges to certain electoral procedures. The Parliament’s vote to reject the Cabinet’s management plan and withdraw confidence from the government represents a challenge in the relationship between the SCAF and Parliament. Furthermore, we should not forget the much anticipated ruling on May 6 that will determine the constitutionality of the Parliamentary Law. If the legality of the parliamentary elections is successfully challenged, it could bring about dramatic consequences and possibly necessitate the dissolution of Parliament. A political shake-up of this magnitude could further  aggravate Egypt’s ailing economy and delay the military’s transfer of power to civilians beyond the June 30 deadline -- leading to a chaotic state of affairs that will not be favorable for any Egyptian whether in power or on the streets. 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

    

Egypt’s Paradox: Foreign-Funded Military attacks Foreign Funded NGOs

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Nahar Net

Just one day before the end of the historic 2011, the Egyptian authorities could not bring themselves to end the year without undertaking actions that, yet again, have provoked domestic and international criticism. On December 29, several democracy and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were stormed by combined police and army forces, accompanied by investigators from the General Prosecutor’s office. The raid targeted 17 offices of 10 NGOs on the grounds that they were illegally operating and accepting international assistance without the required registration permits, according to the Egyptian Middle East News Agency (MENA). This is part of a broader investigation launched by the government earlier this year into foreign funding and alleged violations of Egypt’s highly restrictive law regulating NGOs, Law No. 84/2002.  Of the 10 organizations targeted in the raid, six have officially confirmed break-ins: The Arab Center for Independence of the Judiciary ‎and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP); the Budgetary and Human ‎Rights Observatory; the German Konrad Adenauer –Stiftung (KAS), and the American National ‎Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and ‎Freedom House. These NGOs reported that their offices were raided and sealed by military and police personnel, who confiscated documents and computers.

In a collective response, over 31 groups led by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights (CIHR) expressed their concern and outrage in a statement condemning the break-ins. They appealed to the international community and accused the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of spearheading a campaign since July to defame human rights activists and organizations committed to democracy development. Another Cairo-based group, The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information ‎‎(ANHRI) issued a statement describing the security crackdown as an ‎attempt to intimidate and silence activists with an iron-fisted brazenness that even Mubarak’s regime never dared to exercise. 

Although the international community has for the most part continued to express qualified support for the Egyptian military’s handling of the transition, the December 30 crackdown exposed the generals’ true intentions and mishandling of the transitional period. The United States through its Departments of State and Defense expressed deep concern over the attacks and called on the Egyptian government to end the raids and return all confiscated property. Germany summoned the Egyptian Ambassador and demanded an immediate investigation into the incident, while the European Union described the police raids as “an open demonstration of force” and urged Egyptian officials to support the work of civil society groups for the duration of the transitional period.

Although the latest raids indicate a sharp escalation in the government's crackdown on civil society, Egyptian NGOs have long faced difficulties operating in a hostile environment governed by the restrictive NGO law. The roots of the latest crackdown can be traced back to the aftershocks of Mubarak’s resignation in February of last year, when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $65 million under the new Egyptian Economic and Transition Support programs for grants available to any Egyptian, American and international organizations working in Egypt. But the Egyptian government soon became concerned that American support for civil society would lead to intervention in domestic political affairs, and in July, Fayza Aboul Naga, Egypt’s Minister of International Cooperation, publicly announced that cases of illegal foreign funding to unregistered local and ‎international NGOs in Egypt would be investigated. The government of former Prime Minister Essam Sharaf promptly formed fact-finding committee to launch a probe into the charges. By October, the Ministry of Justice stepped up its investigation by commissioning two judges to explore the allegations, while the interim government increasingly portrayed foreign funding as one of the primary causes of continued political unrest and protests.

By late November, preliminary findings of the commission’s investigations were leaked to the press. The investigation, according to Al-Shorouk newspaper, involved questioning around 400 organizations that received foreign funding over the past 6 years. 

Although Fayza Aboul Naga had clearly intended for the investigation to incriminate US-funded groups promoting democratization, the commission's evidence supported a very different conclusion: Salafi Islamist organizations were actually the biggest beneficiaries of international assistance, much of it originating from the conservative Gulf monarchies. According to the report, Egyptian Salafis received at least $48.9 million in funding from Gulf donors.  The Egyptian Salafi organization Ansar al-Sunna, which received almost $19 million from a single Kuwaiti Islamic association, was the biggest recipient of foreign funding, not any of the human rights groups or youth movements that had been so maligned and defamed by the Egyptian government. 

Since the December 29 raids, growing international criticism and outright condemnations have significantly increased pressure on the ruling generals. Field Marshal Tantawi assured Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in a phone conversation on December 31 - that the government will cease its crackdown and return the confiscated material. However, SCAF’s empty promises have not translated into action. In fact, the issue has escalated into a full-blown media war as the SCAF scrambles to deny responsibility for the raids. The Egyptian Defense Attaché to the United States, General Mohamed al-Keshki, said that the NGO investigation is under the jurisdiction of the judiciary and public prosecutor, denying any involvement by the SCAF. On January 1, the Ministers of International Cooperation and Justice held a press conference in which they defended the measures independently taken by the judiciary while insisting that the SCAF and interim government were not interfering or influencing the investigation. Meanwhile, NDI and IRI have issued updated statements describing the attacks on their offices and clarifying the nature of their activities to try to counter to the latest media attacks.

Why is the Egyptian government pursuing this campaign against civil society, and why now? An analysis of SCAF’s official statements sheds light on the situation and exposes the severity of the harassment faced by NGOs. Since July, the military council has been accusing opposition groups like April 6 and Kefaya of advancing foreign agendas by illegally accepting foreign funding. In the SCAF’s 69^th communiqué, posted to its Facebook page on July 22, the military blamed personal interests and foreign agendas for rising tensions between the military forces and the people. This was further emphasized on December 20 in statements 91 and 92, which claimed that intelligence information pointed to a foreign-led plan to destabilize Egypt through mass protests and sit-ins. The government’s conspiracy theories have created a climate of fear and mistrust among the people, and the recent pattern of events – violent clashes in December followed by the latest raids – suggests that the SCAF is deliberately enflaming anxiety and panic to assert control over the transition.

The SCAF’s latest actions serve the purpose of consolidating the military’s power by sending several different messages to domestic as well as international actors including:

• Reminding human rights groups, NGOs, and revolutionary forces that the SCAF is still in control.

• To the Egyptian public - countering critics of the military by claiming that the SCAF is protecting Egypt’s sovereignty and national interests by securing the country against the “foreign agendas and third party” represented by some NGOs and outside forces.

• A message reminding the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist forces that the SCAF is still in charge of the transition, even though Islamist candidates won a clear parliamentary majority.

• To the West and the U.S. in particular—we have the power. Much of the old system survived the fall of Mubarak; the military is still your best option when compared to rising Islamists, the only clear alternative. We just want you to keep writing us a $1.3 billion check each year that we decide how to spend without interference.

By continuing its own propaganda campaign while allowing contradictory reports from different officials and ministries, the SCAF is trying to deflect blame for the crackdown by portraying the government as a decentralized network of independent institutions that operate beyond the SCAF’s oversight.  

The Egyptian government’s increasingly defensive and often contradictory messages to US officials are evidence of unprecedented tension in the bilateral relationship since the fall of Mubarak. Many Egyptian NGOs rely heavily on foreign funding. Yet the Egyptian government has used the international aid issue as a bargaining chip when dealing with Washington, and has deliberately obstructed American organizations from opening branch offices in Cairo. Both IRI and NDI applied for registration with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2005 and have yet to receive official permits. However, both organizations maintain offices and staff in Egypt. According to the Wikileaks cables, an MFA official in 2006 said that resolving the pending registration could best be resolved by high level talks between the two governments. Over the next few years, Mubarak’s regime used this bargaining chip to try to fend off the democratizing agenda of the Bush administration.

Today, Egypt's military leaders – who are starting to behave a lot like Mubarak – appear to be acting out against the prospect of new conditions linking Egypt's 1.3 billion dollar military aid package to progress on democratization. The U.S. Congress approved a new spending bill on December 16 that imposes tough conditions on military aid to Egypt for 2012. The new restrictions require the State Department to certify that Egypt’s government is supporting the transition to civilian leadership and respecting “freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law.” Will the military leadership risk $1.3 billion in aid by refusing to cease its crackdown? The answer will become increasingly clear in the coming days.

With the 1-year anniversary of the January 25 uprising fast approaching and a new Parliament scheduled to convene at the end of the month, the SCAF is facing many challenges and growing pressure to fulfill the revolution’s democratic demands. Between transferring power to civilians and overseeing the drafting of a new constitution, the SCAF has its hands full and the last thing Egypt's military leaders should be looking for is trouble with Washington.

Let us not forget that the ultimate irony here: The party guilty of receiving the most foreign funding is the Egyptian military, not NGOs, and generals in glass houses should not throw stones.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Is Egypt Turning Islamist?

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Al Arabiya

In retrospect, it’s almost a miracle that last week’s elections went forward as planned with massive turnout and relatively few irregularities, despite predictions of violence and calls for postponing elections after a week of lethal clashes in downtown Cairo and other parts of the country.  While Egyptians are relieved that elections were conducted relatively fairly and peacefully, the sweeping victory of Islamists – whose candidates won a 61 percent majority in the first round – raises new concerns about the policies and ideological positions that will emerge from the next elected parliament.

Egyptians in 9 governorates went out en masse on November 28, not to protest, but rather to cast their votes in the first round of elections since ousting Hosni Mubarak in February. Although the first stage of voting went relatively smoothly, it’s important to recall the broader context of unrest and insecurity in which the electoral process is unfolding. The last 10 days before voting witnessed extreme violence. The army and police used excessive force (tear gas, rubber bullets and live rounds) against civilians protesting in Cairo’s Tahrir square and other governorates against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and a set of draft constitutional principles that would preserve and possibly enhance the military’s political and economic privileges in the future political system. The ensuing clashes between protesters and security forces resulted in over 40 deaths and more than 2,000 injured, according to the Ministry of Health. As a concession, the SCAF convened a series of emergency meetings with party leaders and presidential candidates and issued the long awaited anti-graft law, accepted the government’s resignation and announced a new timetable for a transfer of power to civilians by the end of June 2012. In addition, the SCAF urged all Egyptians to stand united, confirmed that elections would take place on time and extended the voting period by an extra day to encourage turnout and "avoid overcrowding and security issues."

The two-day polling process on November 28-29 went peacefully with minimal violence, although the process was marred by several irregularities and procedural violations, such as polling stations opening late, insufficient ballot papers and boxes, judges arriving late and party representatives campaigning inside polling centers in violation of a ban on campaigning 48 hours prior to the start of voting. These violations were widely documented by voters and NGOs observing the elections, although the High Electoral Commission has tried to downplay the impact of irregularities on the voting process, which saw a record turnout of  52 percent of the eligible voters.

The stunning success of Islamists – the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) received 36.6 percent of the vote while the Salafi al-Nour Party won 24.4 percent -- has raised anxieties among Egyptians, mainly the educated middle-class and Coptic Christian community. Results from the first round indicate that the FJP and Nour Party could hold up to 70 percent of the seats in the next parliament, although the final proportion will not be determined until after the third round of voting in January. For liberal parties, which won a disappointing 12.7 percent of the vote under the banner of the Egyptian Bloc coalition, the Islamist landslide is a slap in the face and a jolting wake-up call.

Many analysts expected a win for the FJP even though its Brotherhood-led coalition, the Democratic Alliance, had been troubled by internal disputes and defections in the weeks leading up to the election. While the FJP’s strong showing was widely predicted, the Salafis’ success was a bit of a surprise and shows how deeply rooted the conservative Islamist movement has become in Egyptian society, especially among the less educated lower classes in Cairo and the Delta. The prospect of an Islamist-dominated parliament raises a number of questions:

First is regarding the sincerity of the Islamist parties to abiding by democratic principles. The FJP has said that its priorities are ending corruption, reviving the economy and establishing a true democracy in Egypt. Mohamed Badie, the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, said the party will work to build an inclusive government and prefers a semi-presidential system based on the French model. Badie also denied making any deals with SCAF. Such statements imply that the FJP will be looking to create a wider coalition in the Parliament and will try to distance itself from the hardline Nour Party. On the other hand, the Salafis have been advocating for stricter moral codes and restrictions on personal freedoms reminiscent of policies backed by Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi establishment. They are among the newcomers to the game in Egyptian politics, and it is unclear exactly how they will play. Having once shunned democracy as inappropriately elevating man-made laws and institutions over Shari’a, Salafis are now choosing to participate in the formal political arena, and their parliamentarians could seek to enshrine conservative Islamist principles in new legislation.

Second, is the SCAF genuinely committed to transferring power to the parliament and a civilian president by end of June 2012? So far the ruling military council has been torn between the desire to preserve its political and economic privileges for as long as possible and the challenge of supervising a successful transition to democracy within a limited time frame.Under Article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration, the SCAF will hold the authority of the President and Parliament until elections are held. But on December 7, the SCAF issued a degree delegating presidential authority to newly appointed Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri, while still retaining power over the armed forces and judiciary. Whether this decision signifies an actual loosening of the SCAF's grip on power remains to be seen, and there are signs that the military is already maneuvering to curb the authority of the next parliament.  in his most recent video interview, SCAF member Major General Mamdouh Shahin stated that the party winning the majority in the Parliament will not have the power to form the government. The statement was perceived as a power-grab by the Islamists, particularly the FJP, whose parliamentarians will likely demand the right to form a coalition government. Even before election results revealed an Islamist majority, the FJP’s head, Mohamed Morsi, stated on November 29 that the new parliament should be empowered to form a government representative of the political forces in the People’s Assembly, rather than a technocratic cabinet appointed by the prime minister. However, the generals’ appointment of Dr. Kamal al-Ganzouri as new Prime Minister confirms the speculation that the SCAF’s preferred scenario is for a technocratic government to hold power at least until the presidential election next summer. In addition, the inevitability of Islamist majority in parliament may make the SCAF even more reluctant to relinquish power, despite assurances that the military will respect the people’s choice.

Egypt is only in the early stages of a long transition that will fundamentally reshape the country’s political landscape. With Islamists rising to the forefront of the political scene, it is unclear to what extent they are prepared to govern and initiate the institutional reforms and economic policies that are badly needed to stabilize the economic situation and create a transparent and accountable government. Furthermore, it is unclear how Islamists will respond if the SCAF continues to resists calls for a transfer of power to civilian leadership by the end of June. While many questions remain unanswered, election results have clearly set the stage for a potential power struggle between the SCAF and Islamists. But the electoral process is just beginning (with four more rounds of voting to go before results for the People’s Assembly are finalized in January), and it is still too early to draw conclusions.  We should allow Islamists in Egypt as well as Tunisia, and Morocco some time to prove trustworthy of the votes that have given them a political mandate.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.