Morsi’s Un-Revolutionary Foreign Policy

By: Ahmed Morsy

For over 30 years Egypt’s foreign policy has stood on three key pillars: building strategic relations with the United States, maintaining the peace treaty with Israel, and promoting the security of Arab states in the Gulf. The presidency and the security apparatus, moreover, have often overshadowed and minimized the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the policymaking process. These pillars solidified under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, and as a result President Mohamed Morsi will not be able to uproot them anytime soon. Though Egypt’s foreign policy under Morsi will undergo modest changes to its surface, its main foundations will remain cemented in place.

The fall of Mubarak received mixed reactions from regional leaders, most of whom had enjoyed a solid alliance with the deposed strongman and had concerns over the sudden uncertainty of Egypt’s political and economic future.[1] The election of Morsi sparked a number of questions about the trajectory of Egypt’s foreign policy and the regional order of the Middle East. Would Morsi’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood influence Egypt’s regional and foreign policy? Would the first “popularly” elected president walk away from Egypt’s commitments and alliances, particularly the relationships with Washington, Tel Aviv, and the Arab Gulf states? Since assuming office, Morsi has sought to reassure the international community that Egypt will maintain its strategic relationships and international commitments.[2] He has followed repetitive public guarantees with an array of state visits in an attempt to present himself as a statesman and assure Egypt’s allies that he, the Egyptian government, and the Muslim Brotherhood are reliable and responsible partners. And Morsi has also shown that, akin to Mubarak, he is adept at selecting a close circle of advisors to develop policy and even rival the duties of officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Steady Military but Wobbly Political Relations with Washington

Late Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat assumed leadership in 1971 with a determination to start a new chapter in Egypt’s relations with the West. Shortly after the end of the October War of 1973, Sadat adopted an open market policy to replace the socialist approach of his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sadat famously remarked in 1976 that “America holds 99 percent of the solution cards” for the Arab-Israeli conflict.[3] It was under Sadat’s tenure that Egypt saw the beginning of a long-term strategic relationship with the United States that would later influence many of Egypt’s political decisions regarding foreign policy. It was also in 1979 that Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel and nominally accepted Israel as part of the region, policy shifts that cost Sadat his life and temporarily demoted Egypt from its traditional heavyweight position in the regional order, particularly due to the state’s subsequent removal from the Arab League.

Hosni Mubarak succeeded in bridging the gap with Arab nations after the rift of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and regaining Egypt’s status as a dominant player in the region, through its various roles as host of the Arab League, broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and prominent member in the security alliance against Iran. Mubarak also strengthened Egypt’s relations with Western countries and benefited greatly from military and economic aid from the United States. The United States has and continues to value Egypt as a key partner in counter-terrorism initiatives and regional security.

The military-military relations of Egypt and the United States remain steady under the Morsi administration, despite a range of political issues that have tested the friendship, including the ongoing trial against democracy and human rights NGOs,[4] the scaling of U.S. embassy walls by protestors and Morsi’s delayed reaction and provision of security, the rolling debate in Congress on conditioning aid to Egypt,[5] and the recent attention to anti-Semitic remarks Morsi made in 2010.[6]The most striking symbols of the sustained military relationship have been the frequent visits of American defense and intelligence officials to Egypt during the past year, as well as the ceremonial delivery of new U.S.-produced F-16 fighter jets that was ironically held at a time when Egypt was plunging further into domestic strife.[7] The recent visit of Secretary of State Kerry to Egypt was significant for its insignificance; vague, cordial public remarks and a pledge of economic assistance marked “business as usual” between the United States and Egypt.

President Morsi, Israelis, and Palestinians

After Morsi’s election Israel publicly stated its respect for the democratic process in Egypt and its outcome, as well as its intent to continue cooperation with the Morsi administration on the basis of the peace treaty.[8] Though Morsi has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, which does not recognize Israel, he has shown that this fact will not be an obstacle for continued cooperation with Tel Aviv. Essam Haddad, Morsi’s assistant for international affairs, asserted this specific point in an interview with Reuters in February 2013.[9]

Morsi was showered with praise from the international community and the United States in particular for negotiating a truce between Hamas and Israel in November 2012.[10] His foreign policy achievement affirmed Egypt’s important role as a broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and initially suggested that Morsi may be able to make some political headway negotiating with Hamas where Mubarak could not because of Hamas’s ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

On the contrary, and in a fashion similar to Mubarak, Morsi has also shown that he and the army are willing to make unpopular moves that benefit Israel’s security and please the United States. Egypt’s flooding of tunnels between Sinai and the Gaza Strip illustrates this point clearly, and has brought simultaneous praise from Israel and the United States as well as sharp criticisms in Egyptian and Palestinian public opinion.[11] As Hussein Ibish notes, furthermore, “Even if Morsi were inclined to intervene on behalf of Hamas at the expense of Egyptian interests, the military will almost certainly prevent this.”[12]

Apprehension from Saudi Arabia

All of the Gulf States, excluding Oman, severed relations with Egypt after it signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Mubarak’s support to Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s war against Iran and his later decision to join the American coalition to liberate Kuwait were among the main reasons that Egypt was able to repair its relationship with the Gulf monarchs. Egypt reaped the benefits of those close relations through direct aid, investments, and opportunities for Egyptian labor. The fall of Mubarak brought severe concerns to the Gulf monarchs, who have long suppressed popular and Islamist movements in their states. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia joined Mubarak in calling Egyptian protesters “infiltrators” seeking to destabilize their country.[13] It was even reported that the King proposed to President Obama that the United States support a dignified exit for Mubarak and that Saudi Arabia would prop up Egypt’s economy if Washington decided to review its annual aid package to Egypt.[14]

Since the Egyptian uprising, a schism is gradually emerging among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regarding relations with Egypt.[15] This schism—chiefly among Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—has become more evident with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the election of Morsi.

The Saudis’ current apprehension toward Egypt stems from their long history with the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite sharing values of Sunni Islam, Riyadh has shown concern with the Brotherhood’s religious political discourse that competes with its ultraconservative Wahhabi doctrine.[16] The late Saudi Crown Prince Nayef, for example, accused the Brotherhood of “betraying” the Kingdom’s generosity and argued that the group is the source of several problems facing the region.[17]Wary of this distrust and the Kingdom’s financial influence, Morsi’s first foreign visit was to Saudi Arabia. His visit was an attempt to defuse any rifts from the loss of Mubarak and assure the richest Arab country of Egypt’s obligation toward Gulf security.[18] Acknowledging the importance of keeping Egypt to its side, the Kingdom granted Egypt $4 billion to help keep its economy afloat.[19] Despite the apparent public recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, the Saudis have boycotted the “Quartet for Syria” (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Egypt) meetings initiated by Morsi during the Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit in Mecca in August 2012. The Kingdom is wary of recent interactions between Egypt and Iran, and it rejects any role for Iran in a solution for Syria, reluctant to overlook Iran’s role an instigator of the conflict through its funding and arming of the Syrian regime.

Politics in Reverse with Qatar and UAE

Mubarak had tense relations with Qatar after the current Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa deposed his father in 1995, and this tension was amplified by the recurring appearances of Egyptian opposition members voicing their criticisms of Mubarak on the Doha-based Al Jazeera. On the other hand, Mubarak enjoyed very close relations with the UAE and its late leader Sheikh Zayed al-Nahyan. Since Morsi’s ascendance to the presidency, however, Qatar and the UAE have reversed their stances toward Egypt. Like the Saudis, the UAE is no big fan of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, the UAE has put on trial over 90 individuals with alleged links to the Brotherhood for plotting to overthrow the regime.[20] This trial follows the UAE government’s refusal to release 11 detained Egyptians with alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood.[21] And although the UAE was amongst the first countries to pledge aid to Egypt in 2011, none has materialized due to the cold relationship between the countries’ leaders. This tension has escalated with the recent accusation that the UAE is financing anti-Morsi groups and establishing “hidden and conspicuous contacts” with members of Egypt’s intelligence. Morsi’s finger-pointing reference during his speech at the Arab League summit in March 2013 is seen as a direct message to the UAE and other regional countries (like Saudi Arabia and Jordan) that are skeptical of the Brotherhood’s ascendance in Egypt.[22]

In contrast to the UAE, the Qataris are reaping the benefits of supporting Egypt’s uprising.[23] Qatar dedicated Al Jazeera to support the anti-Mubarak protests and later the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qataris pledged not to allow Egypt to go bankrupt and injected $5 billion dollars into the ailing Egyptian economy.[24] And the Qatari emir called upon other Arab states to support Egypt’s economy.[25] However, this has raised many concerns in Egyptian society and among political forces.[26] Doha is taking a giant leap of faith with the Brotherhood, aiming to forge a close alliance with Cairo and maximize its regional posture. Qatar offers the Brotherhood important assets, including financial capital and favorable Al Jazeera coverage, surpassing the influence of the UAE and approaching the amount of socioeconomic influence that Saudi Arabia once exerted and might exert on Egypt if it attains such political will in the future. But as Sultan al-Qassemi aptly observes, “while the UAE has alienated Egypt’s new leaders, Qatar has alienated Egypt’s population.”[27]

From Tehran with Love

Iran has expressed a great interest in restarting its relations with Egypt. Iranian leaders have sought to capitalize on the country’s new Islamist government to forge closer ties.[28] Egypt has, however, hesitated to fully embrace Iran. Despite the exchange of visits by both presidents for the first time in 30 years, the trips to Tehran and Cairo did not lead to the normalization of relations between the two states, though various groups within and outside Egypt expressed such concerns.[29] Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was assaulted twice,[30] including by a shoe in an Islamic Cairo neighborhood, and his country’s policies were heavily criticized by the Grand Imam of al-Azhar—the bulwark of Sunni Islam.[31] Nonetheless, Tehran’s eagerness to lure Egypt into normalization led to its cancellation of the need for tourist and business visas for Egyptians to encourage travel to Iran[32]and an offer of a “big credit line” to help Egypt’s ailing economy.[33]

Iran’s anxious attempts to renew relations with Egypt may also be attributed in part to escalating pressure and international sanctions against Tehran.[34] The United States and the EU have tightened sanctions on Iran, with particular focus on financial sectors and the oil industry. By re-establishing relations with Egypt, Iran may hope to win safe access to the Suez Canal and bypass sanctions by opening a new market for its goods. Moreover, in light of the worsening conflict inside Syria, Iran may be pursuing an alliance with Egypt to counteract the potential loss of its Syrian ally. The Syrian crisis has left Iran standing alone while other regional players side with the Syrian opposition.

Despite the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is naïve to assume that Islamists in Egypt will automatically ally with those in Iran. Egypt’s Islamist movement is predominantly Sunni, as are its Arab allies in the Gulf who share an interest in countering Shi`i and Iranian influence in the region. Domestically, the Salafi party, al-Nour, is leading the fight against the spread of Shi`ism in Egypt.[35] Its members have gone so far as to warn[36] against opening Egypt to Iranian tourism, for fear that it would increase Shi`i influence and challenge Egypt’s Sunni character.[37] In addition, Egypt seeks to preserve its vital relationship with the West and the GCC, at least in the short-term, to help overcome its growing economic crisis.

Un-Revolutionary Foreign Policy

The toppling of Hosni Mubarak has brought many changes to the domestic politics of Egypt. However, nothing revolutionary has materialized on the foreign policy front. We continue to see a relegation of the role of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry as an “implementer” rather than an “instigator”[38] of foreign policy.  Morsi is relying on close assistants in the presidential office like Essam Haddad to conduct much of the day-to-day business of Egypt’s foreign policy, from making public statements to holding private meetings with visiting foreign ministers.[39] Indeed, it remains unclear whether and to what extent Morsi has such a working relationship with his own Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr and other career diplomats. Over the course of recent decades, moreover, Cairo has managed to tangle itself in the orbits of the United States, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies, a reality that diminishes opportunities for drastic changes in the short to medium term. Thus, it is difficult to see the Egyptian government’s attempts to seek Iraqi and Libyan investments and funding replacing those of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and international donors.[40] For Egypt to change its foreign policy agenda, it must first stabilize its socioeconomic system and develop mature leadership with a clear vision and goals for Egypt’s future. None of these stars are aligned at the moment.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Middle East Institute's Arab Transition Blog.

Egypt’s NGO Crisis: Political Theater Preventing Democratic Progress

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Huffington Post

Hopes were high that the second session of the NGO trial, held on March 8, would yield a resolution to the worst crisis in US-Egypt relations since the 1967 war. Robert Becker, the only indicted American who did not choose to leave the country after the travel ban was lifted, said he stayed to stand trial along with the 14 accused Egyptians because he is convinced of his innocence and the fairness of the Egyptian judiciary. But after today’s discouraging hearing, a solution seems to be slipping even further out of reach. The presiding judge decided to postpone the case to April 10 and called on the General Prosecutor’s office to bring in all accused foreigners who fled the country last week.     

The strained relationship between Egypt and the United States has been in the epicenter of local and international news for the past 2 months. All around the world, concerned observers have been riveted on the crackdown on Egyptian and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that started suddenly on December 29, 2011. Early on, there were clear signs that this politically motivated investigation was not being conducted fairly or transparently. The investigators and the Egyptian government officials held press conferences and spoke to the media about sensitive information that should have been kept undisclosed due to the ongoing investigation. Egyptian officials, in particular Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Aboul Naga, have repeatedly insisted on upholding Egypt’s right to investigate irregularities and spurred a xenophobic media campaign against the United States and the targeted NGOs. The “Egypt wont kneel” video of Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri speaking at the People’s Assembly brought back memories of similar video of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1964, criticizing the U.S. and its aid policies.

Meanwhile, the United States has been in crisis-management mode. In response to the escalating investigation, the United States sent several delegations of senators and congressmen, diplomats and military officials in an attempt to negotiate with the Egyptian authorities, while threatening to withhold Egypt’s $1.3 billion military aid budget.

Shortly after the Egyptian government raided the offices of 17 NGOs in Cairo on December 29, I wrote an analysis questioning the motivations behind the investigation and criticizing the mismanagement of the process. It was apparent from the sudden escalation of the judicial inquiry that this case was politically driven from the start, and was anything but an independent or democratic process, as Egyptian officials tried to claim. And the abrupt and dramatic lifting of the travel ban last week confirms beyond a doubt that this case is a piece of political theater directed by Egypt’s leaders, who are manipulating the judiciary to advance their own strategic interests. On February 29, just three days after the first court session of the case, an Egyptian judge decided to lift the travel barring foreign NGO employees from leaving the country with a bail of 2 million Egyptian pounds (about $300,000). This mysterious decision, quickly attributed to a dodgy bilateral deal, and the departure of the foreigners the day after prompted a divide within the executive and judicial branches in Egypt, each blaming the other for betraying and selling out Egypt’s sovereignty and national dignity. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) failed to issue any explanatory statement, despite rising pressure from members of parliament who are demanding an inquiry into the government’s handling of the case.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri’s cabinet has also come under fire from Parliament, as prominent members of the Brotherhood and other political forces accuse Ganzouri’s ministers of caving to American pressure. On March 8, Ahmed Fathi, head of the Brotherhood’s Shura Council, described the Cabinet as “weak and shaky” and warned that the People’s Assembly may call for a vote of no confidence within days. International Cooperation Minister Fayza Aboul Naga is struggling to defend the besieged cabinet – and her own job – andclaimed that only the SCAF has the authority to form a new government, according to the interim constitution. As the Parliament escalates its fierce attack on the executive branch, it’s clear that the SCAF’s biggest problem right now is not the United States, but its own legitimacy crisis.

Looking beyond the tense bilateral relationship, the NGO case is much bigger than a diplomatic hiccup in the US-Egypt relationship; it reflects a lack of accountability on the part of Egypt’s leaders and the chaos that has resulted from their mismanagement of the transition and failure to put forward a vision for the future. Since the SCAF took after Mubarak’s resignation last February, Egypt has been stumbling from one hurdle to the next with no clear vision or strategy for correcting failed policies. Starting with the dubious Constitutional Declarationdelegating all executive powers to the ruling generals, Egypt’s political transition has been further complicated by a chaotic electoral law and process and the deepening economic crisis.

The latest stumbling block, a xenophobic and politically motivated row with the United States over NGO funding, is another short-term distraction that prevents Egypt’s political forces from working collaboratively to develop a long-term vision for the country’s future. This self-destructive behavior was aptly described by Thomas Friedman as “Egypt’s Step Backward.” Some would argue that this view is overly pessimistic, but I believe it is a sorely needed reality check. You can’t fight an enemy you don’t know, and therefore it is imperative that Egyptians recognize that the greatest obstacles to a democratic transition are domestic not foreign.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Egypt’s Paradox: Foreign-Funded Military attacks Foreign Funded NGOs

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Nahar Net

Just one day before the end of the historic 2011, the Egyptian authorities could not bring themselves to end the year without undertaking actions that, yet again, have provoked domestic and international criticism. On December 29, several democracy and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were stormed by combined police and army forces, accompanied by investigators from the General Prosecutor’s office. The raid targeted 17 offices of 10 NGOs on the grounds that they were illegally operating and accepting international assistance without the required registration permits, according to the Egyptian Middle East News Agency (MENA). This is part of a broader investigation launched by the government earlier this year into foreign funding and alleged violations of Egypt’s highly restrictive law regulating NGOs, Law No. 84/2002.  Of the 10 organizations targeted in the raid, six have officially confirmed break-ins: The Arab Center for Independence of the Judiciary ‎and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP); the Budgetary and Human ‎Rights Observatory; the German Konrad Adenauer –Stiftung (KAS), and the American National ‎Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and ‎Freedom House. These NGOs reported that their offices were raided and sealed by military and police personnel, who confiscated documents and computers.

In a collective response, over 31 groups led by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights (CIHR) expressed their concern and outrage in a statement condemning the break-ins. They appealed to the international community and accused the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of spearheading a campaign since July to defame human rights activists and organizations committed to democracy development. Another Cairo-based group, The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information ‎‎(ANHRI) issued a statement describing the security crackdown as an ‎attempt to intimidate and silence activists with an iron-fisted brazenness that even Mubarak’s regime never dared to exercise. 

Although the international community has for the most part continued to express qualified support for the Egyptian military’s handling of the transition, the December 30 crackdown exposed the generals’ true intentions and mishandling of the transitional period. The United States through its Departments of State and Defense expressed deep concern over the attacks and called on the Egyptian government to end the raids and return all confiscated property. Germany summoned the Egyptian Ambassador and demanded an immediate investigation into the incident, while the European Union described the police raids as “an open demonstration of force” and urged Egyptian officials to support the work of civil society groups for the duration of the transitional period.

Although the latest raids indicate a sharp escalation in the government's crackdown on civil society, Egyptian NGOs have long faced difficulties operating in a hostile environment governed by the restrictive NGO law. The roots of the latest crackdown can be traced back to the aftershocks of Mubarak’s resignation in February of last year, when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $65 million under the new Egyptian Economic and Transition Support programs for grants available to any Egyptian, American and international organizations working in Egypt. But the Egyptian government soon became concerned that American support for civil society would lead to intervention in domestic political affairs, and in July, Fayza Aboul Naga, Egypt’s Minister of International Cooperation, publicly announced that cases of illegal foreign funding to unregistered local and ‎international NGOs in Egypt would be investigated. The government of former Prime Minister Essam Sharaf promptly formed fact-finding committee to launch a probe into the charges. By October, the Ministry of Justice stepped up its investigation by commissioning two judges to explore the allegations, while the interim government increasingly portrayed foreign funding as one of the primary causes of continued political unrest and protests.

By late November, preliminary findings of the commission’s investigations were leaked to the press. The investigation, according to Al-Shorouk newspaper, involved questioning around 400 organizations that received foreign funding over the past 6 years. 

Although Fayza Aboul Naga had clearly intended for the investigation to incriminate US-funded groups promoting democratization, the commission's evidence supported a very different conclusion: Salafi Islamist organizations were actually the biggest beneficiaries of international assistance, much of it originating from the conservative Gulf monarchies. According to the report, Egyptian Salafis received at least $48.9 million in funding from Gulf donors.  The Egyptian Salafi organization Ansar al-Sunna, which received almost $19 million from a single Kuwaiti Islamic association, was the biggest recipient of foreign funding, not any of the human rights groups or youth movements that had been so maligned and defamed by the Egyptian government. 

Since the December 29 raids, growing international criticism and outright condemnations have significantly increased pressure on the ruling generals. Field Marshal Tantawi assured Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in a phone conversation on December 31 - that the government will cease its crackdown and return the confiscated material. However, SCAF’s empty promises have not translated into action. In fact, the issue has escalated into a full-blown media war as the SCAF scrambles to deny responsibility for the raids. The Egyptian Defense Attaché to the United States, General Mohamed al-Keshki, said that the NGO investigation is under the jurisdiction of the judiciary and public prosecutor, denying any involvement by the SCAF. On January 1, the Ministers of International Cooperation and Justice held a press conference in which they defended the measures independently taken by the judiciary while insisting that the SCAF and interim government were not interfering or influencing the investigation. Meanwhile, NDI and IRI have issued updated statements describing the attacks on their offices and clarifying the nature of their activities to try to counter to the latest media attacks.

Why is the Egyptian government pursuing this campaign against civil society, and why now? An analysis of SCAF’s official statements sheds light on the situation and exposes the severity of the harassment faced by NGOs. Since July, the military council has been accusing opposition groups like April 6 and Kefaya of advancing foreign agendas by illegally accepting foreign funding. In the SCAF’s 69^th communiqué, posted to its Facebook page on July 22, the military blamed personal interests and foreign agendas for rising tensions between the military forces and the people. This was further emphasized on December 20 in statements 91 and 92, which claimed that intelligence information pointed to a foreign-led plan to destabilize Egypt through mass protests and sit-ins. The government’s conspiracy theories have created a climate of fear and mistrust among the people, and the recent pattern of events – violent clashes in December followed by the latest raids – suggests that the SCAF is deliberately enflaming anxiety and panic to assert control over the transition.

The SCAF’s latest actions serve the purpose of consolidating the military’s power by sending several different messages to domestic as well as international actors including:

• Reminding human rights groups, NGOs, and revolutionary forces that the SCAF is still in control.

• To the Egyptian public - countering critics of the military by claiming that the SCAF is protecting Egypt’s sovereignty and national interests by securing the country against the “foreign agendas and third party” represented by some NGOs and outside forces.

• A message reminding the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist forces that the SCAF is still in charge of the transition, even though Islamist candidates won a clear parliamentary majority.

• To the West and the U.S. in particular—we have the power. Much of the old system survived the fall of Mubarak; the military is still your best option when compared to rising Islamists, the only clear alternative. We just want you to keep writing us a $1.3 billion check each year that we decide how to spend without interference.

By continuing its own propaganda campaign while allowing contradictory reports from different officials and ministries, the SCAF is trying to deflect blame for the crackdown by portraying the government as a decentralized network of independent institutions that operate beyond the SCAF’s oversight.  

The Egyptian government’s increasingly defensive and often contradictory messages to US officials are evidence of unprecedented tension in the bilateral relationship since the fall of Mubarak. Many Egyptian NGOs rely heavily on foreign funding. Yet the Egyptian government has used the international aid issue as a bargaining chip when dealing with Washington, and has deliberately obstructed American organizations from opening branch offices in Cairo. Both IRI and NDI applied for registration with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2005 and have yet to receive official permits. However, both organizations maintain offices and staff in Egypt. According to the Wikileaks cables, an MFA official in 2006 said that resolving the pending registration could best be resolved by high level talks between the two governments. Over the next few years, Mubarak’s regime used this bargaining chip to try to fend off the democratizing agenda of the Bush administration.

Today, Egypt's military leaders – who are starting to behave a lot like Mubarak – appear to be acting out against the prospect of new conditions linking Egypt's 1.3 billion dollar military aid package to progress on democratization. The U.S. Congress approved a new spending bill on December 16 that imposes tough conditions on military aid to Egypt for 2012. The new restrictions require the State Department to certify that Egypt’s government is supporting the transition to civilian leadership and respecting “freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law.” Will the military leadership risk $1.3 billion in aid by refusing to cease its crackdown? The answer will become increasingly clear in the coming days.

With the 1-year anniversary of the January 25 uprising fast approaching and a new Parliament scheduled to convene at the end of the month, the SCAF is facing many challenges and growing pressure to fulfill the revolution’s democratic demands. Between transferring power to civilians and overseeing the drafting of a new constitution, the SCAF has its hands full and the last thing Egypt's military leaders should be looking for is trouble with Washington.

Let us not forget that the ultimate irony here: The party guilty of receiving the most foreign funding is the Egyptian military, not NGOs, and generals in glass houses should not throw stones.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.