By: Ahmed Morsy
For over 30 years Egypt’s foreign policy has stood on three key pillars:
building strategic relations with the United States, maintaining the peace
treaty with Israel, and promoting the security of Arab states in the Gulf. The
presidency and the security apparatus, moreover, have often overshadowed and
minimized the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the policymaking
process. These pillars solidified under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, and as a
result President Mohamed Morsi will not be able to uproot them anytime soon.
Though Egypt’s foreign policy under Morsi will undergo modest changes to its
surface, its main foundations will remain cemented in place.
The fall of Mubarak received
mixed reactions from regional leaders, most of whom had enjoyed a solid
alliance with the deposed strongman and had concerns over the sudden
uncertainty of Egypt’s political and economic future.[1] The
election of Morsi sparked a number of questions about the trajectory of Egypt’s
foreign policy and the regional order of the Middle East. Would Morsi’s ties to
the Muslim Brotherhood influence Egypt’s regional and foreign policy? Would the
first “popularly” elected president walk away from Egypt’s commitments and
alliances, particularly the relationships with Washington, Tel Aviv, and the
Arab Gulf states? Since assuming office, Morsi has sought to reassure the
international community that Egypt will maintain its strategic relationships
and international commitments.[2] He has
followed repetitive public guarantees with an array of state visits in an
attempt to present himself as a statesman and assure Egypt’s allies that he,
the Egyptian government, and the Muslim Brotherhood are reliable and
responsible partners. And Morsi has also shown that, akin to Mubarak, he is
adept at selecting a close circle of advisors to develop policy and even rival
the duties of officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Steady Military but Wobbly
Political Relations with Washington
Late Egyptian President Anwar
al-Sadat assumed leadership in 1971 with a determination to start a new chapter
in Egypt’s relations with the West. Shortly after the end of the October War of
1973, Sadat adopted an open market policy to replace the socialist approach of
his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sadat famously remarked in 1976 that
“America holds 99 percent of the solution cards” for the Arab-Israeli conflict.[3] It was
under Sadat’s tenure that Egypt saw the beginning of a long-term strategic
relationship with the United States that would later influence many of Egypt’s
political decisions regarding foreign policy. It was also in 1979 that Egypt
signed the peace treaty with Israel and nominally accepted Israel as part of
the region, policy shifts that cost Sadat his life and temporarily demoted
Egypt from its traditional heavyweight position in the regional order,
particularly due to the state’s subsequent removal from the Arab League.
Hosni Mubarak succeeded in
bridging the gap with Arab nations after the rift of the 1979 peace treaty with
Israel and regaining Egypt’s status as a dominant player in the region, through
its various roles as host of the Arab League, broker in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and prominent member in the security alliance against Iran. Mubarak
also strengthened Egypt’s relations with Western countries and benefited
greatly from military and economic aid from the United States. The United
States has and continues to value Egypt as a key partner in counter-terrorism
initiatives and regional security.
The military-military relations
of Egypt and the United States remain steady under the Morsi administration,
despite a range of political issues that have tested the friendship, including
the ongoing trial against democracy and human rights NGOs,[4] the
scaling of U.S. embassy walls by protestors and Morsi’s delayed reaction and
provision of security, the rolling debate in Congress on conditioning aid to
Egypt,[5] and the
recent attention to anti-Semitic remarks Morsi made in 2010.[6]The most
striking symbols of the sustained military relationship have been the frequent
visits of American defense and intelligence officials to Egypt during the past
year, as well as the ceremonial delivery of new U.S.-produced F-16 fighter jets
that was ironically held at a time when Egypt was plunging further into
domestic strife.[7] The
recent visit of Secretary of State Kerry to Egypt was significant for its
insignificance; vague, cordial public remarks and a pledge of economic
assistance marked “business as usual” between the United States and Egypt.
President Morsi, Israelis, and
Palestinians
After Morsi’s election Israel
publicly stated its respect for the democratic process in Egypt and its
outcome, as well as its intent to continue cooperation with the Morsi
administration on the basis of the peace treaty.[8] Though
Morsi has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, which does not recognize Israel, he
has shown that this fact will not be an obstacle for continued cooperation with
Tel Aviv. Essam Haddad, Morsi’s assistant for international affairs, asserted
this specific point in an interview with Reuters in February 2013.[9]
Morsi was showered with praise
from the international community and the United States in particular for
negotiating a truce between Hamas and Israel in November 2012.[10] His
foreign policy achievement affirmed Egypt’s important role as a broker in the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and initially suggested that Morsi may be able to make
some political headway negotiating with Hamas where Mubarak could not because
of Hamas’s ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
On the contrary, and in a fashion
similar to Mubarak, Morsi has also shown that he and the army are willing to
make unpopular moves that benefit Israel’s security and please the United
States. Egypt’s flooding of tunnels between Sinai and the Gaza Strip
illustrates this point clearly, and has brought simultaneous praise from Israel
and the United States as well as sharp criticisms in Egyptian and Palestinian
public opinion.[11] As
Hussein Ibish notes, furthermore, “Even if Morsi were inclined to intervene on
behalf of Hamas at the expense of Egyptian interests, the military will almost
certainly prevent this.”[12]
Apprehension from Saudi Arabia
All of the Gulf States, excluding
Oman, severed relations with Egypt after it signed the peace treaty with Israel
in 1979. Mubarak’s support to Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s war against Iran and his
later decision to join the American coalition to liberate Kuwait were among the
main reasons that Egypt was able to repair its relationship with the Gulf
monarchs. Egypt reaped the benefits of those close relations through direct
aid, investments, and opportunities for Egyptian labor. The fall of Mubarak
brought severe concerns to the Gulf monarchs, who have long suppressed popular
and Islamist movements in their states. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia joined
Mubarak in calling Egyptian protesters “infiltrators” seeking to destabilize
their country.[13] It
was even reported that the King proposed to President Obama that the United
States support a dignified exit for Mubarak and that Saudi Arabia would prop up
Egypt’s economy if Washington decided to review its annual aid package to
Egypt.[14]
Since the Egyptian uprising, a
schism is gradually emerging among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) regarding relations with Egypt.[15] This
schism—chiefly among Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE)—has become more evident with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
election of Morsi.
The Saudis’ current apprehension
toward Egypt stems from their long history with the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite
sharing values of Sunni Islam, Riyadh has shown concern with the Brotherhood’s
religious political discourse that competes with its ultraconservative Wahhabi
doctrine.[16] The
late Saudi Crown Prince Nayef, for example, accused the Brotherhood of
“betraying” the Kingdom’s generosity and argued that the group is the source of
several problems facing the region.[17]Wary
of this distrust and the Kingdom’s financial influence, Morsi’s first foreign
visit was to Saudi Arabia. His visit was an attempt to defuse any rifts from
the loss of Mubarak and assure the richest Arab country of Egypt’s obligation
toward Gulf security.[18] Acknowledging
the importance of keeping Egypt to its side, the Kingdom granted Egypt $4
billion to help keep its economy afloat.[19] Despite
the apparent public recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, the Saudis
have boycotted the “Quartet for Syria” (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Egypt)
meetings initiated by Morsi during the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
summit in Mecca in August 2012. The Kingdom is wary of recent interactions
between Egypt and Iran, and it rejects any role for Iran in a solution for
Syria, reluctant to overlook Iran’s role an instigator of the conflict through
its funding and arming of the Syrian regime.
Politics in Reverse with Qatar
and UAE
Mubarak had tense relations with
Qatar after the current Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa deposed his father in
1995, and this tension was amplified by the recurring appearances of Egyptian opposition
members voicing their criticisms of Mubarak on the Doha-based Al Jazeera. On
the other hand, Mubarak enjoyed very close relations with the UAE and its late
leader Sheikh Zayed al-Nahyan. Since Morsi’s ascendance to the presidency,
however, Qatar and the UAE have reversed their stances toward Egypt. Like the
Saudis, the UAE is no big fan of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, the UAE has
put on trial over 90 individuals with alleged links to the Brotherhood for
plotting to overthrow the regime.[20] This
trial follows the UAE government’s refusal to release 11 detained Egyptians
with alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood.[21] And
although the UAE was amongst the first countries to pledge aid to Egypt in
2011, none has materialized due to the cold relationship between the countries’
leaders. This tension has escalated with the recent accusation that the UAE is
financing anti-Morsi groups and establishing “hidden and conspicuous contacts”
with members of Egypt’s intelligence. Morsi’s finger-pointing reference during his
speech at the Arab League summit in March 2013 is seen as a direct message to
the UAE and other regional countries (like Saudi Arabia and Jordan) that are
skeptical of the Brotherhood’s ascendance in Egypt.[22]
In contrast to the UAE, the
Qataris are reaping the benefits of supporting Egypt’s uprising.[23] Qatar
dedicated Al Jazeera to support the anti-Mubarak protests and later the
ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qataris pledged not to allow Egypt to
go bankrupt and injected $5 billion dollars into the ailing Egyptian economy.[24] And
the Qatari emir called upon other Arab states to support Egypt’s economy.[25] However,
this has raised many concerns in Egyptian society and among political forces.[26] Doha
is taking a giant leap of faith with the Brotherhood, aiming to forge a close
alliance with Cairo and maximize its regional posture. Qatar offers the
Brotherhood important assets, including financial capital and favorable Al
Jazeera coverage, surpassing the influence of the UAE and approaching the
amount of socioeconomic influence that Saudi Arabia once exerted and might
exert on Egypt if it attains such political will in the future. But as Sultan
al-Qassemi aptly observes, “while the UAE has alienated Egypt’s new leaders,
Qatar has alienated Egypt’s population.”[27]
From Tehran with Love
Iran has expressed a great
interest in restarting its relations with Egypt. Iranian leaders have sought to
capitalize on the country’s new Islamist government to forge closer ties.[28] Egypt
has, however, hesitated to fully embrace Iran. Despite the exchange of visits
by both presidents for the first time in 30 years, the trips to Tehran and
Cairo did not lead to the normalization of relations between the two states,
though various groups within and outside Egypt expressed such concerns.[29] Iran’s
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was assaulted twice,[30] including
by a shoe in an Islamic Cairo neighborhood, and his country’s policies were
heavily criticized by the Grand Imam of al-Azhar—the bulwark of Sunni Islam.[31] Nonetheless,
Tehran’s eagerness to lure Egypt into normalization led to its cancellation of
the need for tourist and business visas for Egyptians to encourage travel to
Iran[32]and
an offer of a “big credit line” to help Egypt’s ailing economy.[33]
Iran’s anxious attempts to renew
relations with Egypt may also be attributed in part to escalating pressure and
international sanctions against Tehran.[34] The
United States and the EU have tightened sanctions on Iran, with particular
focus on financial sectors and the oil industry. By re-establishing relations
with Egypt, Iran may hope to win safe access to the Suez Canal and bypass
sanctions by opening a new market for its goods. Moreover, in light of the
worsening conflict inside Syria, Iran may be pursuing an alliance with Egypt to
counteract the potential loss of its Syrian ally. The Syrian crisis has left Iran
standing alone while other regional players side with the Syrian opposition.
Despite the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood, it is naïve to assume that Islamists in Egypt will automatically
ally with those in Iran. Egypt’s Islamist movement is predominantly Sunni, as
are its Arab allies in the Gulf who share an interest in countering Shi`i and
Iranian influence in the region. Domestically, the Salafi party, al-Nour, is
leading the fight against the spread of Shi`ism in Egypt.[35] Its
members have gone so far as to warn[36] against
opening Egypt to Iranian tourism, for fear that it would increase Shi`i
influence and challenge Egypt’s Sunni character.[37] In
addition, Egypt seeks to preserve its vital relationship with the West and the
GCC, at least in the short-term, to help overcome its growing economic crisis.
Un-Revolutionary Foreign
Policy
The toppling of Hosni Mubarak has
brought many changes to the domestic politics of Egypt. However, nothing
revolutionary has materialized on the foreign policy front. We continue to see
a relegation of the role of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry as an “implementer”
rather than an “instigator”[38] of
foreign policy. Morsi is relying on close assistants in the presidential
office like Essam Haddad to conduct much of the day-to-day business of Egypt’s
foreign policy, from making public statements to holding private meetings with
visiting foreign ministers.[39] Indeed,
it remains unclear whether and to what extent Morsi has such a working relationship
with his own Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr and other career diplomats.
Over the course of recent decades, moreover, Cairo has managed to tangle itself
in the orbits of the United States, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies, a reality
that diminishes opportunities for drastic changes in the short to medium term.
Thus, it is difficult to see the Egyptian government’s attempts to seek Iraqi
and Libyan investments and funding replacing those of the UAE, Saudi Arabia,
and international donors.[40] For
Egypt to change its foreign policy agenda, it must first stabilize its
socioeconomic system and develop mature leadership with a clear vision and goals
for Egypt’s future. None of these stars are aligned at the moment.
Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Middle East Institute's Arab Transition Blog.
