An Eager Iran & Hesitant Egypt: Relations Before & After the Arab Spring

By: Ahmed Morsy

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadineja (L) and Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi (R) (Source: Foreignpolicy.com)

In the wake of the Egyptian revolution, Iran has sought to capitalize on the country’s new Islamist government to forge closer ties between the two nations. Egypt has, however, hesitated to embrace Iran. Indeed, any future alliance between the two countries remains fraught with challenges. The explanation for this can be found in the historical relationship between the two countries, as well as in Egypt’s strategic alliance with the United States and other Arab states that staunchly oppose Iranian influence in the region.

A Historical Overview of Iranian-Egyptian Relations

Egyptian-Iranian relations have included periods of competition and cooperation, friendship and enmity. Prior to the Iranian revolution, the two countries enjoyed close relations influenced by the personal friendship between Egyptian president, Anwar al-Sadat, and Iranian shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. The two leaders shared common interests in building their nations, held a pro-Western bias during the Cold War, and were anxious about the rise of domestic Islamist movements.

After the overthrow of the Shah and ascendance of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Egyptian-Iranian relationship changed into one of distrust and bitterness.  The deterioration grew out of several factors, including Khomeini’s condemnation of the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty, the close relationship between Sadat and the United States, Egypt’s decision to host the ousted Iranian Shah in Cairo, and the Egyptian government’s refusal to hand the Shah over to the revolutionary regime in Tehran. After Sadat’s assassination, one of Tehran’s streets was named after his assassin, Khaled al-Islambouli. In response, Egypt cut all ties with the Iranian government.

Iranian support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas alienated the Egyptians further and was a factor in Egypt’s decision to support Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran in the 1980’s. Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric and presumed influence over the Gulf’s Shiite population pushed Egypt to create a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia to counterbalance Khomeini’s evolving regional aspirations.

After Khomeini’s death, the Iranian leadership began a new path toward reconciliation with neighboring Gulf States. Under the leadership of presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and later Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Iran focused on developing commercial and trade relations with its Arab neighbors and the region as a whole.

Iran’s new approach to the region also extended to Egypt, though the pace of engagement was slower and less successful as compared to the Gulf States. After an extended period of stagnation, relations finally moved forward following a phone call between Presidents Mubarak and Khatami in June 2000. A series of goodwill gesturesfollowed, including a decision from the Tehran City Council to entertain Khatami’s request to rename the street for Sadat’s assassin as “intifada.” The move was hailed by Egyptian parliamentarians, including the Muslim Brotherhood’s then-leader in Parliament and current Egyptian President, Dr. Mohamed Morsi. At the time, Morsi said“there was abundance of goodwill between the two countries before Tehran made this move, perhaps the path is now open to strengthen ties between them.”

Other developments followed. This included a meeting between Presidents Mubarak and Khatami at a UN technology summit in Geneva where they exchanged views dubbed “very important,” and an invitation for Mubarak toattend the D-8 economic summit in Tehran for developing nations.

After Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, the Iranian government continued efforts to normalize relations with Egypt. In 2007, Ahmadinejad said “We are determined to pursue normalization of relations with Egypt, and if the Egyptian government declares its readiness, before the working hour is over today, we are willing to open Iran’s embassy in Cairo.”

Despite these gestures of friendship, Mubarak remained unprepared to pursue better relations with Iran. The Egyptian President enjoyed strong relations with the Gulf monarchies, especially the Saudis, and had built a strategic alliance with Iran’s adversaries, the United States and Israel. For the Mubarak government, maintaining these connections was far more important than reestablishing diplomatic relations with Tehran.

Egypt’s Uprising: Any Prospects for Conciliation?

Shortly after the start of the Egyptian revolution, on February 4th, 2011, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made statements that compared the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt with Iran’s Islamic revolution. Khamenei further described the upheaval in the region as ‘liberating the Islamic movement’ and dealing a blow to the United States.

Khamenei’s comments were intended, in part, to win over the rising Islamist parties in these countries. Unsurprisingly, these statements spurred negative responses from Mubarak’s foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit. Aboul Gheit condemned Khamenei’s comments as “revealing feelings of hatred and hostility toward Egypt.” The Brotherhood also rejected the Supreme Leader’s statement, insisting it was the ‘Egyptian people’s revolution.”

After Mubarak’s fall, Tehran believed a new relationship with Cairo would soon follow.  On April 4th, 2011, Egypt’s new foreign minister, Nabil Al Araby, met with the head of the Iranian Interest Section in Cairo. During the meeting, Al Araby “affirmed that Egypt is opening a new page with all countries including Iran, and the Egyptian and Iranian peoples deserve having relations that reflect their history and culture, provided they are based on mutual respect for the state sovereignty and the non-interference whatsoever in the internal affairs.”

Two months later, an Egyptian delegation of intellectuals, journalists, and businessmen visited Tehran. Dubbed the “people’s diplomacy delegation,” Ahmadinejad and several key government officials received the delegation. Together, they discussed opportunities for restoring ties between the two countries, with Ahmadinejad expressing his willingness to support and share Iran’s industrial and technological expertise with Egypt. Ahmadinejad also took the opportunity to speak of ‘enemies’ opposing renewed relations between the two countries. Two months later, a delegation of Iranian parliamentarians arrived in Cairo.

Iran welcomed the July 2012 inauguration of Mohamed Morsi as Egypt’s first Islamist President. Ahmadinejadspoke with Morsi to wish him success and invited the new President to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Tehran in late August.

Several days before the Morsi-Ahmadinejad call, Iran’s Fars News Agency, published a fabricated interview with the newly elected Egyptian president claiming he was ‘interested in closer ties with Iran’ and ‘sought revisions to the Camp David Accords with Israel.’ The Egyptian government denied these reports and asserted that “legal action will be taken against the Iranian Fars news agency, which fabricated an interview.” The FARS news report received another blow after Morsi made public comments pledging to be ‘president for all Egyptians,’ and ‘to honor all international treaties.’

The Iranian Rationale

Iran’s response to the Egyptian revolution has several potential motivations. First, Tehran may hope to capitalize on post-Arab Spring realities and the rise of Islamists to advance its narrative of an ‘Islamic Awakening’ and to bolster anti-Western sentiments among regional governments.

Second, Iran’s anxious attempts to renew relations with Egypt may also be attributed in part to escalating pressure and international sanctions against Tehran.  The U.S. and the EU have tightened sanctions on Iran, with particular focus on financial sectors and the oil industry. By re-establishing relations with Egypt, Iran may hope to win safe access to the Suez Canal and bypass sanctions by opening a new market for its goods.

Finally, in light of the worsening conflict inside Syria, Iran may be pursuing an alliance with Egypt to counteract the potential loss of its Syrian ally. The Syrian crisis has left Iran standing alone while other regional players side with the Syrian opposition.

The Egyptian Position

Morsi’s decision to attend the NAM summit in Tehran was met with concern from the Western media, who saw it as a victory for Iran. Egypt has responded with an outreach strategy to reassure its regional and international partners that Morsi’s stopover in Tehran – after a state visit to China – does not signal a shift in Egyptian foreign policy and that any possible engagement with Iran will not come at their expense. This strategy likely influenced the U.S. State Department’s decision to downplay Morsi’s Iran visit, stating that normalization of relations between Egypt and Iran is “a national decision (for Egypt) to make.”

Morsi’s speech at the summit criticizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime is further evidence that the President has decided to side with Egypt’s Arab and Western partners over and above the Iranians, who were noticeably displeased with his comments.

Conclusion

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise, it is naïve to assume that Islamists in Egypt will automatically ally with those in Iran. Egypt’s Islamist movement is predominantly Sunni, as are its Arab allies in the Gulf who share an interest in countering Shiite and Iranian influence in the region. Domestically, the Salafi party, al-Nour, is leading the fight against the spread of Shiism in Egypt. Its members have gone so far as to warn against opening Egypt to Iranian tourism, for fears this would increase Shiite influence and challenge Egypt’s Sunni character.

Egypt’s regional and foreign policy will not change swiftly to embrace Iran. Morsi has continually promised to respect Egypt’s international treaties and maintain its close relationship with other Arab states, specifically Saudi Arabia where Morsi made his first official state visit as president. In addition, Egypt will seek to preserve its strategic relationship with several Western countries and the United States. Most importantly, Egypt’s relationship with the West and the GCC is vital, at least in the short-term, to help Egypt overcome its growing economic crisis.

*Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and PhD Candidate at School of International Relations, University of St Andrews. This piece was originally published in a special edition by Muftah.org and Insideiran.org. A later version appeared at Egypt Independent

SCAF Declaration Turns "Soft Coup" Into Hard Reality

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: AP

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has issued an addendum to the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that human rights activists fear will institutionalizemilitary dictatorship in Egypt. The SCAF’s decision to issue amendments to several articles on the eve of the announcement of the official presidential results was strategically timed to avoid accusations of anti-Brotherhood bias after a likely victory by the Freedom and Justice Party’s candidate Mohamed Morsi.

The announcement has renewed concerns that the SCAF is seeking to prolong its political role beyond June 30, the previously announced deadline for its transfer of power to an elected civilian president. Although the SCAF has renewed its pledge to hand over power by the end of the month, the dissolution of Parliament and subsequent transfer of legislative authorities to the military (confirmed in yesterday’s constitutional declaration) means that the SCAF will continue to wield significant political power until a new Parliament is formed – which the latest SCAF declaration suggests will not take place until a month after the new constitution has been written.

The new addendum referenced the role of the newly elected President as stated in Article 56 of the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration. According to the original article, the President possesses supreme rights that no other institution can challenge, especially in the absence of the Parliament. These rights include the issuing of laws and vetoing of Parliament-proposed legislation, appointing the cabinet and state bureaucracies, negotiating treaties and representing Egypt at home and abroad. In the new constitutional supplement, however, the SCAF has abridged presidential powers and further entrenched the military establishment as a de facto fourth branch of government. The SCAF now wields legislative power and the prerogative to oversee all military-related matters until a new Constitution is written and a Parliament is elected a month later. The generals, moreover, by giving themselves the right under Articles 60-B and 60-B1 to form and intervene in the work of the Constituent Assembly, have thus successfully engineered a legal basis for perpetuating their political and economic privileges in the new system and more importantly institutionalizing the “soft coup” they staged in February 2011.

In retrospect, the generals would not have been able to seize this opportunity and issue the new articles if the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) had not ruled the parliamentary law unconstitutional last week, a decision that required the dissolution of the recently elected People’s Assembly. In addition, the military and its security services were further empowered by last week’s Ministry of Justice Decree giving military police and intelligence officers sweeping powers  to arrest civilians, a move that effectively replaces the recently expired Emergency Law with martial law.

It is apparent that the generals issued this new constitutional declaration to maintain their interests and preemptively curb the powers of the President to prepare for their worst case scenario: a win by Mohamed Morsi. No matter how hard the generals feign impartiality, it is clear Shafik would be much more amenable to the perpetuation of military influence over Egypt’s political future, in comparison with Morsi and the Brotherhood, who represent a serious threat to the SCAF’s institutional and economic interests.

On the whole, the constitutional addendum enshrines the power of the military as a separate branch of government that is not only protected from civilian oversight, but possesses the power to check the president’s political agenda. By reserving for itself the power to issue laws and oversee the state budget, as well as veto presidential declarations of war, the SCAF has signaled that it is only willing to partially surrender its interim executive authorities. Instead of returning to the barracks by June 30 as promised to the Egyptian people, the generals have effectively broken their commitment and extended their rule until at least a new constitution is written, a process that could take months. The new powers that the SCAF has unilaterally claimed for itself present a serious and frustrating setback to Egypt’s so-called “democratic” transition. As human rights activist Hossam Baghat remarked, “Egypt just witnessed the smoothest military coup.  We’d be outraged if we weren’t so exhausted." 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

On the Eve of Pivotal Supreme Court Rulings, All Scenarios Point to Turmoil

By: Ahmed Morsy

Photo Credit: AP

Egypt’s judiciary has emerged as a surprising new power-broker on the political scene, pushing the limits of its jurisdiction to rule on a number of polarizing and partisan disputes that have the potential to derail Egypt’s democratic transition just as it reaches the threshold of a transfer of power to civilian leadership. The judges - already struggling for their independence in the face of alleged interference from the executive branch -- have come under intense scrutiny after a controversial decision to suspendthe Constituent Assembly, then the trial against of NGO employees, and most recently the sentencing of former President Mubarak to a 25-year (life) prison term and acquitting his sons and six senior security officials. However, the most significant rulings that will impact Egypt’s democratic transition are still to come on June 14.  Just two days before the scheduled presidential runoff between Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s last prime minister, and Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, the Supreme Constitutional Court will review the constitutionality of both the Political Disenfranchisement and Parliament laws. The decisions of the court will have a tremendous effect on Egypt’s future and could prolong the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

The SCAF as well as political factions have committed terrible mistakes that threaten to reverse the whole transitional process back to square one. The upcoming Supreme Court rulings are politically charged and raise difficult questions about the next steps. For instance, in the case of barring Ahmed Shafiq, will the entire presidential election be re-run from scratch, or will the race be limited to the 12 candidates who competed in the first round? On June 13, Hatem Bagato, the secretary general of the Presidential Election Commission (PEC), suggested that the latter would be the appropriate course of action, but the SCC has yet to decide. If the Parliament is deemed unconstitutional, how would Islamists react to losing control of the legislative branch? Parliamentary Speaker Saad al-Katatny has stated that Parliament will abide by the SCC’s ruling, yet he insists that Parliament cannot be dissolved until the next elected president takes office – if and when that happens. How would these rulings affect the already struggling Constituent Assembly tasked with writing the new Constitution? And finally how would the Egyptians react to the new changes, bearing in mind that it might lead to the extension of SCAF’s rule beyond the June 30 deadline?

Several scenarios have been argued by various constitutional and legal experts regarding the constitutionality of the discussed laws. Below I tried to offer a concise summary of these various possibilities based on some legal opinions.     

Constitutional Court Scenarios for the Disenfranchisement Law:

• The disenfranchisement law is found to be unconstitutional. Ahmed Shafiq will be allowed to participate in the presidential elections runoff on June 16-17 (Most Likely)
   
• The SCC declines to review the constitutionality of the law, finding that the Supreme Presidential Elections Commission (SPEC) did not have jurisdiction to refer it in the first place. The disenfranchisement law is allowed to stand.
   
• The law is upheld and Ahmed Shafiq is banned from the runoff; the election is suspended and restarted (least likely)

Constitutional Court Scenarios for the Parliament Law:

• Law is ruled unconstitutional and Parliament is dissolved (likely option)
   
• Removing party-based MPs from the individual candidates' seats they won, and re-running elections for those seats.  (another likely option that would minimize conflict with the Islamist majority)
   
• Law is ruled unconstitutional but Parliament is allowed to serve out the remainder of its term before new elections are called.
   
•  Law is upheld (least likely, in light of strong precedents for dissolving Parliament on constitutional grounds in 1984, 1987, and 1990)

The Four possible scenarios after the Constitutional Court rulings on June 14:

Scenario 1 

High possibility - Islamists weakened, and Parliament dissolved):

• Disenfranchisement Law is ruled unconstitutional. The elections continue and Ahmed Shafiq participates in the runoff on June 16-17.
   
• The Parliament Law found to be unconstitutional. Parliament will be dissolved and the electoral law changed, leading to a new round of parliamentary elections.

Scenario 2

(Least likely):

• Disenfranchisement Law is upheld (SCC declines to review the law because the electoral commission had no authority to refer it to the SCC in the first place). The Presidential election is halted; Ahmed Shafiq barred, and the election is restarted, probably including only the 12 candidates who participated in the first round.
   
•  Parliament Law is upheld and the legislature is not dissolved.

Scenario 3

(Compromise – Power sharing arrangement between SCAF & MB):

• Disenfranchisement Law ruled unconstitutional. The elections continue and Ahmed Shafiq participates in the runoff on June 16-17.
   
•  Parliament Law is upheld and the legislature is not dissolved.

Scenario 4

(Worst Case; Leads to the continuation of SCAF and wide array of havoc):

•  Disenfranchisement Law is ruled constitutional. The Presidential elections is halted; Ahmed Shafiq barred, and the elections are restarted.
   
•  Parliament Law is ruled unconstitutional. Parliament to be dissolved and the electoral law changed.

 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Egypt's Transition in Danger of Regression

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: AP 

The word “transition” implies both an origin and a destination, yet Egypt’s transitional period is still circling around a dead-end.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has proven incompetent in leading the interim period, except in matters affecting the military. A bigger problem is that none of the other civil political forces in Egypt has yet managed to fill the power vacuum left by Mubarak. Meanwhile, a wave of legal turmoil is shaking up an already volatile political scene. The past weeks have witnessed several controversial decisions and court rulings on a wide range of issues from suspending the constituent assembly to banning 10 presidential candidates and approving a ‘Disenfranchisement Law’ That bars former Mubarak officials from public office.

In the midst of these recent legal developments, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Solidarity (MoISS) issued a contentious decision – on April 23 - denying registration requests for eight American civil society organizations. The Egyptian government claims that the “activities of these NGOs violate Egypt’s sovereignty.” Among these groups are the human rights and election monitoring Carter Center, the development group Coptic Orphans, and the youth-based conflict resolution organization Seeds of Peace. Despite claims made by the Egyptian government, these organizations assert they did not receive any official notices or charges to date. Most of these NGOs, including the ones put on trial last February, have been operating in Egypt for years and their activities were widely known and tracked by the Egyptian authorities. Among these well-established and legitimate organizations is the Carter Center, which was invited last year to “witness” Egypt’s Parliamentary elections. The Egyptian government’s decision to deny the application of an NGO that has been invited by the same government just a few months ago to observe the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections is both inconsistent and irrational.

This unfortunate decision is reminiscent of the NGOs crackdown last December, which resulted in civil society groups being charged with operating and receiving money illegally in a politically motivated trial that has now been postponed until June 5. The MoISS decision issued one month ahead of the upcoming Presidential election is another blow to democracy, and signals to the international community that Egypt’s interim leaders are no more committed to transparency and human rights than their authoritarian predecessor.

On the same day that the eight American NGOs were denied registration, the Supreme Presidential Elections Committee (SPEC) issued the regulations for local as well as foreign NGOs planning to witness the Presidential elections. Unlike the regulations for the Parliamentary elections, foreign groups will now need to be registered in Egypt and file the names of their individual observers, which cannot include any Egyptian nationals, to a special committee comprised of representatives from the SPEC as well as the ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and National Security. This special committee will evaluate the applications and make recommendations to the SPEC, which will issue final decisions on the registration of international observers. However, the electoral commission also reserves the right to invite any organization it deems appropriate, even if it is not registered in Egypt, to observe the elections. It’s important to highlight that the SPEC’s decisions are immune against appeals according to article 28 of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration. This article defines the SPEC’s decisions as final and authoritative, which is an infringement on the constitutional right to due process.

The next couple of weeks will witness crucial decisions that will impact the duration of the transitional period and shape the character of Egypt’s next elected government. Rumors are circulating that the Presidential elections may even be postponed over legal challenges to certain electoral procedures. The Parliament’s vote to reject the Cabinet’s management plan and withdraw confidence from the government represents a challenge in the relationship between the SCAF and Parliament. Furthermore, we should not forget the much anticipated ruling on May 6 that will determine the constitutionality of the Parliamentary Law. If the legality of the parliamentary elections is successfully challenged, it could bring about dramatic consequences and possibly necessitate the dissolution of Parliament. A political shake-up of this magnitude could further  aggravate Egypt’s ailing economy and delay the military’s transfer of power to civilians beyond the June 30 deadline -- leading to a chaotic state of affairs that will not be favorable for any Egyptian whether in power or on the streets. 

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

    

Is Egypt "Change Blind"?

By: Ahmed Morsy 

     Photo Credit: Foreign Policy

Political analysis alone cannot adequately explain the troubled state of Egypt’s transition.  The current crisis is rooted as much in social psychology as it is in politics. As Egypt’s political forces engage are polarizing around the volatile debates over the new constitution and Egypt’s next president, it appears that the population is collectively suffering from a phenomenon known as change blindness. This condition is defined as “a phenomenon in visual perception in which very large changes occurring in full view in a visual scene are not noticed.” In other words, it explains how humans can fail to notice major changes occurring right in front of their eyes and respond only after a delay or not at all. Experiments have shown that brain often does not react to change, and instead tends to portray what the observer expects to see, even if it changes in reality.

Could “change blindness" be one explanation for what happened to Egyptians after the takeover of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) from Mubarak? Or is it “selective listening” to when then-Vice President Omar Sulieman announced the hand in power statement? Or is maybe a selective reading and understanding of the country’s history that has resulted in the public’s failure to anticipate or combat the damaging consequences of protracted military rule?

This is by no means an accusation against one single group or institution in Egypt. It is a collective failure to comprehend the dramatic change of 2011 from all parties involved, whether it is the SCAF, political parties, or general public. For 60 years, Egypt has been governed through military-backed regimes. When Egyptians took to the streets in January 2011 to demand change and toppling the regime, they only succeeded in removing the “civilian” mask that was running the country.

Fourteen months since the January uprisings, it is more evident that though Egypt’s dictator fell, the dictatorship remains. Though the transfer of power from Mubarak to SCAF was unconstitutional, the people welcomed it out of their wide respect for the military, helped along by the army’s neutral stance during the 18 days and claims to have been the only institution that “sided” with the people against the Mubarak regime. But since then, the SCAF has further consolidated the power of the regime, maintaining economic and political privileges behind the façade of supporting a transitional phase into democracy. The failure of the military junta to realize and consider the people’s aspirations over the past year has left the country in political stagnation and strife, a deepening economic crisis and social upheaval.

At the same time, the old and new political forces have also failed in maintaining momentum and unified support for the revolution’s demands. Some have played upon the religiosity of the people to promote certain ideologies while being co-opted by the ruling generals to provide a civilian cover-up to its rule, and others have disastrously failed to connect with the public and participate effectively in the transition. The distorted political process has left the political forces as well as the general public divided and fighting the wrong battles.

On the other hand, the general public – revolutionaries and the silent majority – have also contributed to the chaotic transitional process. The lack of unity and clear vision from the political elite and ruling generals created misunderstanding and confusion for the people. It left the Egyptians to create their own interpretation of the events and decisions taken, which by default increased the rift between certain segments of the society.

Despite all the events that have taken place in Egypt thus far, now is not the time for pessimism. However, Egypt is long overdue for a wake-up call. Egyptians need to realize their weaknesses to be able to overcome them. We need to understand that democracy isn’t created overnight, and it’s not only the rule of the majority but also the respect for the opinions of the minorities. Change blindness, selective reading or listening are human weaknesses; and we all have to admit our faults and differences to able to start building the "new" Egypt.     

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was published originally on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Egypt’s NGO Crisis: Political Theater Preventing Democratic Progress

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Huffington Post

Hopes were high that the second session of the NGO trial, held on March 8, would yield a resolution to the worst crisis in US-Egypt relations since the 1967 war. Robert Becker, the only indicted American who did not choose to leave the country after the travel ban was lifted, said he stayed to stand trial along with the 14 accused Egyptians because he is convinced of his innocence and the fairness of the Egyptian judiciary. But after today’s discouraging hearing, a solution seems to be slipping even further out of reach. The presiding judge decided to postpone the case to April 10 and called on the General Prosecutor’s office to bring in all accused foreigners who fled the country last week.     

The strained relationship between Egypt and the United States has been in the epicenter of local and international news for the past 2 months. All around the world, concerned observers have been riveted on the crackdown on Egyptian and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that started suddenly on December 29, 2011. Early on, there were clear signs that this politically motivated investigation was not being conducted fairly or transparently. The investigators and the Egyptian government officials held press conferences and spoke to the media about sensitive information that should have been kept undisclosed due to the ongoing investigation. Egyptian officials, in particular Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Aboul Naga, have repeatedly insisted on upholding Egypt’s right to investigate irregularities and spurred a xenophobic media campaign against the United States and the targeted NGOs. The “Egypt wont kneel” video of Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri speaking at the People’s Assembly brought back memories of similar video of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1964, criticizing the U.S. and its aid policies.

Meanwhile, the United States has been in crisis-management mode. In response to the escalating investigation, the United States sent several delegations of senators and congressmen, diplomats and military officials in an attempt to negotiate with the Egyptian authorities, while threatening to withhold Egypt’s $1.3 billion military aid budget.

Shortly after the Egyptian government raided the offices of 17 NGOs in Cairo on December 29, I wrote an analysis questioning the motivations behind the investigation and criticizing the mismanagement of the process. It was apparent from the sudden escalation of the judicial inquiry that this case was politically driven from the start, and was anything but an independent or democratic process, as Egyptian officials tried to claim. And the abrupt and dramatic lifting of the travel ban last week confirms beyond a doubt that this case is a piece of political theater directed by Egypt’s leaders, who are manipulating the judiciary to advance their own strategic interests. On February 29, just three days after the first court session of the case, an Egyptian judge decided to lift the travel barring foreign NGO employees from leaving the country with a bail of 2 million Egyptian pounds (about $300,000). This mysterious decision, quickly attributed to a dodgy bilateral deal, and the departure of the foreigners the day after prompted a divide within the executive and judicial branches in Egypt, each blaming the other for betraying and selling out Egypt’s sovereignty and national dignity. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) failed to issue any explanatory statement, despite rising pressure from members of parliament who are demanding an inquiry into the government’s handling of the case.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri’s cabinet has also come under fire from Parliament, as prominent members of the Brotherhood and other political forces accuse Ganzouri’s ministers of caving to American pressure. On March 8, Ahmed Fathi, head of the Brotherhood’s Shura Council, described the Cabinet as “weak and shaky” and warned that the People’s Assembly may call for a vote of no confidence within days. International Cooperation Minister Fayza Aboul Naga is struggling to defend the besieged cabinet – and her own job – andclaimed that only the SCAF has the authority to form a new government, according to the interim constitution. As the Parliament escalates its fierce attack on the executive branch, it’s clear that the SCAF’s biggest problem right now is not the United States, but its own legitimacy crisis.

Looking beyond the tense bilateral relationship, the NGO case is much bigger than a diplomatic hiccup in the US-Egypt relationship; it reflects a lack of accountability on the part of Egypt’s leaders and the chaos that has resulted from their mismanagement of the transition and failure to put forward a vision for the future. Since the SCAF took after Mubarak’s resignation last February, Egypt has been stumbling from one hurdle to the next with no clear vision or strategy for correcting failed policies. Starting with the dubious Constitutional Declarationdelegating all executive powers to the ruling generals, Egypt’s political transition has been further complicated by a chaotic electoral law and process and the deepening economic crisis.

The latest stumbling block, a xenophobic and politically motivated row with the United States over NGO funding, is another short-term distraction that prevents Egypt’s political forces from working collaboratively to develop a long-term vision for the country’s future. This self-destructive behavior was aptly described by Thomas Friedman as “Egypt’s Step Backward.” Some would argue that this view is overly pessimistic, but I believe it is a sorely needed reality check. You can’t fight an enemy you don’t know, and therefore it is imperative that Egyptians recognize that the greatest obstacles to a democratic transition are domestic not foreign.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.