The Grand Sheikh and the President

By: Ahmed Morsy

From Muhammad Ali to Mohamed Morsi, modern Egyptian leaders have understood that any attempt to control the state without the endorsement, if not blatant co-option, of key institutions such as al-Azhar is an ill-fated pursuit. The headache for President Morsi is that these institutions are trying to assert their independence and are presenting a range of direct and indirect challenges to his authority and, more broadly, to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).  One cannot truly grasp the crisis of legitimacy and strategy facing President Morsi without an understanding of the frictional relationships between the state, al-Azhar, and the Muslim Brotherhood before and since the 25 January 2011 uprising.

State Co-Option of al-Azhar

Al-Azhar is recognized as a fundamental and respected source of religious guidance for the Muslim umma (community).[1] Because of its influence and respected status, al-Azhar has been subjected to numerous attempts of co-option and control since the time of Muhammad Ali. He reorganized land ownership and nationalized thousands of acres of waqf (religious endowment) land, thereby limiting the financial resources on which al-Azhar depended. Since Ali, Egypt’s governments have worked hard to control al-Azhar through successive reorganization laws in 1896, 1911, and 1930. The combined effect of these laws was the centralization of al-Azhar’s administration, which effectively facilitated future manipulation of the grand sheikh’s role and the institution by the Egyptian state.

The greatest infiltration of al-Azhar, however, occurred under Gamal Abdel Nasser, who “understood the importance of gaining control over al-Azhar in order to ensure domestic control and promote his foreign-policy objectives.”[2] Under the infamous Law 103 of 1961, Nasser placed the entire institution under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Endowments and, consequently, ensured that all financial resources would be directed through non-Azhar state officials. The law also made the appointment of the grand sheikh the prerogative of the Egyptian president.

Nasser’s domination of al-Azhar set the path for its future manipulation by both Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. While Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all relied on the use of al-Azhar and religious symbolism as part of their legitimization tactics to achieve political gains, each manipulated Islamic references in a slightly different way. Nonetheless, their strategy of controlling al-Azhar rested on three main considerations: they recognized that an institution as established and respected as al-Azhar could provide legitimacy and support for their policies; they realized that they needed a strong counterbalance to the growing religious influence of both internal forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis and external forces like Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism; and they understood that garnering al-Azhar’s power could ensure regional stability among Arab and Muslim nations due to the institution’s influence and legitimacy.

By controlling al-Azhar, the government tainted the neutrality and integrity of the institution.  In “supporting” the corrupt and ineffective state, al-Azhar has at times been considered an accessory to the state’s violations and, accordingly, a failure in upholding the true tenets of Islam.  Illustratively, Sheikh Abd al-Hamid Kishk, a popular Islamist preacher, criticized al-Azhar’s giving-in to the government, arguing that “ever since the reform [of 1961], the leadership of al-Azhar has ceased to render any service to Islam.”[3]

Al-Azhar and the Brotherhood: It’s Complicated

Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna was skeptical at the frail role of al-Azhar in opposing the British occupation of Egypt, the corrupt monarchy, and encroaching Western values. Unlike Muhammad Abduh’s call for Islamic revivalism and critical thinking, al-Banna advocated for a stricter version of Islam, as he believed that all Egypt’s “illnesses” (such as poverty, corruption, and occupation) were a result of adopting Western values and failing to adhere to Islam.  From here came the famous, ambiguous slogan, “Islam is the Solution.”  By the time of Nasser, Brotherhood skepticism toward al-Azhar had turned into antagonism.

The Brotherhood faced heavy setbacks under Nasser. After the “failed assassination attempt” on the president in 1954,[4] the group was banned and thousands of its members were tortured or killed or fled the country. During this period, al-Azhar stood with Nasser against the Brotherhood, and its senior scholars issued several statements that portrayed the Brotherhood’s ideology as a threat to social cohesion and as anti-Islamic and apostate.[5] Many Brotherhood members have never forgotten or forgiven al-Azhar for this betrayal or the way that al-Azhar became a tool of subsequent regimes against the Brotherhood and extremist groups.

A more recent case that shows how this bitterness is still at play is the 2006 Brotherhood-affiliated students’ “military parade” at al-Azhar University. Grand Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, university president at the time, criticized the Brotherhood, accused it of infiltrating al-Azhar via the parade, and vowed that the university would never be an open field for Islamists to spread their religious and political ideologies.[6] Over 100 students were arrested, and Mubarak’s regime used the arrests as a pretext to detain senior Brotherhood leaders, later sentencing them in a military trial. 

Al-Azhar and the Brotherhood beyond 25 January 2011

In the last two years, al-Azhar has managed to re-emerge as an important player in the political and social vacuum created by the 2011 uprising. It took progressive steps by bringing together Coptic leaders, Islamists, opposition figures, women, and youth and sponsoring several consensus initiatives[7] in a way that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) failed to do and Morsi has yet to accomplish. Understanding the importance of al-Azhar against the rising Islamists, the SCAF hastily issued a decree to amend Law 103 of 1961, establishing a quasi-independent position for al-Azhar.[8] Its main component was reinstalling the senior scholars council that would elect al-Azhar’s grand sheikh and nominate Egypt’s mufti—a pre-Nasser selection process. The law stirred controversy,[9] especially since the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood regarded Grand Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb and Mufti Ali Gomaa as remnants of the Mubarak regime.[10] However, the Islamist-dominated parliament of 2011 decided not to challenge the law, and President Morsi later confirmed the composition of the council.[11]

Despite this display of accord, since Morsi’s election several incidents have characterized the friction between al-Azhar and the Brotherhood. The initial incident occurred when el-Tayeb walked out of Morsi’s inauguration at Cairo University after discovering that he would be seated at the back.[12] Despite the official explanation that blamed his seat assignment on “lack of organization,” it can be inferred as a snub against him, especially since Saad el-Katatni, a Brotherhood and FJP leader who held no official role in the government at the time, was seated in the front row among dignitaries.

In November 2012, Morsi issued a constitutional decree that sparked violent protests across the country. Al-Azhar challenged Morsi in a statement, saying that “the president of the republic must freeze the recent constitutional declaration and engage immediately in a dialogue that includes all political forces, without exception and without preconditions.”[13] Such a political statement, viewed within the context of al-Azhar’s successful track record of sponsoring inclusive dialogues, represented another blow to Morsi through criticism of his divisive policies.  

Another sticking point has been the new constitutional role of al-Azhar, chiefly Article 4, which enshrines the spirit of the SCAF-approved al-Azhar law.[14] The article stipulates that the senior scholars’ council is to be consulted on issues pertaining to the application of Shariah, but the language does not indicate when or which branches of government must carry out such consultations. Al-Azhar asserted its constitutional right by insisting that it review the contentious bill regarding Islamic bonds (sukuk). Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Complex said that “the draft [law] should have been referred to the Senior Scholars Authority for discussion and so it could give its legal opinion, in line with its duty.”[15] This move, supported by the Salafi al-Nour party, surprised the FJP and Morsi, who then acknowledged that al-Azhar did indeed have the right to review the law. Al-Azhar submitted nine amendments to the law, which were accepted unanimously by the Shura Council before Morsi signed it into law in May 2013.[16]  The case of the sukuk law set an important precedent for al-Azhar to review draft legislation in the future.

Recent public interest stories have also illustrated the rift between al-Azhar and the Brotherhood. Al-Azhar students affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have capitalized on the April 2013 food poisoning scandal on campus to call for the dismissal of the grand sheikh and the university president, who was indeed sacked. This case and the associated student protests have fueled conspiracy theories and brought concern of a “Brotherhoodization” of al-Azhar—controlling such prized positions as the grand sheikh and mufti—back to the forefront.[17] When a second round of food poisoning occurred just weeks later, the grand sheikh was in the United Arab Emirates receiving the Sheikh Zayed Book Award for Cultural Personality of the Year. El-Tayeb was recognized for his “leadership in moderation and tolerance…and lauded for encouraging a culture of tolerance, dialogue and protection of civil society.”[18] This particular praise for el-Tayeb, describing qualities that Morsi lacks and coming from Abu Dhabi at a time when the Emirati government led a crackdown against 94 members of al-Islah, an Islamist group suspected of having links to the Brotherhood, is a striking affront to Morsi and the Brotherhood back in Cairo.[19]

Conclusion

Beyond its tense relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Azhar faces internal challenges,[20] from an influx of extreme religious opinions (fatwas) presented by independent untrained preachers as well as its own faculty to a lack of institutional and educational reform and alleged instances of corruption. In recent discussions with senior aides to the grand sheikh, this author learned that al-Azhar is working with a consultancy firm to restructure its bureaucracy to improve the management of the institution and launch a satellite channel to present “moderate” Islamic views to counter extremist, Salafi interpretations promoted on channels like al-Nas and al-Rahma.[21] And in a huge step for al-Azhar’s bid for further independence, the prime minister recently delegated powers to the grand sheikh to issue and amend stipulations from the 1961 law regarding the internal administration of al-Azhar.[22] Though vaguely written, this decree represents a rare gesture from the government to return authority to the grand sheikh to govern al-Azhar’s internal affairs, authority that has been traditionally sidelined by the modern Egyptian state. It remains unclear what kind of discussions took place behind the scenes before this decree was issued, why Morsi and the Brotherhood would tacitly allow this to occur, and what changes the grand sheikh will pursue and be sanctioned to pursue in the near future.

With the Muslim Brotherhood in power and Islamist discourse crowding the public sphere, al-Azhar cannot help but to be an important player in Egyptian politics. A stark difference between the organizations, however, is their ambitions. While the Muslim Brotherhood seeks socioeconomic and political gains, as well as success at the ballot box, al-Azhar is concerned with ensuring its institutional independence and promoting its moderate interpretation of Islam. In the coming months, it will be important to follow the al-Azhar-Brotherhood dynamics, paying particular attention to public remarks by figureheads and possible reviews of legislation by al-Azhar. A large part of the contestation between the organizations lies in personality politics between el-Tayeb and al-Azhar’s senior scholars on the one hand, and Morsi and Brotherhood figures on the other. And because al-Azhar has already won the legitimacy game that the Brotherhood desperately seeks to champion itself, the historical contestation between both organizations will continue.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on Middle East Institute's Arab Transitions Blog.

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[1] As Nathan Brown observes, al-Azhar has historically had three key interests: to maintain institutional autonomy; to preserve its respected status through its role as key interpreter of Islam; and to encourage the propagation of Islam. Nathan Brown, “Post Revolutionary al-Azhar,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/al_azhar.pdf.

[2] Tamir Moustafa, “Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (February 2000).

[3] Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 183.

[4] Al-Ahram newspaper (Arabic), 27 October 1954, Accessed on 8 May 2013, http://digital.ahram.org.eg/youmy/EventBrowes2.aspx?addd=28573.

[5] Al-Ahram newspaper (Arabic), 17 November 1954, Accessed on 8 May 2013, http://digital.ahram.org.eg/youmy/EventBrowes2.aspx?addd=28594.

[6] Gamal Essam el-Din, “Unmasked Condemnation,” Ahram Weekly, 21-27 December 2006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/825/fr2.htm.

[7] For example, check the June 2011 al-Azhar document from the Egypt State Information Service, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=56424. Zeinab el-Gundy, “Al-Azhar Unveils 10-point Initiative to End Egypt's Political Crisis,” Ahramonline, 31 January 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/63759.aspx and Ahmed Morsy, “An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?,” Sada Journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 July 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/07/13/independent-voice-for-egypt-s-al-azhar/eiat.

[8] SCAF Decree no. 13 of 2012 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 19 January 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=279738.

[9] Gihane Shahin, “Change at Al-Azhar?,” Ahram Weekly, 8-11 February 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1083/eg51.htm.

[10] Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb was appointed as al-Azhar’s grand sheikh in March 2010 and previously held the positions of grand mufti (2002-2003) and president of al-Azhar University (2003-2010). Sheikh Ali Gomaa served as grand mufti from September 2003 until March 2013. Nadia Abou el-Magd, “Mubarak Appoints a New Chief of Al Azhar,” The National, 21 March 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/mubarak-appoints-a-new-chief-of-al-azhar#page1.

[11]Presidential Decree no. 24 of 2012 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 17 July 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=281274.

[12]“Egypt's Grand Imam Walked out of Morsi's Inauguration,” Ahram Online, 30 June 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/46560.aspx.

[13] Noha el-Hennawy, “Al-Azhar Body Calls on Morsy to Freeze Constitutional Declaration,” Egypt Independent, 6 December 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/al-azhar-body-calls-morsy-freeze-constitutional-declaration.

[14] 2012 Egypt Constitution (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 25 December 2012, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=281480; Nariman Youssef, “Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated,” Egypt Independent, 2 December 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated.

[15] “Al-Azhar Asserts Role, Clashes with the Brotherhood,” Egypt Independent, 29 March 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/al-azhar-asserts-role-clashes-brotherhood?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter.

[16] “Egypt's President Signs Islamic Bonds Bill into Law,” Ahramonline, 9 May 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/71025.aspx.

[17] Mai Shams el-Din, “Food Poisoning Scandal Further Deepens Political Split inside Al-Azhar,” Egypt Independent, 6 April 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/food-poisoning-scandal-further-deepens-political-split-inside-al-azhar.

[18] Mohammed Eissa, “Azhar Grand Imam el-Tayyeb Wins Cultural Personality Award,” Ahramonline, 30 April 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/18/0/70444/Books/Azhar-Grand-Imam-ElTayyeb-wins-Cultural-Personalit.aspx.

[19] Ayesha al-Khoori, “UAE Sedition Trial: Final Addresses for the 94 Accused as Court Sets Date for Verdict,” The National, 22 May 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/courts/uae-sedition-trial-final-addresses-for-the-94-accused-as-court-sets-date-for-verdict; “UAE to Try 94 Over Plot to Seize Power: Agency,”Reuters, 27 January 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-emirates-security-idUSBRE90Q0C120130127.

[20] Ahmed Morsy, “Al-Azhar on the Tightrope,” Sada Journal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 February 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/21/al-azhar-on-tightrope/fk3t.

[21] Author interviews at al-Azhar, April 2013.

[22] Prime Minster Decree no. 501 of 2013 (Arabic), Official Gazette, Court of Cassation Portal, 19 May 2013, http://www.cc.gov.eg/Legislations/Egypt_Legislations_Images.aspx?ID=282596.

Morsi’s Un-Revolutionary Foreign Policy

By: Ahmed Morsy

For over 30 years Egypt’s foreign policy has stood on three key pillars: building strategic relations with the United States, maintaining the peace treaty with Israel, and promoting the security of Arab states in the Gulf. The presidency and the security apparatus, moreover, have often overshadowed and minimized the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the policymaking process. These pillars solidified under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, and as a result President Mohamed Morsi will not be able to uproot them anytime soon. Though Egypt’s foreign policy under Morsi will undergo modest changes to its surface, its main foundations will remain cemented in place.

The fall of Mubarak received mixed reactions from regional leaders, most of whom had enjoyed a solid alliance with the deposed strongman and had concerns over the sudden uncertainty of Egypt’s political and economic future.[1] The election of Morsi sparked a number of questions about the trajectory of Egypt’s foreign policy and the regional order of the Middle East. Would Morsi’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood influence Egypt’s regional and foreign policy? Would the first “popularly” elected president walk away from Egypt’s commitments and alliances, particularly the relationships with Washington, Tel Aviv, and the Arab Gulf states? Since assuming office, Morsi has sought to reassure the international community that Egypt will maintain its strategic relationships and international commitments.[2] He has followed repetitive public guarantees with an array of state visits in an attempt to present himself as a statesman and assure Egypt’s allies that he, the Egyptian government, and the Muslim Brotherhood are reliable and responsible partners. And Morsi has also shown that, akin to Mubarak, he is adept at selecting a close circle of advisors to develop policy and even rival the duties of officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Steady Military but Wobbly Political Relations with Washington

Late Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat assumed leadership in 1971 with a determination to start a new chapter in Egypt’s relations with the West. Shortly after the end of the October War of 1973, Sadat adopted an open market policy to replace the socialist approach of his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sadat famously remarked in 1976 that “America holds 99 percent of the solution cards” for the Arab-Israeli conflict.[3] It was under Sadat’s tenure that Egypt saw the beginning of a long-term strategic relationship with the United States that would later influence many of Egypt’s political decisions regarding foreign policy. It was also in 1979 that Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel and nominally accepted Israel as part of the region, policy shifts that cost Sadat his life and temporarily demoted Egypt from its traditional heavyweight position in the regional order, particularly due to the state’s subsequent removal from the Arab League.

Hosni Mubarak succeeded in bridging the gap with Arab nations after the rift of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and regaining Egypt’s status as a dominant player in the region, through its various roles as host of the Arab League, broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and prominent member in the security alliance against Iran. Mubarak also strengthened Egypt’s relations with Western countries and benefited greatly from military and economic aid from the United States. The United States has and continues to value Egypt as a key partner in counter-terrorism initiatives and regional security.

The military-military relations of Egypt and the United States remain steady under the Morsi administration, despite a range of political issues that have tested the friendship, including the ongoing trial against democracy and human rights NGOs,[4] the scaling of U.S. embassy walls by protestors and Morsi’s delayed reaction and provision of security, the rolling debate in Congress on conditioning aid to Egypt,[5] and the recent attention to anti-Semitic remarks Morsi made in 2010.[6]The most striking symbols of the sustained military relationship have been the frequent visits of American defense and intelligence officials to Egypt during the past year, as well as the ceremonial delivery of new U.S.-produced F-16 fighter jets that was ironically held at a time when Egypt was plunging further into domestic strife.[7] The recent visit of Secretary of State Kerry to Egypt was significant for its insignificance; vague, cordial public remarks and a pledge of economic assistance marked “business as usual” between the United States and Egypt.

President Morsi, Israelis, and Palestinians

After Morsi’s election Israel publicly stated its respect for the democratic process in Egypt and its outcome, as well as its intent to continue cooperation with the Morsi administration on the basis of the peace treaty.[8] Though Morsi has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, which does not recognize Israel, he has shown that this fact will not be an obstacle for continued cooperation with Tel Aviv. Essam Haddad, Morsi’s assistant for international affairs, asserted this specific point in an interview with Reuters in February 2013.[9]

Morsi was showered with praise from the international community and the United States in particular for negotiating a truce between Hamas and Israel in November 2012.[10] His foreign policy achievement affirmed Egypt’s important role as a broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and initially suggested that Morsi may be able to make some political headway negotiating with Hamas where Mubarak could not because of Hamas’s ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

On the contrary, and in a fashion similar to Mubarak, Morsi has also shown that he and the army are willing to make unpopular moves that benefit Israel’s security and please the United States. Egypt’s flooding of tunnels between Sinai and the Gaza Strip illustrates this point clearly, and has brought simultaneous praise from Israel and the United States as well as sharp criticisms in Egyptian and Palestinian public opinion.[11] As Hussein Ibish notes, furthermore, “Even if Morsi were inclined to intervene on behalf of Hamas at the expense of Egyptian interests, the military will almost certainly prevent this.”[12]

Apprehension from Saudi Arabia

All of the Gulf States, excluding Oman, severed relations with Egypt after it signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Mubarak’s support to Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s war against Iran and his later decision to join the American coalition to liberate Kuwait were among the main reasons that Egypt was able to repair its relationship with the Gulf monarchs. Egypt reaped the benefits of those close relations through direct aid, investments, and opportunities for Egyptian labor. The fall of Mubarak brought severe concerns to the Gulf monarchs, who have long suppressed popular and Islamist movements in their states. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia joined Mubarak in calling Egyptian protesters “infiltrators” seeking to destabilize their country.[13] It was even reported that the King proposed to President Obama that the United States support a dignified exit for Mubarak and that Saudi Arabia would prop up Egypt’s economy if Washington decided to review its annual aid package to Egypt.[14]

Since the Egyptian uprising, a schism is gradually emerging among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regarding relations with Egypt.[15] This schism—chiefly among Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—has become more evident with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the election of Morsi.

The Saudis’ current apprehension toward Egypt stems from their long history with the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite sharing values of Sunni Islam, Riyadh has shown concern with the Brotherhood’s religious political discourse that competes with its ultraconservative Wahhabi doctrine.[16] The late Saudi Crown Prince Nayef, for example, accused the Brotherhood of “betraying” the Kingdom’s generosity and argued that the group is the source of several problems facing the region.[17]Wary of this distrust and the Kingdom’s financial influence, Morsi’s first foreign visit was to Saudi Arabia. His visit was an attempt to defuse any rifts from the loss of Mubarak and assure the richest Arab country of Egypt’s obligation toward Gulf security.[18] Acknowledging the importance of keeping Egypt to its side, the Kingdom granted Egypt $4 billion to help keep its economy afloat.[19] Despite the apparent public recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, the Saudis have boycotted the “Quartet for Syria” (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Egypt) meetings initiated by Morsi during the Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit in Mecca in August 2012. The Kingdom is wary of recent interactions between Egypt and Iran, and it rejects any role for Iran in a solution for Syria, reluctant to overlook Iran’s role an instigator of the conflict through its funding and arming of the Syrian regime.

Politics in Reverse with Qatar and UAE

Mubarak had tense relations with Qatar after the current Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa deposed his father in 1995, and this tension was amplified by the recurring appearances of Egyptian opposition members voicing their criticisms of Mubarak on the Doha-based Al Jazeera. On the other hand, Mubarak enjoyed very close relations with the UAE and its late leader Sheikh Zayed al-Nahyan. Since Morsi’s ascendance to the presidency, however, Qatar and the UAE have reversed their stances toward Egypt. Like the Saudis, the UAE is no big fan of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, the UAE has put on trial over 90 individuals with alleged links to the Brotherhood for plotting to overthrow the regime.[20] This trial follows the UAE government’s refusal to release 11 detained Egyptians with alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood.[21] And although the UAE was amongst the first countries to pledge aid to Egypt in 2011, none has materialized due to the cold relationship between the countries’ leaders. This tension has escalated with the recent accusation that the UAE is financing anti-Morsi groups and establishing “hidden and conspicuous contacts” with members of Egypt’s intelligence. Morsi’s finger-pointing reference during his speech at the Arab League summit in March 2013 is seen as a direct message to the UAE and other regional countries (like Saudi Arabia and Jordan) that are skeptical of the Brotherhood’s ascendance in Egypt.[22]

In contrast to the UAE, the Qataris are reaping the benefits of supporting Egypt’s uprising.[23] Qatar dedicated Al Jazeera to support the anti-Mubarak protests and later the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qataris pledged not to allow Egypt to go bankrupt and injected $5 billion dollars into the ailing Egyptian economy.[24] And the Qatari emir called upon other Arab states to support Egypt’s economy.[25] However, this has raised many concerns in Egyptian society and among political forces.[26] Doha is taking a giant leap of faith with the Brotherhood, aiming to forge a close alliance with Cairo and maximize its regional posture. Qatar offers the Brotherhood important assets, including financial capital and favorable Al Jazeera coverage, surpassing the influence of the UAE and approaching the amount of socioeconomic influence that Saudi Arabia once exerted and might exert on Egypt if it attains such political will in the future. But as Sultan al-Qassemi aptly observes, “while the UAE has alienated Egypt’s new leaders, Qatar has alienated Egypt’s population.”[27]

From Tehran with Love

Iran has expressed a great interest in restarting its relations with Egypt. Iranian leaders have sought to capitalize on the country’s new Islamist government to forge closer ties.[28] Egypt has, however, hesitated to fully embrace Iran. Despite the exchange of visits by both presidents for the first time in 30 years, the trips to Tehran and Cairo did not lead to the normalization of relations between the two states, though various groups within and outside Egypt expressed such concerns.[29] Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was assaulted twice,[30] including by a shoe in an Islamic Cairo neighborhood, and his country’s policies were heavily criticized by the Grand Imam of al-Azhar—the bulwark of Sunni Islam.[31] Nonetheless, Tehran’s eagerness to lure Egypt into normalization led to its cancellation of the need for tourist and business visas for Egyptians to encourage travel to Iran[32]and an offer of a “big credit line” to help Egypt’s ailing economy.[33]

Iran’s anxious attempts to renew relations with Egypt may also be attributed in part to escalating pressure and international sanctions against Tehran.[34] The United States and the EU have tightened sanctions on Iran, with particular focus on financial sectors and the oil industry. By re-establishing relations with Egypt, Iran may hope to win safe access to the Suez Canal and bypass sanctions by opening a new market for its goods. Moreover, in light of the worsening conflict inside Syria, Iran may be pursuing an alliance with Egypt to counteract the potential loss of its Syrian ally. The Syrian crisis has left Iran standing alone while other regional players side with the Syrian opposition.

Despite the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is naïve to assume that Islamists in Egypt will automatically ally with those in Iran. Egypt’s Islamist movement is predominantly Sunni, as are its Arab allies in the Gulf who share an interest in countering Shi`i and Iranian influence in the region. Domestically, the Salafi party, al-Nour, is leading the fight against the spread of Shi`ism in Egypt.[35] Its members have gone so far as to warn[36] against opening Egypt to Iranian tourism, for fear that it would increase Shi`i influence and challenge Egypt’s Sunni character.[37] In addition, Egypt seeks to preserve its vital relationship with the West and the GCC, at least in the short-term, to help overcome its growing economic crisis.

Un-Revolutionary Foreign Policy

The toppling of Hosni Mubarak has brought many changes to the domestic politics of Egypt. However, nothing revolutionary has materialized on the foreign policy front. We continue to see a relegation of the role of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry as an “implementer” rather than an “instigator”[38] of foreign policy.  Morsi is relying on close assistants in the presidential office like Essam Haddad to conduct much of the day-to-day business of Egypt’s foreign policy, from making public statements to holding private meetings with visiting foreign ministers.[39] Indeed, it remains unclear whether and to what extent Morsi has such a working relationship with his own Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr and other career diplomats. Over the course of recent decades, moreover, Cairo has managed to tangle itself in the orbits of the United States, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies, a reality that diminishes opportunities for drastic changes in the short to medium term. Thus, it is difficult to see the Egyptian government’s attempts to seek Iraqi and Libyan investments and funding replacing those of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and international donors.[40] For Egypt to change its foreign policy agenda, it must first stabilize its socioeconomic system and develop mature leadership with a clear vision and goals for Egypt’s future. None of these stars are aligned at the moment.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Middle East Institute's Arab Transition Blog.

الأزهر بين الدين و السياسة

أحمد مرسي

ينبغي على المؤسسة الإسلامية الأعلى مقاماً في مصر أن تحارب من أجل استقلاليتها، لكن عليها البقاء خارج السياسة.

أحدثت الانتفاضة المصرية فراغاً سياسياً أدّى مؤخراً إلى أن يلعب الأزهر دوراً سياسياً ليس جزءاً من عقيدته الأساسية. وقد استمرّ في لعب هذا الدور، لاسيما بسبب الشعبية التي يتمتّع بها الأزهر ناهيك عن غياب الثقة بسياسات الرئيس محمد مرسي. على أن هذا لايمنح الأزهر مسوّغاً للتدخّل في السياسة وعقد الصفقات السياسية. ومع أن الإمام الأكبر أحمد الطيب قدّم، بالتعاون مع مجموعة كبيرة من السياسيين والمفكّرين المصريين، العديد من المبادرات لوضع حد للنزاع الأهلي في مصر، فإنه لم يتحقّق الكثير منها و أثرت على مصداقية المؤسسة عموماً. وقد كان الأزهر موضع ثناء للقائه مع مجموعات متنوّعة من المصريين والتشاور معهم - من قادة أقباط، وإسلاميين، وشخصيات معارضة، ونساء وشباب - وهو ما لم تنجح الحكومة في القيام به. بيد أن هذا المديح ينطوي على موافقة غير مبرّرة على تأدية الأزهر دور سياسي من الأجدى به تجنّبه. يجب ألا يُستخدَم الاحترام والشعبية اللذان تحظى بهما الأزهر ذريعةً للتدخّل في الشؤون السياسية.

عقب سقوط حسني مبارك، اتّخذت قيادة الأزهر خطوات للتحرّر من قبضة النظام وتحكُّمه بها لفترة طويلة. في حزيران/يونيو 2011، أصدر الإمام الأكبر - إلى جانب مجموعة من المفكّرين والسياسيين - ورقة من إحدى عشرة نقطة حول مستقبل مصر عُرِفَت بـ"وثيقة الأزهر". وحدّدت أولويات ما بعد الثورة: التركيز على الحرية والمساواة للجميع، ومكافحة الفساد وتحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية، وإصلاح التعليم، والحد من البطالة، والالتزام بالمعاهدات الدولية. وضغطت الوثيقة أيضاً من أجل استقلال الأزهر عن سيطرة الدولة.

في كانون الثاني/يناير 2012، اصدر المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة بعجالة قانون ينصّ على تغيير طريقة اختيار الإمام الأكبر للأزهر، فبات يُنتخَب من هيئة مؤلّفة من كبار علماء الأزهر بدلاً من أن يعيّنه رئيس الجمهورية. وبهذا أعيد اعتماد طريقة الاختيار القديمة التي كانت هذه المؤسسة الدينية تطبّقها قبل القرار الذي اتّخذه جمال عبد الناصر بتعيين الإمام الأكبر من قبل الرئيس. لكن القانون أثار جدلاً بسبب عدم تضمّنه بنوداً عملية وملموسة تمنح الأزهر استقلالية سياسية ومالية. وتجاوزت آلية إقراره الإشراف التشريعي، إذ تمّت قبل أيام من انعقاد الجلسة الأولى لمجلس الشعب المُنتخَب. وكان هناك أيضاً غياب كامل للشفافية بشأن الدوافع التي جعلت المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة يصدر المرسوم؛ ولانزال نجهل حتى الآن ما هي طبيعة الشروط والمعطيات التي أثيرت في المباحثات بين المجلس والإمام الأكبر توصّلاً إلى إقرار القانون المذكور.

على أي حال، فإن روح القانون الصادر عن المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلّحة حول الأزهر تجسّدت في الدستور المصري الذي أُقِرّ مؤخراً. فقد ورد في المادة الرابعة أن الأزهر هو "هيئة إسلامية مستقلة جامعة يختص دون غيره بالقيام على شؤونه كافة". كما تنص المادّة على أن "يؤخذ رأي هيئة كبار العلماء بالأزهر الشريف في الشؤون المتعلقة بالشريعة الإسلامية"، إلا أنها لاتذكر ما هي المؤسسات الحكومية التي يجدر بها التشاور مع الهيئة أو متى يجب القيام بذلك. وإذ تعي الدولة تماماً الدور المهم والنافذ للأزهر، فقد أحتفظت بحق توفير "الاعتمادات المالية الضرورية ليحقّق الأزهر أغراضه"، مما يُبقي الباب مفتوحاً أمام التأثير المستمر من النظام على الأزهر. وعلى غرار العديد من المواد الأخرى في الدستور، تُختتَم المادّة الرابعة بعبارة ملتبسة: "وكل ذلك على النحو الذي ينظّمه القانون"، بما يُتيح إعادة تحديد نص مبهم أصلاً وتقييده بموجب مراسيم تصدر لاحقاً عن الهيئة التشريعية.

الدور الاستشاري الذي يُحدّده الدستور الجديد للأزهر قد يجعله عرضة للتأثيرات من الدولة ومن مجموعة من التفسيرات الإسلامية للشريعة. بيد أن هذه التغييرات تبدو رمزية إزاء تنامي شعبية الدعاة السلفيين الذين قد يتسلّلون في نهاية المطاف إلى قيادة الأزهر ويغيروا من سياساته و ارائه المعتدلة التي عُرِف بها على مر العصور. وربما يقف هذا الأمر كأحد الأسباب التي دفعت المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة إلى إصدار قانون الأزهر الذي يهدف إلى "تمكين" الهيئة، لتشكّل توزاناً في مقابل صعود السلفيين.

بعيدا عن هذه التغييرات البنيوية والقانونية، يواجه الأزهر تحدّيات داخلية نتيجة التفسيرات والتأويلات المختلفة، وتدفق الفتاوى المتطرّفة الصادرة عن دعاة مستقلين غير مدرَّبين وكذلك عن أساتذة في هيئته التعليمية. فعلى سبيل المثال، أثارت الفتوى الصادرة أخيراً عن الأستاذ في جامعة الأزهر، محمود شعبان، إلى اغتيال قادة المعارضة في "جبهة الإنقاذ الوطني" لغطاً شديداً. ويحل شعبان ودعاة آخرون يومياً ضيوفاً على محطات فضائية ذات اتجّاهات سلفية مثل "الناس" و"الرحمة". ففي خضم الصراع الدائر حالياً في مصر، تشكل هذه التصريحات المثيرة للجدل ضربة قوية لقدرة الأزهر على تمثيل الرأي الإسلامي الوسطي، كما تثير علامات استفهام حول منهجيته التعليمية ومناهجه الدراسيه، وقدرته على الوقوف في وجه مثل هذه الآراء الغريبة والشاذّة التي تصدر عن هيئته التعليمية (ومن خارجها).

ما الذي يحمله المستقبل لمؤسسة الأزهر؟ مع أنه لايزال من المبكر تقييم تأثير التغييرات الأخيرة، فيمكننا افتراض بعض السيناريوهات. السيناريو الأول هو أن يُدير الأزهر بحذر وتروٍّ الوضع الجديد الذي بلغه في العامين الماضيين، أي شبه الاستقلالية المذكورة في الدستور. في هذه الحالة، يواصل الأزهر ممارسة "القوة الناعمة" التي تتمحور حول سلطة الإمام الأكبر وشخصه، وستستمر هذه الاستراتيجية على الأرجح ببقاء أحمد الطيب، البالغ من العمر 67 عاماً، في السلطة. بموجب الدستور الجديد، يستطيع الإمام الأكبر البقاء في السلطة حتى بلوغه الثمانين من العمر، ويملك حصانة تحول دون إمكانية إقالته من منصبه.

السيناريو الثاني هو استمرار النظام أو الإسلاميين، أو حتى الاثنين معاً، في استيعاب الأزهر تحت مظلّتهم. أدرك القادة المصريون المعاصرون القوة و الشرعية الكبيرة التي يكتسبوها إذا استمالوا الأزهر إلى جانبهم،  ومع أن الرئيس خسر "امتياز" تعيين الإمام الأكبر، لايزال يحتفظ مع الحكومة بالسيطرة على شؤون الأزهر المالية عن طريق وزارة الأوقاف. لكن، في الوقت نفسه، بإمكان العلماء المحافظين داخل الهيئة ممارسة تأثير كبير أيضاً على الطبيعة المعتدلة التي عُرِف بها الأزهر وقيادته تقليدياً. الأسبوع الماضي، انتخبت هيئة كبار العلماء المفتي الجديد شوقي إبراهيم عبد الكريم علام خلفاً لعلي جمعة المنتهي ولايته. وبحسب مصادر مختلفة، ليست لدى المفتي الجديد أي أيديولوجية سياسية أو انتماء سياسي واضح. وقبل الانتخاب، كانت هناك مخاوف من اختيار عبد الرحمن البر، عضو مكتب الإرشاد في جماعة الإخوان المسلمين الذي يُلقَّب "بمفتي" الجماعة. فاختياره كان ليشكّل خطوة أساسية نحو إحكام قبضة الإخوان على الأزهر، وهو ما تتخوّف منه قوى المعارضة والمسلمون الذين لاتعنيهم السياسة، فكلاهما لايريدان رؤية الإسلاميين يحتكرون الحكومة والأزهر.

السيناريو الثالث قد يكون الأصعب بالنسبة إلى الأزهر، ويتمثّل في خوض معركة لاستعادة الاستقلالية التي كان يتمتّع بها على المستويَين الإداري والمالي قبل عهد جمال عبد الناصر. الأمر الذي من شأنه أن يسمح للمؤسسة بالعودة إلى وظيفتها التعليمية الأساسية وعقيدتها الوسطية و التصدّي للتفسيرات المتطرّفة للدين الإسلامي. بيد أن الظروف الراهنة تحول دون تحقّيق ذلك. فيجب قطع شوط طويل لتغيير القوانين الحالية التي تعطّل استقلالية الأزهر، ولاسيما القانون 103 الصادر في العام 1961 الذي وضع الأزهر تحت سلطة وزارة الأوقاف، وما تلته من تشريعات تمنح الحكومة مزيداً من الإشراف عليه.

في ظل الأجواء السياسية الضبابية، حيث تعاني البلاد من ضعف نظام الحكم وترنح تحت وطأة الجدل و الخلاف حول مستقبل مصر، وجد الأزهر المجال متاحاً أمامه لاستخدام مصداقيته و احترامه في الشارع في لعب دور سياسي قد يكون مغرياً، إلا أنه يجب ألا يشكّل جزءاً من وظيفته الأساسية.

أحمد مرسي باحث مصري و طالب دكتوراه في كلية العلاقات الدولية في جامعة سانت أندروز، المملكة المتحدة.

* تُرجم هذا المقال من اللغة الإنجليزية.