Egypt’s NGO Crisis: Political Theater Preventing Democratic Progress

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Huffington Post

Hopes were high that the second session of the NGO trial, held on March 8, would yield a resolution to the worst crisis in US-Egypt relations since the 1967 war. Robert Becker, the only indicted American who did not choose to leave the country after the travel ban was lifted, said he stayed to stand trial along with the 14 accused Egyptians because he is convinced of his innocence and the fairness of the Egyptian judiciary. But after today’s discouraging hearing, a solution seems to be slipping even further out of reach. The presiding judge decided to postpone the case to April 10 and called on the General Prosecutor’s office to bring in all accused foreigners who fled the country last week.     

The strained relationship between Egypt and the United States has been in the epicenter of local and international news for the past 2 months. All around the world, concerned observers have been riveted on the crackdown on Egyptian and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that started suddenly on December 29, 2011. Early on, there were clear signs that this politically motivated investigation was not being conducted fairly or transparently. The investigators and the Egyptian government officials held press conferences and spoke to the media about sensitive information that should have been kept undisclosed due to the ongoing investigation. Egyptian officials, in particular Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Aboul Naga, have repeatedly insisted on upholding Egypt’s right to investigate irregularities and spurred a xenophobic media campaign against the United States and the targeted NGOs. The “Egypt wont kneel” video of Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri speaking at the People’s Assembly brought back memories of similar video of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1964, criticizing the U.S. and its aid policies.

Meanwhile, the United States has been in crisis-management mode. In response to the escalating investigation, the United States sent several delegations of senators and congressmen, diplomats and military officials in an attempt to negotiate with the Egyptian authorities, while threatening to withhold Egypt’s $1.3 billion military aid budget.

Shortly after the Egyptian government raided the offices of 17 NGOs in Cairo on December 29, I wrote an analysis questioning the motivations behind the investigation and criticizing the mismanagement of the process. It was apparent from the sudden escalation of the judicial inquiry that this case was politically driven from the start, and was anything but an independent or democratic process, as Egyptian officials tried to claim. And the abrupt and dramatic lifting of the travel ban last week confirms beyond a doubt that this case is a piece of political theater directed by Egypt’s leaders, who are manipulating the judiciary to advance their own strategic interests. On February 29, just three days after the first court session of the case, an Egyptian judge decided to lift the travel barring foreign NGO employees from leaving the country with a bail of 2 million Egyptian pounds (about $300,000). This mysterious decision, quickly attributed to a dodgy bilateral deal, and the departure of the foreigners the day after prompted a divide within the executive and judicial branches in Egypt, each blaming the other for betraying and selling out Egypt’s sovereignty and national dignity. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) failed to issue any explanatory statement, despite rising pressure from members of parliament who are demanding an inquiry into the government’s handling of the case.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri’s cabinet has also come under fire from Parliament, as prominent members of the Brotherhood and other political forces accuse Ganzouri’s ministers of caving to American pressure. On March 8, Ahmed Fathi, head of the Brotherhood’s Shura Council, described the Cabinet as “weak and shaky” and warned that the People’s Assembly may call for a vote of no confidence within days. International Cooperation Minister Fayza Aboul Naga is struggling to defend the besieged cabinet – and her own job – andclaimed that only the SCAF has the authority to form a new government, according to the interim constitution. As the Parliament escalates its fierce attack on the executive branch, it’s clear that the SCAF’s biggest problem right now is not the United States, but its own legitimacy crisis.

Looking beyond the tense bilateral relationship, the NGO case is much bigger than a diplomatic hiccup in the US-Egypt relationship; it reflects a lack of accountability on the part of Egypt’s leaders and the chaos that has resulted from their mismanagement of the transition and failure to put forward a vision for the future. Since the SCAF took after Mubarak’s resignation last February, Egypt has been stumbling from one hurdle to the next with no clear vision or strategy for correcting failed policies. Starting with the dubious Constitutional Declarationdelegating all executive powers to the ruling generals, Egypt’s political transition has been further complicated by a chaotic electoral law and process and the deepening economic crisis.

The latest stumbling block, a xenophobic and politically motivated row with the United States over NGO funding, is another short-term distraction that prevents Egypt’s political forces from working collaboratively to develop a long-term vision for the country’s future. This self-destructive behavior was aptly described by Thomas Friedman as “Egypt’s Step Backward.” Some would argue that this view is overly pessimistic, but I believe it is a sorely needed reality check. You can’t fight an enemy you don’t know, and therefore it is imperative that Egyptians recognize that the greatest obstacles to a democratic transition are domestic not foreign.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Egypt’s Paradox: Foreign-Funded Military attacks Foreign Funded NGOs

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Nahar Net

Just one day before the end of the historic 2011, the Egyptian authorities could not bring themselves to end the year without undertaking actions that, yet again, have provoked domestic and international criticism. On December 29, several democracy and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were stormed by combined police and army forces, accompanied by investigators from the General Prosecutor’s office. The raid targeted 17 offices of 10 NGOs on the grounds that they were illegally operating and accepting international assistance without the required registration permits, according to the Egyptian Middle East News Agency (MENA). This is part of a broader investigation launched by the government earlier this year into foreign funding and alleged violations of Egypt’s highly restrictive law regulating NGOs, Law No. 84/2002.  Of the 10 organizations targeted in the raid, six have officially confirmed break-ins: The Arab Center for Independence of the Judiciary ‎and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP); the Budgetary and Human ‎Rights Observatory; the German Konrad Adenauer –Stiftung (KAS), and the American National ‎Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and ‎Freedom House. These NGOs reported that their offices were raided and sealed by military and police personnel, who confiscated documents and computers.

In a collective response, over 31 groups led by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights (CIHR) expressed their concern and outrage in a statement condemning the break-ins. They appealed to the international community and accused the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of spearheading a campaign since July to defame human rights activists and organizations committed to democracy development. Another Cairo-based group, The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information ‎‎(ANHRI) issued a statement describing the security crackdown as an ‎attempt to intimidate and silence activists with an iron-fisted brazenness that even Mubarak’s regime never dared to exercise. 

Although the international community has for the most part continued to express qualified support for the Egyptian military’s handling of the transition, the December 30 crackdown exposed the generals’ true intentions and mishandling of the transitional period. The United States through its Departments of State and Defense expressed deep concern over the attacks and called on the Egyptian government to end the raids and return all confiscated property. Germany summoned the Egyptian Ambassador and demanded an immediate investigation into the incident, while the European Union described the police raids as “an open demonstration of force” and urged Egyptian officials to support the work of civil society groups for the duration of the transitional period.

Although the latest raids indicate a sharp escalation in the government's crackdown on civil society, Egyptian NGOs have long faced difficulties operating in a hostile environment governed by the restrictive NGO law. The roots of the latest crackdown can be traced back to the aftershocks of Mubarak’s resignation in February of last year, when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $65 million under the new Egyptian Economic and Transition Support programs for grants available to any Egyptian, American and international organizations working in Egypt. But the Egyptian government soon became concerned that American support for civil society would lead to intervention in domestic political affairs, and in July, Fayza Aboul Naga, Egypt’s Minister of International Cooperation, publicly announced that cases of illegal foreign funding to unregistered local and ‎international NGOs in Egypt would be investigated. The government of former Prime Minister Essam Sharaf promptly formed fact-finding committee to launch a probe into the charges. By October, the Ministry of Justice stepped up its investigation by commissioning two judges to explore the allegations, while the interim government increasingly portrayed foreign funding as one of the primary causes of continued political unrest and protests.

By late November, preliminary findings of the commission’s investigations were leaked to the press. The investigation, according to Al-Shorouk newspaper, involved questioning around 400 organizations that received foreign funding over the past 6 years. 

Although Fayza Aboul Naga had clearly intended for the investigation to incriminate US-funded groups promoting democratization, the commission's evidence supported a very different conclusion: Salafi Islamist organizations were actually the biggest beneficiaries of international assistance, much of it originating from the conservative Gulf monarchies. According to the report, Egyptian Salafis received at least $48.9 million in funding from Gulf donors.  The Egyptian Salafi organization Ansar al-Sunna, which received almost $19 million from a single Kuwaiti Islamic association, was the biggest recipient of foreign funding, not any of the human rights groups or youth movements that had been so maligned and defamed by the Egyptian government. 

Since the December 29 raids, growing international criticism and outright condemnations have significantly increased pressure on the ruling generals. Field Marshal Tantawi assured Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in a phone conversation on December 31 - that the government will cease its crackdown and return the confiscated material. However, SCAF’s empty promises have not translated into action. In fact, the issue has escalated into a full-blown media war as the SCAF scrambles to deny responsibility for the raids. The Egyptian Defense Attaché to the United States, General Mohamed al-Keshki, said that the NGO investigation is under the jurisdiction of the judiciary and public prosecutor, denying any involvement by the SCAF. On January 1, the Ministers of International Cooperation and Justice held a press conference in which they defended the measures independently taken by the judiciary while insisting that the SCAF and interim government were not interfering or influencing the investigation. Meanwhile, NDI and IRI have issued updated statements describing the attacks on their offices and clarifying the nature of their activities to try to counter to the latest media attacks.

Why is the Egyptian government pursuing this campaign against civil society, and why now? An analysis of SCAF’s official statements sheds light on the situation and exposes the severity of the harassment faced by NGOs. Since July, the military council has been accusing opposition groups like April 6 and Kefaya of advancing foreign agendas by illegally accepting foreign funding. In the SCAF’s 69^th communiqué, posted to its Facebook page on July 22, the military blamed personal interests and foreign agendas for rising tensions between the military forces and the people. This was further emphasized on December 20 in statements 91 and 92, which claimed that intelligence information pointed to a foreign-led plan to destabilize Egypt through mass protests and sit-ins. The government’s conspiracy theories have created a climate of fear and mistrust among the people, and the recent pattern of events – violent clashes in December followed by the latest raids – suggests that the SCAF is deliberately enflaming anxiety and panic to assert control over the transition.

The SCAF’s latest actions serve the purpose of consolidating the military’s power by sending several different messages to domestic as well as international actors including:

• Reminding human rights groups, NGOs, and revolutionary forces that the SCAF is still in control.

• To the Egyptian public - countering critics of the military by claiming that the SCAF is protecting Egypt’s sovereignty and national interests by securing the country against the “foreign agendas and third party” represented by some NGOs and outside forces.

• A message reminding the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist forces that the SCAF is still in charge of the transition, even though Islamist candidates won a clear parliamentary majority.

• To the West and the U.S. in particular—we have the power. Much of the old system survived the fall of Mubarak; the military is still your best option when compared to rising Islamists, the only clear alternative. We just want you to keep writing us a $1.3 billion check each year that we decide how to spend without interference.

By continuing its own propaganda campaign while allowing contradictory reports from different officials and ministries, the SCAF is trying to deflect blame for the crackdown by portraying the government as a decentralized network of independent institutions that operate beyond the SCAF’s oversight.  

The Egyptian government’s increasingly defensive and often contradictory messages to US officials are evidence of unprecedented tension in the bilateral relationship since the fall of Mubarak. Many Egyptian NGOs rely heavily on foreign funding. Yet the Egyptian government has used the international aid issue as a bargaining chip when dealing with Washington, and has deliberately obstructed American organizations from opening branch offices in Cairo. Both IRI and NDI applied for registration with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2005 and have yet to receive official permits. However, both organizations maintain offices and staff in Egypt. According to the Wikileaks cables, an MFA official in 2006 said that resolving the pending registration could best be resolved by high level talks between the two governments. Over the next few years, Mubarak’s regime used this bargaining chip to try to fend off the democratizing agenda of the Bush administration.

Today, Egypt's military leaders – who are starting to behave a lot like Mubarak – appear to be acting out against the prospect of new conditions linking Egypt's 1.3 billion dollar military aid package to progress on democratization. The U.S. Congress approved a new spending bill on December 16 that imposes tough conditions on military aid to Egypt for 2012. The new restrictions require the State Department to certify that Egypt’s government is supporting the transition to civilian leadership and respecting “freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law.” Will the military leadership risk $1.3 billion in aid by refusing to cease its crackdown? The answer will become increasingly clear in the coming days.

With the 1-year anniversary of the January 25 uprising fast approaching and a new Parliament scheduled to convene at the end of the month, the SCAF is facing many challenges and growing pressure to fulfill the revolution’s democratic demands. Between transferring power to civilians and overseeing the drafting of a new constitution, the SCAF has its hands full and the last thing Egypt's military leaders should be looking for is trouble with Washington.

Let us not forget that the ultimate irony here: The party guilty of receiving the most foreign funding is the Egyptian military, not NGOs, and generals in glass houses should not throw stones.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Is Egypt Turning Islamist?

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Al Arabiya

In retrospect, it’s almost a miracle that last week’s elections went forward as planned with massive turnout and relatively few irregularities, despite predictions of violence and calls for postponing elections after a week of lethal clashes in downtown Cairo and other parts of the country.  While Egyptians are relieved that elections were conducted relatively fairly and peacefully, the sweeping victory of Islamists – whose candidates won a 61 percent majority in the first round – raises new concerns about the policies and ideological positions that will emerge from the next elected parliament.

Egyptians in 9 governorates went out en masse on November 28, not to protest, but rather to cast their votes in the first round of elections since ousting Hosni Mubarak in February. Although the first stage of voting went relatively smoothly, it’s important to recall the broader context of unrest and insecurity in which the electoral process is unfolding. The last 10 days before voting witnessed extreme violence. The army and police used excessive force (tear gas, rubber bullets and live rounds) against civilians protesting in Cairo’s Tahrir square and other governorates against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and a set of draft constitutional principles that would preserve and possibly enhance the military’s political and economic privileges in the future political system. The ensuing clashes between protesters and security forces resulted in over 40 deaths and more than 2,000 injured, according to the Ministry of Health. As a concession, the SCAF convened a series of emergency meetings with party leaders and presidential candidates and issued the long awaited anti-graft law, accepted the government’s resignation and announced a new timetable for a transfer of power to civilians by the end of June 2012. In addition, the SCAF urged all Egyptians to stand united, confirmed that elections would take place on time and extended the voting period by an extra day to encourage turnout and "avoid overcrowding and security issues."

The two-day polling process on November 28-29 went peacefully with minimal violence, although the process was marred by several irregularities and procedural violations, such as polling stations opening late, insufficient ballot papers and boxes, judges arriving late and party representatives campaigning inside polling centers in violation of a ban on campaigning 48 hours prior to the start of voting. These violations were widely documented by voters and NGOs observing the elections, although the High Electoral Commission has tried to downplay the impact of irregularities on the voting process, which saw a record turnout of  52 percent of the eligible voters.

The stunning success of Islamists – the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) received 36.6 percent of the vote while the Salafi al-Nour Party won 24.4 percent -- has raised anxieties among Egyptians, mainly the educated middle-class and Coptic Christian community. Results from the first round indicate that the FJP and Nour Party could hold up to 70 percent of the seats in the next parliament, although the final proportion will not be determined until after the third round of voting in January. For liberal parties, which won a disappointing 12.7 percent of the vote under the banner of the Egyptian Bloc coalition, the Islamist landslide is a slap in the face and a jolting wake-up call.

Many analysts expected a win for the FJP even though its Brotherhood-led coalition, the Democratic Alliance, had been troubled by internal disputes and defections in the weeks leading up to the election. While the FJP’s strong showing was widely predicted, the Salafis’ success was a bit of a surprise and shows how deeply rooted the conservative Islamist movement has become in Egyptian society, especially among the less educated lower classes in Cairo and the Delta. The prospect of an Islamist-dominated parliament raises a number of questions:

First is regarding the sincerity of the Islamist parties to abiding by democratic principles. The FJP has said that its priorities are ending corruption, reviving the economy and establishing a true democracy in Egypt. Mohamed Badie, the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, said the party will work to build an inclusive government and prefers a semi-presidential system based on the French model. Badie also denied making any deals with SCAF. Such statements imply that the FJP will be looking to create a wider coalition in the Parliament and will try to distance itself from the hardline Nour Party. On the other hand, the Salafis have been advocating for stricter moral codes and restrictions on personal freedoms reminiscent of policies backed by Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi establishment. They are among the newcomers to the game in Egyptian politics, and it is unclear exactly how they will play. Having once shunned democracy as inappropriately elevating man-made laws and institutions over Shari’a, Salafis are now choosing to participate in the formal political arena, and their parliamentarians could seek to enshrine conservative Islamist principles in new legislation.

Second, is the SCAF genuinely committed to transferring power to the parliament and a civilian president by end of June 2012? So far the ruling military council has been torn between the desire to preserve its political and economic privileges for as long as possible and the challenge of supervising a successful transition to democracy within a limited time frame.Under Article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration, the SCAF will hold the authority of the President and Parliament until elections are held. But on December 7, the SCAF issued a degree delegating presidential authority to newly appointed Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri, while still retaining power over the armed forces and judiciary. Whether this decision signifies an actual loosening of the SCAF's grip on power remains to be seen, and there are signs that the military is already maneuvering to curb the authority of the next parliament.  in his most recent video interview, SCAF member Major General Mamdouh Shahin stated that the party winning the majority in the Parliament will not have the power to form the government. The statement was perceived as a power-grab by the Islamists, particularly the FJP, whose parliamentarians will likely demand the right to form a coalition government. Even before election results revealed an Islamist majority, the FJP’s head, Mohamed Morsi, stated on November 29 that the new parliament should be empowered to form a government representative of the political forces in the People’s Assembly, rather than a technocratic cabinet appointed by the prime minister. However, the generals’ appointment of Dr. Kamal al-Ganzouri as new Prime Minister confirms the speculation that the SCAF’s preferred scenario is for a technocratic government to hold power at least until the presidential election next summer. In addition, the inevitability of Islamist majority in parliament may make the SCAF even more reluctant to relinquish power, despite assurances that the military will respect the people’s choice.

Egypt is only in the early stages of a long transition that will fundamentally reshape the country’s political landscape. With Islamists rising to the forefront of the political scene, it is unclear to what extent they are prepared to govern and initiate the institutional reforms and economic policies that are badly needed to stabilize the economic situation and create a transparent and accountable government. Furthermore, it is unclear how Islamists will respond if the SCAF continues to resists calls for a transfer of power to civilian leadership by the end of June. While many questions remain unanswered, election results have clearly set the stage for a potential power struggle between the SCAF and Islamists. But the electoral process is just beginning (with four more rounds of voting to go before results for the People’s Assembly are finalized in January), and it is still too early to draw conclusions.  We should allow Islamists in Egypt as well as Tunisia, and Morocco some time to prove trustworthy of the votes that have given them a political mandate.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Monitoring Egypt’s Chaotic Electoral System

By: Ahmed Morsy

Egypt is preparing for its first real multi-party parliamentary elections without the grip of Hosni Mubarak and his abolished National Democratic Party (NDP), ousted over nine months ago. The electoral law finally announced on October 8 has made the Egyptian electoral system one of a kind: with 2/3 of parliament to be elected via proportional party lists and 1/3 through first-past-the-vote system, while retaining the quota of 50 percent for workers and farmers. Further complicating the process is the arrangement of huge electoral districts that make it difficult for candidates or parties to feasibly reach voters with their campaigns. Parliamentary elections will start with the People’s Assembly (Lower House) on November 28.  This will be the first stage of a three-round system to elect 498 members to parliament in a process set to end in January 2012.  A similar process will be used for the Shura Council (Upper House) elections to choose 180 members during a period from January to March 2012.  In light of the complexity of the new electoral system, international and domestic monitors will have a particularly important role to play in scrutinizing the multi-stage polling process and reporting any irregularities that may arise. However, new regulations on election monitoring have troubling implications for the ability of monitors to effectively supervise the voting process.  

Initially, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had refused to allow international monitoring (Morakaba in Arabic) of the parliamentary elections saying that “we reject anything that affects our sovereignty,” a statement that was very disappointing to pro-democracy groups. But perhaps taking into account backlash from Egyptian civil society and the international community, the SCAF backed down from its position and announced that local and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would be allowed to “follow” the elections.

On October 17, the High Electoral Commission (HEC) issued a decree to regulate the process; clearly indicating that only registered local as well as international NGOs would be able to watch the elections. The question of election monitoring in Egypt has been long debated, and the Egyptian authorities have always taken a strong stand against international observation, seeing it as an infringement on sovereignty. Despite some initial positive steps taken by the HEC toward the NGOs like extending the registration period and issuing accreditations for free, human rights activists are still skeptical that the HEC will allow monitors full access to all stages of the polling process, including the all-important counting facilities where elections results will be tabulated. Albeit welcoming the decision to allow election “followers,” civil society groups and NGOs fear that the HEC won’t accredit their teams on time for the elections and that a “follower” (Motabe’ in Arabic) will not be endowed with any meaningful authority. As for the foreign groups, in addition to being registered, they have to get pre-approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) before they are able to even apply for permits. So far, the Carter Center is the only foreign entity that will be allowed to follow the elections after being invited by SCAF.

Confusion over the vague terminology of election “followers” and uncertainty over whether or not they will be allowed to supervise all aspects of the electoral process is adding to concerns over Egypt’s highly complex and evolving electoral system. This chaotic system underwent several significant changes before it was finally announced – after repeated delays – by the SCAF in October. 

An earlier draft of the electoral law released by the military council on May 30 drew criticism from most political parties and revolutionary forces. Parties and analysts were stunned by the SCAF’s lack of transparency and shocked that the law had been drafted without any consultation with political groups and civil society. The care-taker government and SCAF came back in July after meeting with political parties to approve new amendments to the original draft, but many remain concerned about the confusing structure of the electoral system and its uncertain implications for the composition of the next parliament.

The parliament to be elected holds an extreme importance to most Egyptians and indeed the political parties, as the first elected assembly of the post-Mubarak era and the one that will be responsible for drafting the new constitution through selection of a 100-member constituent assembly. According to Article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration released following Mubarak’s stepping down on February 11, the SCAF holds authority of the President and Parliament until elections are held.  Given the importance of the upcoming elections, the latest changes to the electoral law – which reflect the chaotic political environment and lack of clear guidelines or framework for a transition – are particularly troubling.

Most of the parties, especially those formed after the fall of Mubarak, have no or limited experience and insufficient time to build national constituencies. This explains the amount of complaining and whining about each step in the process. They have been focusing more on issues not of high importance for Egyptians. According to polls conducted, security and economy come on top of everything else Egyptians look for now. On the other hand, the SCAF is clinging to power using the rights given to it by the Constitutional Declaration, which led to a lot of criticism. The military junta was accused of not being serious about reforms and the public began to question their motive for not identifying a clear timeline for transitioning power to civilians; and many began to suspect that the generals wanted a weak parliament that won’t challenge their powers during the transitional period. This was apparent on several fronts, such as the court decision to allow Egyptians abroad to vote; the controversy over the supra-constitutional proposal presented by Dr. Ali al-Selmi, Deputy Prime Minister for Political Affairs; and a momentous court ruling on November 11 banning former NDP members from running in the parliamentary elections.  

The fact that all of the previous examples have occurred just weeks before the start of  elections is probably not a coincidence and suggests that the SCAF and the interim government  not only lacks a vision for Egypt’s transitional period but is also determined to keep the post-Mubarak political order as opaque as it was under the former regime.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.