Is Egypt Turning Islamist?

By: Ahmed Morsy 

Photo Credit: Al Arabiya

In retrospect, it’s almost a miracle that last week’s elections went forward as planned with massive turnout and relatively few irregularities, despite predictions of violence and calls for postponing elections after a week of lethal clashes in downtown Cairo and other parts of the country.  While Egyptians are relieved that elections were conducted relatively fairly and peacefully, the sweeping victory of Islamists – whose candidates won a 61 percent majority in the first round – raises new concerns about the policies and ideological positions that will emerge from the next elected parliament.

Egyptians in 9 governorates went out en masse on November 28, not to protest, but rather to cast their votes in the first round of elections since ousting Hosni Mubarak in February. Although the first stage of voting went relatively smoothly, it’s important to recall the broader context of unrest and insecurity in which the electoral process is unfolding. The last 10 days before voting witnessed extreme violence. The army and police used excessive force (tear gas, rubber bullets and live rounds) against civilians protesting in Cairo’s Tahrir square and other governorates against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and a set of draft constitutional principles that would preserve and possibly enhance the military’s political and economic privileges in the future political system. The ensuing clashes between protesters and security forces resulted in over 40 deaths and more than 2,000 injured, according to the Ministry of Health. As a concession, the SCAF convened a series of emergency meetings with party leaders and presidential candidates and issued the long awaited anti-graft law, accepted the government’s resignation and announced a new timetable for a transfer of power to civilians by the end of June 2012. In addition, the SCAF urged all Egyptians to stand united, confirmed that elections would take place on time and extended the voting period by an extra day to encourage turnout and "avoid overcrowding and security issues."

The two-day polling process on November 28-29 went peacefully with minimal violence, although the process was marred by several irregularities and procedural violations, such as polling stations opening late, insufficient ballot papers and boxes, judges arriving late and party representatives campaigning inside polling centers in violation of a ban on campaigning 48 hours prior to the start of voting. These violations were widely documented by voters and NGOs observing the elections, although the High Electoral Commission has tried to downplay the impact of irregularities on the voting process, which saw a record turnout of  52 percent of the eligible voters.

The stunning success of Islamists – the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) received 36.6 percent of the vote while the Salafi al-Nour Party won 24.4 percent -- has raised anxieties among Egyptians, mainly the educated middle-class and Coptic Christian community. Results from the first round indicate that the FJP and Nour Party could hold up to 70 percent of the seats in the next parliament, although the final proportion will not be determined until after the third round of voting in January. For liberal parties, which won a disappointing 12.7 percent of the vote under the banner of the Egyptian Bloc coalition, the Islamist landslide is a slap in the face and a jolting wake-up call.

Many analysts expected a win for the FJP even though its Brotherhood-led coalition, the Democratic Alliance, had been troubled by internal disputes and defections in the weeks leading up to the election. While the FJP’s strong showing was widely predicted, the Salafis’ success was a bit of a surprise and shows how deeply rooted the conservative Islamist movement has become in Egyptian society, especially among the less educated lower classes in Cairo and the Delta. The prospect of an Islamist-dominated parliament raises a number of questions:

First is regarding the sincerity of the Islamist parties to abiding by democratic principles. The FJP has said that its priorities are ending corruption, reviving the economy and establishing a true democracy in Egypt. Mohamed Badie, the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, said the party will work to build an inclusive government and prefers a semi-presidential system based on the French model. Badie also denied making any deals with SCAF. Such statements imply that the FJP will be looking to create a wider coalition in the Parliament and will try to distance itself from the hardline Nour Party. On the other hand, the Salafis have been advocating for stricter moral codes and restrictions on personal freedoms reminiscent of policies backed by Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi establishment. They are among the newcomers to the game in Egyptian politics, and it is unclear exactly how they will play. Having once shunned democracy as inappropriately elevating man-made laws and institutions over Shari’a, Salafis are now choosing to participate in the formal political arena, and their parliamentarians could seek to enshrine conservative Islamist principles in new legislation.

Second, is the SCAF genuinely committed to transferring power to the parliament and a civilian president by end of June 2012? So far the ruling military council has been torn between the desire to preserve its political and economic privileges for as long as possible and the challenge of supervising a successful transition to democracy within a limited time frame.Under Article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration, the SCAF will hold the authority of the President and Parliament until elections are held. But on December 7, the SCAF issued a degree delegating presidential authority to newly appointed Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri, while still retaining power over the armed forces and judiciary. Whether this decision signifies an actual loosening of the SCAF's grip on power remains to be seen, and there are signs that the military is already maneuvering to curb the authority of the next parliament.  in his most recent video interview, SCAF member Major General Mamdouh Shahin stated that the party winning the majority in the Parliament will not have the power to form the government. The statement was perceived as a power-grab by the Islamists, particularly the FJP, whose parliamentarians will likely demand the right to form a coalition government. Even before election results revealed an Islamist majority, the FJP’s head, Mohamed Morsi, stated on November 29 that the new parliament should be empowered to form a government representative of the political forces in the People’s Assembly, rather than a technocratic cabinet appointed by the prime minister. However, the generals’ appointment of Dr. Kamal al-Ganzouri as new Prime Minister confirms the speculation that the SCAF’s preferred scenario is for a technocratic government to hold power at least until the presidential election next summer. In addition, the inevitability of Islamist majority in parliament may make the SCAF even more reluctant to relinquish power, despite assurances that the military will respect the people’s choice.

Egypt is only in the early stages of a long transition that will fundamentally reshape the country’s political landscape. With Islamists rising to the forefront of the political scene, it is unclear to what extent they are prepared to govern and initiate the institutional reforms and economic policies that are badly needed to stabilize the economic situation and create a transparent and accountable government. Furthermore, it is unclear how Islamists will respond if the SCAF continues to resists calls for a transfer of power to civilian leadership by the end of June. While many questions remain unanswered, election results have clearly set the stage for a potential power struggle between the SCAF and Islamists. But the electoral process is just beginning (with four more rounds of voting to go before results for the People’s Assembly are finalized in January), and it is still too early to draw conclusions.  We should allow Islamists in Egypt as well as Tunisia, and Morocco some time to prove trustworthy of the votes that have given them a political mandate.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

Monitoring Egypt’s Chaotic Electoral System

By: Ahmed Morsy

Egypt is preparing for its first real multi-party parliamentary elections without the grip of Hosni Mubarak and his abolished National Democratic Party (NDP), ousted over nine months ago. The electoral law finally announced on October 8 has made the Egyptian electoral system one of a kind: with 2/3 of parliament to be elected via proportional party lists and 1/3 through first-past-the-vote system, while retaining the quota of 50 percent for workers and farmers. Further complicating the process is the arrangement of huge electoral districts that make it difficult for candidates or parties to feasibly reach voters with their campaigns. Parliamentary elections will start with the People’s Assembly (Lower House) on November 28.  This will be the first stage of a three-round system to elect 498 members to parliament in a process set to end in January 2012.  A similar process will be used for the Shura Council (Upper House) elections to choose 180 members during a period from January to March 2012.  In light of the complexity of the new electoral system, international and domestic monitors will have a particularly important role to play in scrutinizing the multi-stage polling process and reporting any irregularities that may arise. However, new regulations on election monitoring have troubling implications for the ability of monitors to effectively supervise the voting process.  

Initially, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had refused to allow international monitoring (Morakaba in Arabic) of the parliamentary elections saying that “we reject anything that affects our sovereignty,” a statement that was very disappointing to pro-democracy groups. But perhaps taking into account backlash from Egyptian civil society and the international community, the SCAF backed down from its position and announced that local and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would be allowed to “follow” the elections.

On October 17, the High Electoral Commission (HEC) issued a decree to regulate the process; clearly indicating that only registered local as well as international NGOs would be able to watch the elections. The question of election monitoring in Egypt has been long debated, and the Egyptian authorities have always taken a strong stand against international observation, seeing it as an infringement on sovereignty. Despite some initial positive steps taken by the HEC toward the NGOs like extending the registration period and issuing accreditations for free, human rights activists are still skeptical that the HEC will allow monitors full access to all stages of the polling process, including the all-important counting facilities where elections results will be tabulated. Albeit welcoming the decision to allow election “followers,” civil society groups and NGOs fear that the HEC won’t accredit their teams on time for the elections and that a “follower” (Motabe’ in Arabic) will not be endowed with any meaningful authority. As for the foreign groups, in addition to being registered, they have to get pre-approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) before they are able to even apply for permits. So far, the Carter Center is the only foreign entity that will be allowed to follow the elections after being invited by SCAF.

Confusion over the vague terminology of election “followers” and uncertainty over whether or not they will be allowed to supervise all aspects of the electoral process is adding to concerns over Egypt’s highly complex and evolving electoral system. This chaotic system underwent several significant changes before it was finally announced – after repeated delays – by the SCAF in October. 

An earlier draft of the electoral law released by the military council on May 30 drew criticism from most political parties and revolutionary forces. Parties and analysts were stunned by the SCAF’s lack of transparency and shocked that the law had been drafted without any consultation with political groups and civil society. The care-taker government and SCAF came back in July after meeting with political parties to approve new amendments to the original draft, but many remain concerned about the confusing structure of the electoral system and its uncertain implications for the composition of the next parliament.

The parliament to be elected holds an extreme importance to most Egyptians and indeed the political parties, as the first elected assembly of the post-Mubarak era and the one that will be responsible for drafting the new constitution through selection of a 100-member constituent assembly. According to Article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration released following Mubarak’s stepping down on February 11, the SCAF holds authority of the President and Parliament until elections are held.  Given the importance of the upcoming elections, the latest changes to the electoral law – which reflect the chaotic political environment and lack of clear guidelines or framework for a transition – are particularly troubling.

Most of the parties, especially those formed after the fall of Mubarak, have no or limited experience and insufficient time to build national constituencies. This explains the amount of complaining and whining about each step in the process. They have been focusing more on issues not of high importance for Egyptians. According to polls conducted, security and economy come on top of everything else Egyptians look for now. On the other hand, the SCAF is clinging to power using the rights given to it by the Constitutional Declaration, which led to a lot of criticism. The military junta was accused of not being serious about reforms and the public began to question their motive for not identifying a clear timeline for transitioning power to civilians; and many began to suspect that the generals wanted a weak parliament that won’t challenge their powers during the transitional period. This was apparent on several fronts, such as the court decision to allow Egyptians abroad to vote; the controversy over the supra-constitutional proposal presented by Dr. Ali al-Selmi, Deputy Prime Minister for Political Affairs; and a momentous court ruling on November 11 banning former NDP members from running in the parliamentary elections.  

The fact that all of the previous examples have occurred just weeks before the start of  elections is probably not a coincidence and suggests that the SCAF and the interim government  not only lacks a vision for Egypt’s transitional period but is also determined to keep the post-Mubarak political order as opaque as it was under the former regime.

Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.

An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?

An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?

In a June 20th statement titled the “Al-Azhar Document”, read and covered by different media outlets, Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayeb, the country’s highest religious authority, outlined an eleven-point program  that addressed a number of political, social, and economic issues the center of the extensive debates in post-revolution Egypt. Based on a broad consensus of numerous religious figures, the document expresses support for a "modern, democratic state, based on a constitution, which separates between state authorities; determines the boundaries of governance; guarantees the rights and duties of its citizens on equal footing and gives people’s representatives the power of legislation in accordance with the precepts of true Islam, a religion, which has never, throughout its history, experienced a religious or a theocratic state.”  

With this article, Al-Tayeb effectively presents Al-Azhar’s rejection of Salafist demands for a theocratic state.  The Al-Azhar document incriminates,  furthermore, “the abuse of religion to disunite and pit citizens against each other.”  The document declares Al-Azhar’s embrace of democracy, which the institution considers to be “the modern formula of the Islamic precept of ‘shura’ (or consultation)”, and the guarantor of pluralism, circulation of power, and accountability to the people.  The sum of these articles, along with others outlining priorities in post-revolution Egypt--like education, scientific research, fighting corruption, reducing unemployment, maintaining international treaties and rebuilding relations with Arab, Islamic, and African countries--result in a document that reads very much like a short version of Egypt’s missing constitution.

In addition to these calls, one of the key demands presented in the document is the appeal for al-Azhar’s independence. As the oldest Islamic institution in the world (established 973 CE), the university represents one of the most respected sources of guidance and religious scholarship in the Muslim world.  As such, tapping into the institution’s credibility has long been a strategic component of authoritarian rule in Egypt. Muhammad ‘Ali (ruled 1805-1848), for example, nationalized 623,000 acres of waqf land and sought to sideline the influence and checks of ‘ulama, effectively laying the groundwork for future manipulation of Al-Azhar by the state.

Modern Egyptian leaders have also understood that controlling al-Azhar, and by extension Egypt’s vast network of imams and mosques, represented a means to secure political capital and counter Islamist opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.  The greatest infiltration of Al-Azhar occurred under the regime of Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser, who placed the entire institution and all waqf land under the purview of the Ministry of Endowments, added a number of secular colleges whose deans gained seats on the Al-Azhar High Council, and stipulated that the appointment of Sheikh Al-Azhar become the prerogative of the Egyptian President instead of an internal election process at Al-Azhar.  These changes were met with strong opposition and between the years 1959 to 1963, Nasser removed the most vocal opposition voices, reducing Al-Azhar’s faculty by nearly half.

In an attempt to break away from Nasser’s era, Sadat offered Al-Azhar’s ‘ulema a relatively more open space for expression, which some used to voice their opposition to a number of Sadat’s policies, including the infitah, “Jehan’s law” regarding personal status matters, and peace with Israel. Under Mubarak, the state’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood--particularly during election cycles--as well as its efforts to outdo Islamists by wrapping government policies in an Islamic cloak, illustrated the regime’s continued perception of threat from Islamist opposition. Through the co-option of Al-Azhar and the appointment of pro-government sheikhs--like Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi in 1996 and then-National Democratic Party member Ahmed El-Tayeb in 2010--the government tainted the neutrality and integrity of the Al-Azhar. Hossam Tamam, an expert on Islamist groups, explains that “After Mubarak held the helm of state, Al-Azhar kept losing its influence to radical groups, which sought to discredit the state-sanctioned religious establishment by arguing that it represented the regime’s interests rather than true Islam.”

Given this context, the release of the al-Azhar’s document drafting in Egypt’s post-revolutionary environment demonstrates the institution’s desire to break away from its previous role as a regime puppet, regain independence, and win popular support with an assertive statement made amidst the uncertainty of Egypt’s transitional period.  Several groups and coalitions of imams have formed to advocate for al-Azhar’s independence. In a March 13 rally that went largely unnoticed in the shadow of mass protests in Tahrir Square, over 1,000 imams marched from the Nour Mosque in Abbassiya toward the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) to protest the failure to fulfill promises addressing their demands. The imams called for investigation into corruption charges leveled at the Ministry of Endowments and  the reversal of Nasser's 1961 law that put the university’s budget under state control and gave the president the power to appoint the Grand Sheikh. The military police clashed with the protesters, assaulting them with fists and electric batons, according to eyewitnesses.  Imams have continued protesting in recent months, joining last Friday’s sit-in at Tahrir Square, where they also distributed fliers for a mass rally for al-Azhar’s independence on the symbolic national day of July 23, the date commemorating Egypt’s 1952 coup d’état.

A wide range of Egyptian intellectuals and figures have offered their support for the document.  Literary critic Salah Fadl said the document “confirms al-Azhar's respect for others’ values and ideals. The institution has been regarded as a symbol of enlightenment and moderate Islam throughout history...and the document will help it regain its former prominence.”  Deputy Prime Minister Yehia El Gamal commended it as “one of the most important charters issued to date,” and similar support was voiced by Rifaat Al-Saeid, head of the leftist Tagammu Party, and Christian business tycoon Naguib Sawiris, who heads the Free Egyptians Party.  Spokespersons of the Coptic Church, though skeptical of any religious intervention in politics, welcomed al-Azhar’s document as an illustration of wisdom, social justice, and respect and equality for all citizens.

Despite initial praise from some groups, advocacy organizations like Human Rights First, have expressed concern over the document’s “vagueness”, stressing that certain safeguards are needed to protect the envisioned civil state and prevent potential rights abuses.  The document’s stipulation identifying shari’a law as the basis for legislation, for example, highlights the statement’s inherent ambiguities and raises a number of questions about the drafters’ intentions. Can a state be considered civil and tolerant of all faiths if its laws are derived from the tenets of one particular religion? Secularist writer Salah Elissa argues that “if new laws need the consent of al-Azhar, then that immediately means we are in a religious, and not a civil, state.”  Ikram Lamie, Director of the Evangelical School of Theology in Egypt and spokesman of the Evangelical Church, reiterates a similar concern, stressing that religious figures should not interfere in political matters.  Abdel Mouti Bayoumi member of Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Center and a scholar who helped draft the document, reotrts that Egypt’s secular Supreme Constitutional Court would be responsible for approving new laws, and that al-Azhar would have only an advisory role.

Despite this assertion, the issue of what role religion may play in the politics of the new Egypt remains contentious, with divided opinions even within Egypt’s Muslim community. Al-Azhar has pledged support for a state that practices religious tolerance, while simultaneously reiterating its position that shari’a remain the primary source of legislation and Islam as Egypt’s official religion, under Article 2 of the 1971 constitution. Deputy Leader of the Brotherhood Rashad Bayoumi welcomed this commitment, commenting that the document “demonstrates accurately the meaning of a secular state in Islam.” And though he added that the Brotherhood does not seek a theocratic state, it remains unclear whether the group and the newly-legal Freedom and Justice Party will actually retain this commitment and ensure equal rights for minorities if elected to power.  In contrast to Bayoumi, Sheikh Gamal Qotb--former head of Al-Azhar's Fatwa Committee--criticized the document, arguing that it fails to focus on mechanisms for reform, calling it “window-dressing.” Others still (such as Mamdouh Ismail, founder of the Egyptian Renaissance Party) refused to comment “on anything issued by Al-Azhar as long as it remains headed by a [former National Democratic] party member,” in reference to al-Tayeb. Further reactions from the Salafists came from the Liberation Party, whose members presented on July 6 an “advisory memorandum” to al-Tayeb calling upon him to abolish the document they find to be contrary to Islam and God’s law.

The release and words of the Al-Azhar document show promise for the new Egypt, and special attention must be paid toward upcoming protests (like the one scheduled for July 23), statements, and conferences sponsored by Al-Azhar.  As noted by Nabil Abdel Fattah, political analyst for Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and one of the drafters of the Al-Azhar statement, “this document was established through calm dialogue and a true will to establish a document that would unite the people away from slogans and propaganda.”  This effort lends great significance to the Al-Azhar document, especially in the context of a transitional period that has seen the emergence of several competing voices and actors seeking to cause national and sectarian strife. According to Abdel Fattah, this document will be followed by several others in advance of a national conference titled “The Egyptian Nation” that Al-Azhar will hold to further discuss issues deemed critical to Egypt’s future.  Supporting a democratic state in the new Egypt will require the rule of law and truly independent institutions, among other things, and Al-Azhar could prove a case in point for other Egyptian institutions like the judiciary, syndicates, unions, and other universities who may follow to demand their own independence from government intervention. Fridays have become regular times of protests for Egyptians, and it will be essential to follow the demands from Egyptians week to week as we approach the historic parliamentary elections tentatively scheduled for September.

This piece was originally published at Carnegie's Sada Journal