An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?

An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?

In a June 20th statement titled the “Al-Azhar Document”, read and covered by different media outlets, Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayeb, the country’s highest religious authority, outlined an eleven-point program  that addressed a number of political, social, and economic issues the center of the extensive debates in post-revolution Egypt. Based on a broad consensus of numerous religious figures, the document expresses support for a "modern, democratic state, based on a constitution, which separates between state authorities; determines the boundaries of governance; guarantees the rights and duties of its citizens on equal footing and gives people’s representatives the power of legislation in accordance with the precepts of true Islam, a religion, which has never, throughout its history, experienced a religious or a theocratic state.”  

With this article, Al-Tayeb effectively presents Al-Azhar’s rejection of Salafist demands for a theocratic state.  The Al-Azhar document incriminates,  furthermore, “the abuse of religion to disunite and pit citizens against each other.”  The document declares Al-Azhar’s embrace of democracy, which the institution considers to be “the modern formula of the Islamic precept of ‘shura’ (or consultation)”, and the guarantor of pluralism, circulation of power, and accountability to the people.  The sum of these articles, along with others outlining priorities in post-revolution Egypt--like education, scientific research, fighting corruption, reducing unemployment, maintaining international treaties and rebuilding relations with Arab, Islamic, and African countries--result in a document that reads very much like a short version of Egypt’s missing constitution.

In addition to these calls, one of the key demands presented in the document is the appeal for al-Azhar’s independence. As the oldest Islamic institution in the world (established 973 CE), the university represents one of the most respected sources of guidance and religious scholarship in the Muslim world.  As such, tapping into the institution’s credibility has long been a strategic component of authoritarian rule in Egypt. Muhammad ‘Ali (ruled 1805-1848), for example, nationalized 623,000 acres of waqf land and sought to sideline the influence and checks of ‘ulama, effectively laying the groundwork for future manipulation of Al-Azhar by the state.

Modern Egyptian leaders have also understood that controlling al-Azhar, and by extension Egypt’s vast network of imams and mosques, represented a means to secure political capital and counter Islamist opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.  The greatest infiltration of Al-Azhar occurred under the regime of Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser, who placed the entire institution and all waqf land under the purview of the Ministry of Endowments, added a number of secular colleges whose deans gained seats on the Al-Azhar High Council, and stipulated that the appointment of Sheikh Al-Azhar become the prerogative of the Egyptian President instead of an internal election process at Al-Azhar.  These changes were met with strong opposition and between the years 1959 to 1963, Nasser removed the most vocal opposition voices, reducing Al-Azhar’s faculty by nearly half.

In an attempt to break away from Nasser’s era, Sadat offered Al-Azhar’s ‘ulema a relatively more open space for expression, which some used to voice their opposition to a number of Sadat’s policies, including the infitah, “Jehan’s law” regarding personal status matters, and peace with Israel. Under Mubarak, the state’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood--particularly during election cycles--as well as its efforts to outdo Islamists by wrapping government policies in an Islamic cloak, illustrated the regime’s continued perception of threat from Islamist opposition. Through the co-option of Al-Azhar and the appointment of pro-government sheikhs--like Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi in 1996 and then-National Democratic Party member Ahmed El-Tayeb in 2010--the government tainted the neutrality and integrity of the Al-Azhar. Hossam Tamam, an expert on Islamist groups, explains that “After Mubarak held the helm of state, Al-Azhar kept losing its influence to radical groups, which sought to discredit the state-sanctioned religious establishment by arguing that it represented the regime’s interests rather than true Islam.”

Given this context, the release of the al-Azhar’s document drafting in Egypt’s post-revolutionary environment demonstrates the institution’s desire to break away from its previous role as a regime puppet, regain independence, and win popular support with an assertive statement made amidst the uncertainty of Egypt’s transitional period.  Several groups and coalitions of imams have formed to advocate for al-Azhar’s independence. In a March 13 rally that went largely unnoticed in the shadow of mass protests in Tahrir Square, over 1,000 imams marched from the Nour Mosque in Abbassiya toward the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) to protest the failure to fulfill promises addressing their demands. The imams called for investigation into corruption charges leveled at the Ministry of Endowments and  the reversal of Nasser's 1961 law that put the university’s budget under state control and gave the president the power to appoint the Grand Sheikh. The military police clashed with the protesters, assaulting them with fists and electric batons, according to eyewitnesses.  Imams have continued protesting in recent months, joining last Friday’s sit-in at Tahrir Square, where they also distributed fliers for a mass rally for al-Azhar’s independence on the symbolic national day of July 23, the date commemorating Egypt’s 1952 coup d’état.

A wide range of Egyptian intellectuals and figures have offered their support for the document.  Literary critic Salah Fadl said the document “confirms al-Azhar's respect for others’ values and ideals. The institution has been regarded as a symbol of enlightenment and moderate Islam throughout history...and the document will help it regain its former prominence.”  Deputy Prime Minister Yehia El Gamal commended it as “one of the most important charters issued to date,” and similar support was voiced by Rifaat Al-Saeid, head of the leftist Tagammu Party, and Christian business tycoon Naguib Sawiris, who heads the Free Egyptians Party.  Spokespersons of the Coptic Church, though skeptical of any religious intervention in politics, welcomed al-Azhar’s document as an illustration of wisdom, social justice, and respect and equality for all citizens.

Despite initial praise from some groups, advocacy organizations like Human Rights First, have expressed concern over the document’s “vagueness”, stressing that certain safeguards are needed to protect the envisioned civil state and prevent potential rights abuses.  The document’s stipulation identifying shari’a law as the basis for legislation, for example, highlights the statement’s inherent ambiguities and raises a number of questions about the drafters’ intentions. Can a state be considered civil and tolerant of all faiths if its laws are derived from the tenets of one particular religion? Secularist writer Salah Elissa argues that “if new laws need the consent of al-Azhar, then that immediately means we are in a religious, and not a civil, state.”  Ikram Lamie, Director of the Evangelical School of Theology in Egypt and spokesman of the Evangelical Church, reiterates a similar concern, stressing that religious figures should not interfere in political matters.  Abdel Mouti Bayoumi member of Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Center and a scholar who helped draft the document, reotrts that Egypt’s secular Supreme Constitutional Court would be responsible for approving new laws, and that al-Azhar would have only an advisory role.

Despite this assertion, the issue of what role religion may play in the politics of the new Egypt remains contentious, with divided opinions even within Egypt’s Muslim community. Al-Azhar has pledged support for a state that practices religious tolerance, while simultaneously reiterating its position that shari’a remain the primary source of legislation and Islam as Egypt’s official religion, under Article 2 of the 1971 constitution. Deputy Leader of the Brotherhood Rashad Bayoumi welcomed this commitment, commenting that the document “demonstrates accurately the meaning of a secular state in Islam.” And though he added that the Brotherhood does not seek a theocratic state, it remains unclear whether the group and the newly-legal Freedom and Justice Party will actually retain this commitment and ensure equal rights for minorities if elected to power.  In contrast to Bayoumi, Sheikh Gamal Qotb--former head of Al-Azhar's Fatwa Committee--criticized the document, arguing that it fails to focus on mechanisms for reform, calling it “window-dressing.” Others still (such as Mamdouh Ismail, founder of the Egyptian Renaissance Party) refused to comment “on anything issued by Al-Azhar as long as it remains headed by a [former National Democratic] party member,” in reference to al-Tayeb. Further reactions from the Salafists came from the Liberation Party, whose members presented on July 6 an “advisory memorandum” to al-Tayeb calling upon him to abolish the document they find to be contrary to Islam and God’s law.

The release and words of the Al-Azhar document show promise for the new Egypt, and special attention must be paid toward upcoming protests (like the one scheduled for July 23), statements, and conferences sponsored by Al-Azhar.  As noted by Nabil Abdel Fattah, political analyst for Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and one of the drafters of the Al-Azhar statement, “this document was established through calm dialogue and a true will to establish a document that would unite the people away from slogans and propaganda.”  This effort lends great significance to the Al-Azhar document, especially in the context of a transitional period that has seen the emergence of several competing voices and actors seeking to cause national and sectarian strife. According to Abdel Fattah, this document will be followed by several others in advance of a national conference titled “The Egyptian Nation” that Al-Azhar will hold to further discuss issues deemed critical to Egypt’s future.  Supporting a democratic state in the new Egypt will require the rule of law and truly independent institutions, among other things, and Al-Azhar could prove a case in point for other Egyptian institutions like the judiciary, syndicates, unions, and other universities who may follow to demand their own independence from government intervention. Fridays have become regular times of protests for Egyptians, and it will be essential to follow the demands from Egyptians week to week as we approach the historic parliamentary elections tentatively scheduled for September.

This piece was originally published at Carnegie's Sada Journal

الجمعة و ما أدراك ما الجمعة

الهدف من هذه الخاطرة ليس بأي شكل من الأشكال للحكم على أي شخص أو أي فعل. و لكنها محاولة للتساؤل و إلقاء الضوء على بعض الممارسات التي ترتكب و تغلف بإسم الدين و بالأخص من خلال خطبة الجمعة. أنا على يقين أن هناك اخرين سبقوني في التعليق عليها و هم أفضل و أكثر مني علما و معرفة و لكن ما سأحاول سرده هو بعض الأسئلة التي تحتاج إلى إجابات إلى جانب تجربة شخصية من الجمعة الماضية. و من المؤكد أنها حدثت من قبل مع كثيرين غيري ليست في المساجد فقط و لكن في بعض الكنائس أيضا.  

            إن يوم الجمعة لهو أحد الأيام التي ينتظرها الكثير منا، إن لم نكن جميعا، بصبر و شغف. ينتظره الموظفون و الطلبة و اخرون ليستمتعوا بعدة ساعات نوم إضافية - بما أنه يوم أجازة رسمية للدولة- عوضا عن الإستيقاظ المبكر طوال أيام الأسبوع. يمثل هذا اليوم فرصة للكثيريين للقاء الأحبة و الأهل و الأصدقاء. ينتظر و يستغل اخرون ليلة الجمعة (مساء الخميس) لمآرب اخرى مثل السهر و المرح و الإحتفال بنهاية الأسبوع بحلوه و مره. و مؤخرا، منذ 28 يناير 2011، أصبح هذا اليوم مرتبط بالتظاهرات و يطلق على كل منها اسم خاص مثل: الغضب – الرحيل – التطهير ... إلخ.

و بالرغم مما تمثله أيام الجمع لكل منا، فإنه أحد الأيام التي تحمل قدسية خاصة للمسلمين (كأيام السبت لليهود و الأحد للمسيحيين) و فيه تقام شعائر صلاة الجمعة (الظهر). هذه الصلاة الجماعية التي تتكون من خطبة يعقبها ركعتان و تأخذ محل صلاة الظهر لهذا اليوم. هذه الصلاة التي ذكرها الله في القرآن و خصها بسورة كاملة مثلما خص صلاتي الفجر و العصر أيضا و هو ما يدل على أهميتها. وللعلم فهناك الكثير من المسلمين الذين لا يصلون طوال الأسبوع و مع ذلك يحرصون على الذهاب إلى المساجد يوم الجمعة للمشاركة في الصلاة.

            لقد دأبت على الذهاب إلى صلاة الجمعة منذ الصغر و كنت أشعر بالسعادة لمجرد أن أبي يصطحبني في يده للمسجد. و لكن في الأعوام الأخيرة أصبحت أشعر بثقل شديد تجاه التوجه للمسجد لصلاة الجمعة، و لا أظن هذا نابع من وسوسة الشيطان و العياذ بالله، و لكن يمكن أن نقول أنه في معظم الأحيان اعتبره إحساس نابع من فكره عدم الإستفادة من الخطبة. و قبل أن يهاجمني أحد على كلامي يجب أن نسأل أنفسنا ماذا حدث لصلاة الجمعة، لخطبة الجمعة، بل سأتسائل حتى عن صوت المؤذن (المنادي للصلاة) و نشاذه و نحن بلاد تتباهى بأصوات فنانيها العظام! هل كل من لبس جلباب و عمامة أو قفطان و أطلق اللحية أصبح شيخا أو إماما أو عالما بأمور الدين؟ أين ذهب دور الأزهر و العلماء المستنيرين؟ كيف قبلوا بالوصول إلى هذا التردي و التعصب في الخطاب الديني و استغلال المساجد لطرح و ترويج أفكار جماعات و مؤسسات بعينها! كيف قبلوا بالخضوع و الإرتماء في أحضان السلطة الحاكمة و تناسيهم بعقاب الله للمفسدين في الأرض. كيف وصل البعض منا إلى فكره تأليه الرسول الكريم - و هو من هذا براء – و الخلط بين النبي محمد رسول الله و خاتم أنبيائه و محمد الإنسان الذي يصيب و يخطئ و يستشير زوجاته و أهله و أصحابه في العديد من الأمور الحياتية. فإذا كان لا يخطئ فلماذا يعاتبه الله في الحادثة الشهيرة المذكورة في القرآن عندما عبس (امتعض و اكفهر وجهه) في وجه الرجل الأعمى الذي اتاه سائلا!

            أثناء صلاة الجمعة 8 أبريل، تحول خطيب المسجد من الحديث عن الأمور الدينية إلى الحديث في السياسة و أهمية توافق الدين مع السياسة و أنه لا انفصام بينهما. و جدتني أعلق بصوت سمعه من حولي "أنا جاي أسمع خطبة جمعة مش خطبة سياسية"، و نظرا لأن المصلين غير معتادين على تعليق أحد على الخطبة فقد رمقني من حولي بنظرات استغراب و تساؤل. و استمر الخطيب في الحديث عن السياسة و الإقتصاد كأحد المنظرين، فهو يطالب بوجوب تطبيق النظام الإسلامي في كل أمور الحياة من سياسة و إقتصاد و نظام إجتماعي و قضائي. و وصل به الأمر إلى إعلانه أن العلماء و السياسيين و الإقتصاديين الغربيين اجتمعوا في لندن في أعقاب الأزمة المالية الأخيرة و أعلنوا أن كل النظم التي ابتدعها البشر من شيوعية و اشتراكية و حتى الرأسمالية قد سقطت و فشلت و يجب أن يتعلموا من النظام الإقتصادي الإسلامي (لا أحد يعلم صحة هذه الحادثة أو إذا كانت الرأسمالية قد انتهت فعلا و احنا نايميين)!!! و للأسف لم يحاول مرة واحدة أن يشرح أي من المصطلحات المذكورة (بما انه أصبح سياسي و اقتصادي)، حتى مصطلح الإقتصاد الإسلامي الذي لا يعلم أحد ما هيته. و كأن على الحضور جميعا أن يوافق بدون إبداء الرأي أو التساؤل. فهو من يمسك الميكروفون و من يملك السلطة داخل المسجد. تحول بعد ذلك إلى الحديث عن الثورة المضادة مصورا إياها أنها منظمة من فلول الحزب الوطني و أمن الدولة و لكن ضد "الإسلاميين" و تشويه صورتهم و محاولة تصنيفهم سلفيين و إخوان. فطبقا له "مافيش حاجه اسمها سلفيين و إخوان، كلنا مسلمين" "يعني السلف دول ميين؟ دول مجموعة آثرت أن تعود إلى الكتاب و السنة و تطبقهم. و هوا حد يكره أو يرفض كلام الله و رسوله..." -  طبعا هذا الكلام أعقبه ذكر الشريعة و ما تحمله من عدالة للجميع – مسلمين و غير مسلمين. و هو شئ جميل أن يساوي النظام ما بين الجميع و لكن يبقى التساؤل هو لماذا يقوم إذن الخطيب بالدعاء على الكفرة و اليهود و النصارة!!! أليس من الأولى أن ندعو لهم بالرحمة و المغفرة كما يحث الإسلام و شريعته.

إن الدين الإسلامي برئ من كل من استخدموه في غير محله، سواء كان لتكفير جماعات أو ارهاب افراد أو حتى لتحقيق مآرب سياسية بالوصول إلى السلطة أو اقتصادية بالتربح من الدين. إن الدين لله و الوطن للجميع و لو أراد الله لجعل الناس خلقا واحدا لا اختلاف بينهم و لكن في الإختلاف حكمه تجبرنا على التفكر و التدبر مستخدمين الألباب و هي العقول. أنا لا أدعو إلى التوقف عن صلاة الجمعة أو الذهاب إلى المساجد و التقرب إلى الله، فسأظل أذهب و أحاول أن أبحث عن مسجد به خطيب يثير عقلي و يمدني بالمعلومات و الروحانيات المفقودة. و لكنني ادعو نفسي و الاخرين إلى استخدام عقولنا التي وهبها الله لنا لنفكر و نتدبر الكون و العالم من حولنا حتى نصل إلى ما فيه الخير و الصالح لوطننا. و علينا أن نتذكر جميعا – مسلمين و مسيحيين- أن العمل عبادة و الدين المعاملة.  و في النهاية أعتذر لطول الخاطرة و أرحب بأي تعليقات.

Power Vacuum in the Middle East: The Case for Tunisia

Power Vacuum in the Middle East: The Case for Tunisia

Despite the latest, unprecedented revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and their impact in a region as politically stagnant as the Middle East, there remains a crucial concern over power vacuum. All the autocratic regimes of the region have worked so hard to drain their societies from any meaningful opposition. Such governments have always believed they know what is best for their people, who should be grateful in return for what is offered to them. In addition, regimes have sought to control all vital political, economic, and social foundations that might challenge their ruling, including the religious establishment. Thus, any opposition group is left with nothing to work with; and by default weakened with almost no resources or popular roots. Moreover, some of the opposition groups are accused either as working with a foreign agenda; or as an Islamist group that would bring chaos to the country and the region if reached to power. Nevertheless, opposition parties and the silent people share part of the responsibility for such condition by agreeing to the rules of the game offered by the ruling elites, without presenting and/or pressuring for any reforms or changes.  

            When we look at the situation in Tunis, we will find that former President Zine el-‘Abdin Ben ‘Ali made sure there is no opposition to his regime during his reign. He based his rule on what is called “performance legitimacy”. His grandiose rhetoric as the protector of the nation and the relative economic success were not enough justification to govern for 23 years. Thus, once the economic gains faded and large masses became aware and organized the regime went down. The police state and the ruling party in Tunisia were in control of every medium possible, especially the media that can be turned against the system. Several opposition and Islamic group leaders were expelled to Paris and London. In a nut shell, the Tunisian society has been facing 23 years of oppression, crushing political activism, and control of media and internet. All these tyrannical actions pushed any remaining political parties and opposition groups, which could fill in the political vacuum, to remain underground or play with the rules laid by Ben ‘Ali’s regime.

Since most, if not all, opposition parties out of service and weak; Tunisians were only left with powerful organized trade and labors unions. Fortunately for Tunisians, these unions were one of the things adopted from the French colonialism. The unions played a vital role in the lives of many Tunisian workers. It helped raise awareness among its members and led the strikes in the early days of the revolution. Another positive aspect in the Tunisian society was the quality of education and the economic success. This helped generate a well educated middle class. Together with the various syndicates worked side by side during the month long revolt to oust Ben ‘Ali. Thus, if it wasn’t for an educated middle class backed by powerful trade unions, Tunisians won’t have been able to stand against the state terror, economic distress, political stagnation, corruption, and a controlled iron fest on media and internet.

With the downfall of the Tunisian dictator and his ruling party, in addition to the resignation of Mohamed Ghannoushi, Prime Minister of the caretaker government, the political scene became open for all sorts of options and it’s unclear who would standout to fill in the power vacuum. Several of the opposition leaders and groups - banned under Ben ‘Ali - are back to the scene aspiring to play a role in the new Tunis. However, most Tunisians are anxious due to the weakness of the opposition. Some fear the organized Islamic political movement - Ennahdha or Renaissance - that is allied with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. They express concerns that the Islamic group might mess with the liberal social policies and western lifestyle in Tunisia.

The protesters’ demands were clear. The whole regime must fall, Ben ‘Ali isn’t enough. The departing prime minister acknowledged the people’s complaints saying “my resignation will provide a better atmosphere for the new era.” This will put pressure on the current government to take credible measures to bring stability to the country. That can happen only if they are seen to be serious about recognizing the people’s demands and implementing needed reforms.