An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?

An Independent Voice for Egypt’s al-Azhar?

In a June 20th statement titled the “Al-Azhar Document”, read and covered by different media outlets, Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayeb, the country’s highest religious authority, outlined an eleven-point program  that addressed a number of political, social, and economic issues the center of the extensive debates in post-revolution Egypt. Based on a broad consensus of numerous religious figures, the document expresses support for a "modern, democratic state, based on a constitution, which separates between state authorities; determines the boundaries of governance; guarantees the rights and duties of its citizens on equal footing and gives people’s representatives the power of legislation in accordance with the precepts of true Islam, a religion, which has never, throughout its history, experienced a religious or a theocratic state.”  

With this article, Al-Tayeb effectively presents Al-Azhar’s rejection of Salafist demands for a theocratic state.  The Al-Azhar document incriminates,  furthermore, “the abuse of religion to disunite and pit citizens against each other.”  The document declares Al-Azhar’s embrace of democracy, which the institution considers to be “the modern formula of the Islamic precept of ‘shura’ (or consultation)”, and the guarantor of pluralism, circulation of power, and accountability to the people.  The sum of these articles, along with others outlining priorities in post-revolution Egypt--like education, scientific research, fighting corruption, reducing unemployment, maintaining international treaties and rebuilding relations with Arab, Islamic, and African countries--result in a document that reads very much like a short version of Egypt’s missing constitution.

In addition to these calls, one of the key demands presented in the document is the appeal for al-Azhar’s independence. As the oldest Islamic institution in the world (established 973 CE), the university represents one of the most respected sources of guidance and religious scholarship in the Muslim world.  As such, tapping into the institution’s credibility has long been a strategic component of authoritarian rule in Egypt. Muhammad ‘Ali (ruled 1805-1848), for example, nationalized 623,000 acres of waqf land and sought to sideline the influence and checks of ‘ulama, effectively laying the groundwork for future manipulation of Al-Azhar by the state.

Modern Egyptian leaders have also understood that controlling al-Azhar, and by extension Egypt’s vast network of imams and mosques, represented a means to secure political capital and counter Islamist opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.  The greatest infiltration of Al-Azhar occurred under the regime of Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser, who placed the entire institution and all waqf land under the purview of the Ministry of Endowments, added a number of secular colleges whose deans gained seats on the Al-Azhar High Council, and stipulated that the appointment of Sheikh Al-Azhar become the prerogative of the Egyptian President instead of an internal election process at Al-Azhar.  These changes were met with strong opposition and between the years 1959 to 1963, Nasser removed the most vocal opposition voices, reducing Al-Azhar’s faculty by nearly half.

In an attempt to break away from Nasser’s era, Sadat offered Al-Azhar’s ‘ulema a relatively more open space for expression, which some used to voice their opposition to a number of Sadat’s policies, including the infitah, “Jehan’s law” regarding personal status matters, and peace with Israel. Under Mubarak, the state’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood--particularly during election cycles--as well as its efforts to outdo Islamists by wrapping government policies in an Islamic cloak, illustrated the regime’s continued perception of threat from Islamist opposition. Through the co-option of Al-Azhar and the appointment of pro-government sheikhs--like Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi in 1996 and then-National Democratic Party member Ahmed El-Tayeb in 2010--the government tainted the neutrality and integrity of the Al-Azhar. Hossam Tamam, an expert on Islamist groups, explains that “After Mubarak held the helm of state, Al-Azhar kept losing its influence to radical groups, which sought to discredit the state-sanctioned religious establishment by arguing that it represented the regime’s interests rather than true Islam.”

Given this context, the release of the al-Azhar’s document drafting in Egypt’s post-revolutionary environment demonstrates the institution’s desire to break away from its previous role as a regime puppet, regain independence, and win popular support with an assertive statement made amidst the uncertainty of Egypt’s transitional period.  Several groups and coalitions of imams have formed to advocate for al-Azhar’s independence. In a March 13 rally that went largely unnoticed in the shadow of mass protests in Tahrir Square, over 1,000 imams marched from the Nour Mosque in Abbassiya toward the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) to protest the failure to fulfill promises addressing their demands. The imams called for investigation into corruption charges leveled at the Ministry of Endowments and  the reversal of Nasser's 1961 law that put the university’s budget under state control and gave the president the power to appoint the Grand Sheikh. The military police clashed with the protesters, assaulting them with fists and electric batons, according to eyewitnesses.  Imams have continued protesting in recent months, joining last Friday’s sit-in at Tahrir Square, where they also distributed fliers for a mass rally for al-Azhar’s independence on the symbolic national day of July 23, the date commemorating Egypt’s 1952 coup d’état.

A wide range of Egyptian intellectuals and figures have offered their support for the document.  Literary critic Salah Fadl said the document “confirms al-Azhar's respect for others’ values and ideals. The institution has been regarded as a symbol of enlightenment and moderate Islam throughout history...and the document will help it regain its former prominence.”  Deputy Prime Minister Yehia El Gamal commended it as “one of the most important charters issued to date,” and similar support was voiced by Rifaat Al-Saeid, head of the leftist Tagammu Party, and Christian business tycoon Naguib Sawiris, who heads the Free Egyptians Party.  Spokespersons of the Coptic Church, though skeptical of any religious intervention in politics, welcomed al-Azhar’s document as an illustration of wisdom, social justice, and respect and equality for all citizens.

Despite initial praise from some groups, advocacy organizations like Human Rights First, have expressed concern over the document’s “vagueness”, stressing that certain safeguards are needed to protect the envisioned civil state and prevent potential rights abuses.  The document’s stipulation identifying shari’a law as the basis for legislation, for example, highlights the statement’s inherent ambiguities and raises a number of questions about the drafters’ intentions. Can a state be considered civil and tolerant of all faiths if its laws are derived from the tenets of one particular religion? Secularist writer Salah Elissa argues that “if new laws need the consent of al-Azhar, then that immediately means we are in a religious, and not a civil, state.”  Ikram Lamie, Director of the Evangelical School of Theology in Egypt and spokesman of the Evangelical Church, reiterates a similar concern, stressing that religious figures should not interfere in political matters.  Abdel Mouti Bayoumi member of Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Center and a scholar who helped draft the document, reotrts that Egypt’s secular Supreme Constitutional Court would be responsible for approving new laws, and that al-Azhar would have only an advisory role.

Despite this assertion, the issue of what role religion may play in the politics of the new Egypt remains contentious, with divided opinions even within Egypt’s Muslim community. Al-Azhar has pledged support for a state that practices religious tolerance, while simultaneously reiterating its position that shari’a remain the primary source of legislation and Islam as Egypt’s official religion, under Article 2 of the 1971 constitution. Deputy Leader of the Brotherhood Rashad Bayoumi welcomed this commitment, commenting that the document “demonstrates accurately the meaning of a secular state in Islam.” And though he added that the Brotherhood does not seek a theocratic state, it remains unclear whether the group and the newly-legal Freedom and Justice Party will actually retain this commitment and ensure equal rights for minorities if elected to power.  In contrast to Bayoumi, Sheikh Gamal Qotb--former head of Al-Azhar's Fatwa Committee--criticized the document, arguing that it fails to focus on mechanisms for reform, calling it “window-dressing.” Others still (such as Mamdouh Ismail, founder of the Egyptian Renaissance Party) refused to comment “on anything issued by Al-Azhar as long as it remains headed by a [former National Democratic] party member,” in reference to al-Tayeb. Further reactions from the Salafists came from the Liberation Party, whose members presented on July 6 an “advisory memorandum” to al-Tayeb calling upon him to abolish the document they find to be contrary to Islam and God’s law.

The release and words of the Al-Azhar document show promise for the new Egypt, and special attention must be paid toward upcoming protests (like the one scheduled for July 23), statements, and conferences sponsored by Al-Azhar.  As noted by Nabil Abdel Fattah, political analyst for Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and one of the drafters of the Al-Azhar statement, “this document was established through calm dialogue and a true will to establish a document that would unite the people away from slogans and propaganda.”  This effort lends great significance to the Al-Azhar document, especially in the context of a transitional period that has seen the emergence of several competing voices and actors seeking to cause national and sectarian strife. According to Abdel Fattah, this document will be followed by several others in advance of a national conference titled “The Egyptian Nation” that Al-Azhar will hold to further discuss issues deemed critical to Egypt’s future.  Supporting a democratic state in the new Egypt will require the rule of law and truly independent institutions, among other things, and Al-Azhar could prove a case in point for other Egyptian institutions like the judiciary, syndicates, unions, and other universities who may follow to demand their own independence from government intervention. Fridays have become regular times of protests for Egyptians, and it will be essential to follow the demands from Egyptians week to week as we approach the historic parliamentary elections tentatively scheduled for September.

This piece was originally published at Carnegie's Sada Journal