By: Ahmed Morsy
Just one day before the end of the historic 2011, the Egyptian
authorities could not bring themselves to end the year without undertaking
actions that, yet again, have provoked domestic and international criticism. On
December 29, several democracy and human rights non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) were stormed by combined police and army forces, accompanied by
investigators from the General Prosecutor’s office. The raid targeted 17
offices of 10 NGOs on the grounds that they were illegally operating and
accepting international assistance without the required registration permits,
according to the Egyptian Middle East News Agency (MENA).
This is part of a broader investigation launched by the government earlier this
year into foreign funding and alleged violations of Egypt’s highly restrictive
law regulating NGOs, Law No. 84/2002. Of the 10 organizations targeted in
the raid, six have officially confirmed break-ins: The Arab Center for
Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal
Profession (ACIJLP); the Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory; the German Konrad Adenauer
–Stiftung (KAS),
and the American National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and Freedom House. These NGOs reported that their
offices were raided and sealed by military and police personnel, who
confiscated documents and computers.
In a collective response, over 31 groups led by the Cairo
Institute for Human Rights (CIHR) expressed their concern and outrage in
a statement condemning
the break-ins. They appealed to
the international community and accused the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) of spearheading a campaign since July to defame human rights activists
and organizations committed to democracy development. Another Cairo-based
group, The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI)
issued a statement describing
the security crackdown as an attempt to
intimidate and silence activists with an iron-fisted brazenness that even
Mubarak’s regime never dared to exercise.
Although the international community has for the most part
continued to express qualified support for the Egyptian military’s handling of
the transition, the December 30 crackdown exposed the generals’ true intentions
and mishandling of the transitional period. The United States through its
Departments of State and Defense expressed
deep concern over the attacks and called on the Egyptian government to end the
raids and return all confiscated property. Germany summoned the Egyptian Ambassador
and demanded an immediate investigation into the incident, while the European Union described
the police raids as “an open demonstration of force” and urged Egyptian
officials to support the work of civil society groups for the duration of the
transitional period.
Although the latest raids indicate a sharp escalation in the
government's crackdown on civil society, Egyptian NGOs have long faced
difficulties operating in a hostile environment governed by the restrictive NGO
law. The roots of the latest crackdown can be traced back to the aftershocks of
Mubarak’s resignation in February of last year, when the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) allocated $65 million under the new Egyptian Economic and
Transition Support programs
for grants available to any Egyptian, American and international organizations
working in Egypt. But the Egyptian government soon became concerned that
American support for civil society would lead to intervention in domestic
political affairs, and in July, Fayza Aboul Naga, Egypt’s Minister of
International Cooperation, publicly announced that
cases of illegal foreign funding to unregistered local and international
NGOs in Egypt would be investigated. The government of former Prime
Minister Essam Sharaf promptly formed fact-finding committee to launch a
probe into the charges. By October, the Ministry of Justice stepped
up its investigation by commissioning two judges to explore the allegations,
while the interim government increasingly portrayed foreign funding as one of
the primary causes of continued political unrest and protests.
By late November, preliminary findings of the commission’s
investigations were leaked to the press. The investigation, according
to Al-Shorouk newspaper,
involved questioning around 400 organizations that received foreign funding
over the past 6 years.
Although Fayza Aboul Naga had clearly intended for the
investigation to incriminate US-funded groups promoting democratization, the
commission's evidence supported a very different conclusion: Salafi Islamist
organizations were actually the biggest beneficiaries of international
assistance, much of it originating from the conservative Gulf monarchies. According to the report, Egyptian Salafis received at least $48.9 million in
funding from Gulf donors. The Egyptian Salafi organization Ansar
al-Sunna, which received almost $19 million from a single Kuwaiti Islamic
association, was the biggest recipient of foreign funding, not any of the
human rights groups or youth movements that had been so maligned and defamed by
the Egyptian government.
Since the December 29 raids, growing international criticism and
outright condemnations have significantly increased pressure on the ruling
generals. Field Marshal Tantawi assured Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta, in a phone conversation on December 31 - that the
government will cease its crackdown and return the confiscated material.
However, SCAF’s empty promises have not translated into action. In fact, the
issue has escalated into a full-blown media war as the SCAF scrambles to deny
responsibility for the raids. The Egyptian Defense Attaché to the United
States, General Mohamed al-Keshki, said that
the NGO investigation is under the jurisdiction of the judiciary and public
prosecutor, denying any
involvement by the SCAF. On January 1, the Ministers of International Cooperation
and Justice held a press conference in which they defended the measures
independently taken by the judiciary while insisting that the SCAF and interim
government were not interfering or influencing the investigation.
Meanwhile, NDI and IRI have
issued updated statements describing the attacks on their offices and
clarifying the nature of their activities to try to counter to the latest media
attacks.
Why is the Egyptian government pursuing this campaign against
civil society, and why now? An analysis of SCAF’s official statements sheds
light on the situation and exposes the severity of the harassment faced by
NGOs. Since July, the military council has been accusing opposition groups like
April 6 and Kefaya of advancing foreign agendas by illegally accepting foreign
funding. In the SCAF’s 69th communiqué, posted to its Facebook page on July 22, the military blamed
personal interests and foreign agendas for rising tensions between the military
forces and the people. This was further emphasized on December 20 in
statements 91 and 92,
which claimed that intelligence information pointed to a foreign-led plan to
destabilize Egypt through mass protests and sit-ins. The government’s
conspiracy theories have created a climate of fear and mistrust among the
people, and the recent pattern of events – violent clashes in December followed
by the latest raids – suggests that the SCAF is deliberately enflaming anxiety
and panic to assert control over the transition.
The SCAF’s latest actions serve the purpose of consolidating the
military’s power by sending several different messages to domestic as well as
international actors including:
- Reminding human rights groups, NGOs, and revolutionary forces that the SCAF is still in control.
- To the Egyptian public - countering critics of the military by claiming that the SCAF is protecting Egypt’s sovereignty and national interests by securing the country against the “foreign agendas and third party” represented by some NGOs and outside forces.
- A message reminding the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist forces that the SCAF is still in charge of the transition, even though Islamist candidates won a clear parliamentary majority.
- To the West and the U.S. in particular—we have the power. Much of the old system survived the fall of Mubarak; the military is still your best option when compared to rising Islamists, the only clear alternative. We just want you to keep writing us a $1.3 billion check each year that we decide how to spend without interference.
By continuing its own propaganda campaign while allowing
contradictory reports from different officials and ministries, the SCAF is
trying to deflect blame for the crackdown by portraying the government as a
decentralized network of independent institutions that operate beyond the
SCAF’s oversight.
The Egyptian government’s increasingly defensive and
often contradictory messages to US officials are evidence of unprecedented
tension in the bilateral relationship since the fall of Mubarak. Many Egyptian
NGOs rely heavily on foreign funding. Yet the Egyptian government has used the
international aid issue as a bargaining chip when dealing with Washington, and
has deliberately obstructed American organizations from opening branch offices
in Cairo. Both IRI and NDI applied for registration with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in
2005 and have yet to receive official permits. However, both organizations
maintain offices and staff in Egypt. According to the Wikileaks cables,
an MFA official in 2006 said that resolving the pending registration could best
be resolved by high level talks between the two governments. Over the next few
years, Mubarak’s regime used this bargaining chip to try to fend off the
democratizing agenda of the Bush administration.
Today, Egypt's military leaders – who are starting to behave a
lot like Mubarak – appear to be acting out against the prospect of new
conditions linking Egypt's 1.3 billion dollar military aid package to progress
on democratization. The U.S. Congress approved a new spending bill on December 16 that
imposes tough conditions on military aid to Egypt for 2012. The new
restrictions require the State Department to certify that Egypt’s government is
supporting the transition to civilian leadership and respecting “freedom of
expression, association, and religion, and due process of law.” Will the
military leadership risk $1.3 billion in aid by refusing to cease its
crackdown? The answer will become increasingly clear in the coming days.
With the 1-year anniversary of the January 25 uprising fast
approaching and a new Parliament scheduled to convene at the end of the month,
the SCAF is facing many challenges and growing pressure to fulfill the
revolution’s democratic demands. Between transferring power to civilians and
overseeing the drafting of a new constitution, the SCAF has its hands full and
the last thing Egypt's military leaders should be looking for is trouble with
Washington.
Let us not forget that the ultimate irony here: The party guilty
of receiving the most foreign funding is the Egyptian military, not NGOs, and
generals in glass houses should not throw stones.
Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian researcher and Ph.D.
candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St.
Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.