By: Ahmed Morsy
In retrospect, it’s
almost a miracle that last week’s elections went forward as planned with
massive turnout and relatively few irregularities, despite predictions of
violence and calls for postponing
elections after
a week of lethal clashes in downtown Cairo and other parts of the country. While Egyptians are relieved
that elections were conducted relatively fairly and peacefully, the sweeping
victory of Islamists – whose candidates won a 61 percent majority in the first
round – raises new concerns about the policies and ideological positions that
will emerge from the next elected parliament.
Egyptians in 9
governorates went out en masse on
November 28, not to protest, but rather to cast their
votes in the first round of elections since ousting Hosni Mubarak in February.
Although the first stage of voting went relatively smoothly, it’s important to
recall the broader context of unrest and insecurity in which the electoral
process is unfolding. The last 10 days before voting witnessed extreme violence. The
army and police used excessive force (tear gas, rubber bullets and live rounds)
against civilians protesting in Cairo’s Tahrir square and other governorates
against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and a set of draft
constitutional principles that would preserve and possibly enhance the
military’s political and economic privileges in the future political system.
The ensuing clashes between protesters and security forces resulted in over 40
deaths and more than 2,000 injured, according to the
Ministry of Health. As a concession, the
SCAF convened a series of emergency meetings with party leaders and
presidential candidates and issued the long awaited anti-graft
law, accepted the government’s
resignation and
announced a new
timetable for
a transfer of power to civilians by the end of June 2012. In addition, the SCAF
urged all Egyptians to stand united, confirmed that elections would take place
on time and extended the voting period by an extra
day to
encourage turnout and "avoid
overcrowding and security issues."
The two-day polling
process on November 28-29 went peacefully
with minimal violence, although the process was
marred by several irregularities and procedural violations, such as polling
stations opening late, insufficient ballot papers and boxes, judges arriving
late and party representatives campaigning inside polling centers in violation
of a ban on campaigning 48 hours prior to the start of voting. These violations
were widely documented by voters and
NGOs observing
the elections, although the High Electoral Commission has tried to downplay the
impact of irregularities on the voting process, which saw a record turnout of 52
percent of
the eligible voters.
The stunning success of
Islamists – the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) received
36.6 percent of
the vote while the Salafi al-Nour Party won 24.4 percent -- has raised
anxieties among Egyptians, mainly the educated middle-class and Coptic
Christian community. Results from the first round indicate that the FJP and
Nour Party could hold up to 70 percent of the seats in the next parliament,
although the final proportion will not be determined until after the third
round of voting in January. For liberal parties, which won a disappointing 12.7
percent of the vote under the banner of the Egyptian Bloc coalition, the
Islamist landslide is a slap in the face and a jolting wake-up call.
Many analysts expected a
win for the FJP even though its Brotherhood-led coalition, the Democratic
Alliance, had been troubled by internal disputes and defections in the weeks
leading up to the election. While the FJP’s strong showing was widely
predicted, the Salafis’ success was a bit of a surprise and shows how deeply
rooted the conservative Islamist movement has become in Egyptian society,
especially among the less educated lower classes in Cairo and the Delta. The
prospect of an Islamist-dominated parliament raises a number of questions:
First is regarding the
sincerity of the Islamist parties to abiding by democratic principles. The FJP
has said that
its priorities are ending corruption, reviving the economy and establishing a
true democracy in Egypt. Mohamed Badie, the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, said
the party will work to build an inclusive government and prefers a
semi-presidential system based on the French model. Badie also denied making
any deals with SCAF. Such statements imply that the FJP will be looking to
create a wider coalition in the Parliament and will try to distance itself from
the hardline Nour Party. On the other hand, the Salafis have been advocating
for stricter moral codes and restrictions on personal freedoms reminiscent of
policies backed by Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi establishment. They are among the
newcomers to the game in Egyptian politics, and it is unclear exactly how they
will play. Having once shunned democracy as inappropriately elevating man-made
laws and institutions over Shari’a, Salafis are now choosing to participate in
the formal political arena, and their parliamentarians could seek to enshrine
conservative Islamist principles in new legislation.
Second, is the SCAF
genuinely committed to transferring power to the parliament and a civilian
president by end of June 2012? So far the ruling military council has been torn
between the desire to preserve its political and economic privileges for as
long as possible and the challenge of supervising a successful transition to
democracy within a limited time frame.Under Article 56 of the Constitutional
Declaration, the SCAF will hold the authority of the President and Parliament until
elections are held. But on December 7, the SCAF issued
a degree delegating presidential authority to newly appointed
Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri, while still retaining power over the armed
forces and judiciary. Whether this decision signifies an actual loosening of
the SCAF's grip on power remains to be seen, and there are signs that the
military is already maneuvering to curb the authority of the next parliament.
in his most recent video
interview, SCAF member Major General Mamdouh Shahin stated
that the party winning the majority in the Parliament will not have the power
to form the government. The statement was
perceived as a power-grab by the Islamists, particularly the FJP, whose
parliamentarians will likely demand the right to form a coalition government.
Even before election results revealed an Islamist majority, the FJP’s head,
Mohamed Morsi, stated
on November 29 that
the new parliament should be empowered to form a government representative of
the political forces in the People’s Assembly, rather than a technocratic
cabinet appointed by the prime minister. However, the generals’ appointment of
Dr. Kamal al-Ganzouri as new Prime Minister confirms the speculation that the
SCAF’s preferred scenario is for a technocratic government to hold power at
least until the presidential election next summer. In addition, the
inevitability of Islamist majority in parliament may make the SCAF even more
reluctant to relinquish power, despite assurances that the military will
respect the people’s choice.
Egypt is only in the
early stages of a long transition that will fundamentally reshape the country’s
political landscape. With Islamists rising to the forefront of the political
scene, it is unclear to what extent they are prepared to
govern and
initiate the institutional reforms and economic policies that are badly needed
to stabilize the economic situation and create a transparent and accountable
government. Furthermore, it is unclear how Islamists will respond if the SCAF
continues to resists calls for a transfer of power to civilian leadership by the
end of June. While many questions remain unanswered, election results have
clearly set the stage for a potential power struggle between the SCAF and
Islamists. But the electoral process is just beginning (with four more rounds
of voting to go before results for the People’s Assembly are finalized in
January), and it is still too early to draw conclusions. We should allow
Islamists in Egypt as well as Tunisia, and Morocco some time to prove
trustworthy of the votes that have given them a political mandate.
Ahmed
Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St.
Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.
