By: Ahmed Morsy
Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.
Egypt
is preparing for its first real multi-party parliamentary elections without the
grip of Hosni Mubarak and his abolished National Democratic Party (NDP), ousted
over nine months ago. The electoral law finally announced on October 8 has
made the Egyptian electoral system one of a kind: with 2/3 of parliament to be
elected via proportional party lists and 1/3 through first-past-the-vote system,
while retaining the quota of 50 percent for workers and farmers. Further
complicating the process is the arrangement of huge electoral districts that
make it difficult for candidates or parties to feasibly reach voters with their
campaigns. Parliamentary elections will
start with the People’s Assembly (Lower House) on November 28. This will
be the first stage of a three-round system to elect 498 members to parliament
in a process set to end in January 2012. A similar process will be used
for the Shura Council (Upper House) elections to choose 180
members during a period from January to March 2012. In light of the
complexity of the new electoral system, international and domestic monitors
will have a particularly important role to play in scrutinizing the multi-stage
polling process and reporting any irregularities that may arise. However, new
regulations on election monitoring have troubling implications for the ability
of monitors to effectively supervise the voting process.
Initially, the ruling
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had refused to allow international
monitoring (Morakaba in Arabic) of the parliamentary elections
saying that “we reject anything that affects our sovereignty,” a statement that
was very disappointing to pro-democracy
groups. But perhaps taking into account backlash from
Egyptian civil society and the international community, the SCAF backed down
from its position and announced that local and foreign non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) would be allowed to “follow” the elections.
On October 17, the High
Electoral Commission (HEC) issued a decree to
regulate the process; clearly indicating that only registered local
as well as international NGOs would be able to watch the elections. The
question of election monitoring in Egypt has been long debated,
and the Egyptian authorities have always taken a strong stand against
international observation, seeing it as an infringement on sovereignty. Despite
some initial positive steps taken by the HEC toward the NGOs like extending the registration period
and issuing accreditations for free, human rights activists are still skeptical that the HEC will
allow monitors full access to all stages of the polling process, including the
all-important counting facilities where elections results will be tabulated.
Albeit welcoming the decision to allow election “followers,” civil society
groups and NGOs fear that the HEC won’t accredit their
teams on time for the elections and that a “follower” (Motabe’ in
Arabic) will not be endowed with any meaningful authority. As for the foreign
groups, in addition to being registered, they have to get pre-approval from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) before they are able to even apply for
permits. So far, the Carter Center is the only foreign entity that will
be allowed to
follow the elections after being invited by SCAF.
Confusion over the vague
terminology of election “followers” and uncertainty over whether or not they
will be allowed to supervise all aspects of the electoral process is adding to
concerns over Egypt’s highly complex and evolving electoral system. This
chaotic system underwent several significant changes before it was finally
announced – after repeated delays – by the SCAF in October.
An earlier draft of the
electoral law released by the military council on May 30 drew criticism from most political
parties and revolutionary forces. Parties and analysts were stunned by the SCAF’s
lack of transparency and shocked that the law had been drafted without any
consultation with political groups and civil society. The care-taker government
and SCAF came back in July after meeting with political parties to approve new amendments to
the original draft, but many remain concerned about the confusing structure of
the electoral system and its uncertain implications for the composition of the
next parliament.
The parliament to be
elected holds an extreme importance to most Egyptians and indeed the political
parties, as the first elected assembly of the post-Mubarak era and the one that
will be responsible for drafting the new constitution through selection of a
100-member constituent assembly. According to Article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration released
following Mubarak’s stepping down on
February 11, the SCAF holds authority of the President and Parliament until
elections are held. Given the importance of the upcoming elections, the
latest changes to the electoral law – which reflect the chaotic political
environment and lack of clear guidelines or framework for a transition – are
particularly troubling.
Most of the parties,
especially those formed after the fall of Mubarak, have no or limited
experience and insufficient time to build national constituencies. This
explains the amount of complaining and whining about
each step in the process. They have been focusing more on issues not of high
importance for Egyptians. According to polls conducted, security and economy
come on top of everything else Egyptians look for now. On the other hand, the
SCAF is clinging to power using the rights given to it by the Constitutional
Declaration, which led to a lot of criticism. The military junta was
accused of not being serious about reforms and the public began to question
their motive for not identifying a clear timeline for transitioning power to
civilians; and many began to suspect that the generals wanted a weak parliament
that won’t challenge their powers during the transitional period. This was
apparent on several fronts, such as the court decision to allow Egyptians abroad to vote;
the controversy over
the supra-constitutional proposal presented by Dr. Ali al-Selmi, Deputy Prime
Minister for Political Affairs; and a momentous court ruling on November
11 banning former
NDP members from running in the parliamentary elections.
The fact that all of the
previous examples have occurred just weeks before the start of elections is
probably not a coincidence and suggests that the SCAF and the interim
government not only lacks a vision for Egypt’s transitional period but is
also determined to keep the post-Mubarak political order as opaque as it was
under the former regime.
Ahmed Morsy is an Egyptian Researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. This piece was originally published on the Atlantic Council's Egypt Source Blog.